证券投资基金的经济学与法学分析

【作者】 叶俊英；

【导师】 刘诗白；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 国民经济学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 基金已经成为证券市场中最重要的机构投资者之一,对证券市场的发展发挥着越来越重要的作用。2000 年中国基金黑幕、2003 年美国基金丑闻以及香港基金黑幕等事件,使理论界和实践界都对基金进行深入反思。现有对基金治理的研究绝大多数着眼于基金治理结构、具体的治理机制等方面。基金治理固然是基金业发展的一个非常关键的问题,但在研究基金的治理之前,应先弄清楚基金究竟是什么,基金为什么存在,其所有权配置应如何安排等本源性问题。为此,应首先对基金的经济法律性质进行深入研究,方能对基金治理有一个深刻的理解。本文从理论上系统地分析了基金产生的根源以及基金的经济法律性质,探讨了基金治理安排的理论基础。鉴于很多文章将基金治理与基金管理公司治理混为一谈,本文对基金治理与基金管理公司治理进行了区分,专题研究了基金管理公司的治理。总体上看,本文对基金的性质、基金治理安排的理论基础、基金治理机制以及基金管理公司治理进行了一些创造性的思考。本文共有六章,结构安排与主要内容如下:导论,阐述了本文选题的缘由、研究对象与研究方法,阐述了本文的研究思路,概括了各章的主要内容和基本观点。第 1 章.契约经济学分析框架。本文主要以契约经济学作为理论基础,对基金进行经济分析。目前契约理论还没有一个完整的体系,契约理论主要是体现在企业理论中,本章通过评述企业理论,提炼出契约经济学的分析框架。主流的企业理论——企业的契约理论可概括为:(1)企业的契约性;(2)契约的不完全性;(3)契约不完全性导致的企业所有权配置的重要性。现代契约经济学主要的研究逻辑是:契约的不完全性(世界的不确定性、人的有限理性和交易成本的存在);契约的不完全导致了契约权利配置的重要性(剩余索取权和剩余控制权的分配问题);契约的优化问题(即最优契约问题)。企业理 2论中的交易费用理论实质上是现代契约经济学的契约不完全性的一个具体例证;产权理论是契约权利配置理论的一部分;企业理论中委托代理理论也就是契约的优化问题。契约不完全性的原因主要有环境的不确定性、复杂性,人的有限理性,信息的不完全和不对称分布,机会主义倾向以及交易成本的存在。基金契约的不完全性决定了基金契约权利配置的重要性,契约的核心问题是契约权利的配置问题,而剩余索取权和剩余控制权如何在非人力资本和人力资本中配置取决于双方博弈的结果,这种权利配置不是固定不变的,而是一个动态演进过程,契约权利配置最终决定于要素所有者的谈判力。 第 2 章.基金的经济分析。本章对基金进行了经济学意义上的分析,指出基金在本质上是不特定的非人力资本的集合与法人化的人力资本团队之间的一组特殊契约。基金契约的经济性质应该从三个层次上去把握:一是金融契约,二是关系契约,三是非人力资本与法人化的人力资本团队之间的特别契约。在基金管理公司中,人力资本居于重要地位,非人力资本并不能真正起到承担风险、向基金持有人提供担保的作用。从理论上讲,基金持有人可以同时也是基金管理公司的股东。基金之所以存在,是投资者追求低信息成本的结果,是证券投资中缓解信息直接定价困境的产物。剩余索取权和控制权尽可能对应,这是企业所有权配置的一个基本原则,但是,在基金契约中,却不遵循这样的原则。基金所有权配置的基本特征是剩余索取权与剩余控制权相分离,而这种分离的根源在于基金持有人极度分散,申购赎回机制则起到了润滑剂的作用。另外,基金持有人与基金管理人之间是一种典型的委托代理关系,基金持有人是委托人,基金管理人是代理人,投资的风险和收益由基金持有人承担和享有。第 3 章.基金契约的法律分析。本章对基金契约进行了法律分析。基金契约的法律性质就是信托,基金作为信托的一种,属于营业信托。公司型基金适用与契约型基金不同的法律,但并没有改变基金契约的信托性质。基金属于信托,但又是一种特殊的信托方式,其特殊性体现在委托人人数众多,信托资产规模大,委托人与受托人的地位较一般信托更加不对等,信息在委托人与受托人之间更加不对称。因此, 3除一般的信托法外,还要有专门的法律对这一特殊的信托形式加以规范,以进一步保护基金持有人的利益,防止基金受托人的权利滥用和道德风险。基金管理人与基金托管人之间的关系是特殊的受托人关系,基金管理人是管理受托人,托管人则是保管受托人。基金招募说明书的法律性质是要约邀请。基金合同是典型的标准格式合同,即合同内容已由一方拟好、双方无需经过谈判即可签订的合同。从基金作为集合投资方式的特征看,由监管部门制定强制性的标准格式——基金合同、托管协议、招募说明书等法律文件,有利于投资者利益的保护。基金合同与托管协议,在法律上是主合同与从合同的关系,后者以前者为依据,以前者生效为生效条件,前者的解除亦意味着后者的解除。 第 4 章.基金治理Ⅰ:缘由与模式。本章在对基金契约进行经济法律分析的基础上,深入研究了基金治理的有关问题,着重探讨了基金治理的模式选择。基金治理产生的根源在于基金的委托代理问题、基金契约的不完全性、信息的不对称分布以及?更多还原

【Abstract】 As one of the major institutional investors, the mutual fundindustry has been playing an increasingly important role in thedevelopment of global securities markets. However, the occurrence offraudulent practices in the mutual fund industry, including thosewitnessed by China in 2000, USA and Hong Kong in 2003, has led toreflections and research efforts on this industry both by academiciansand practitioners. So far, most of the research on mutual fund tends tofocus on the structure and mechanism of mutual fund governance. Newefforts are needed to be made in probing such questions as thefundamental economic and legal characteristics of mutual fund, why itthrives, how property rights are allocated among stakeholders. It isalmost impossible to have a profound understanding of the mutual fundindustry if these questions are not properly addressed. This paperprovides in theory a systematic analysis of the origin and economic andlegal characteristics of the mutual fund industry, as well as theoreticalunderpinning for fund governance. In view of the common confusionbetween mutual fund governance and governance of the fundmanagement company found in many research papers, the authorpresents a conceptual analysis of these two types of governance, beforededicating a whole chapter on the discussion of fund managementcompany governance. In a nutshell, this paper presents the author’screative thoughts on four key issues: the fundamental characteristics of amutual fund, theoretical underpinning for mutual fund governance,governance mechanism, and the governance of fund managementcompanies. This paper is composed of six chapters. In the Introduction, the author outlines reasons for topic selection,scope of and approach to research, major findings and key themes of eachchapter. Chapter Ⅰ. An analytical framework of contract economics. Theauthor presents an economic analysis of mutual fund within theframework of contract economics. Since contract theory is best reflectedin the analysis of enterprise theory, the author builds his analyticalframework of contact theory through his review and analysis of theenterprise theory. Mainstream enterprise theory-the contract theory ofenterprise, can be summarized as the following: A. the contractual natureof an enterprise. B. imperfect contracts (uncertainty of the world, limitedrationality of people, existence of transaction costs). C. the importanceof allocation of property rights of an enterprise as a result of an imperfectcontract (the allocation of residual claims and residual control,optimization of contracts). Enterprise theory is made up of threebranches: transaction cost theory, property rights theory andprincipal-agent theory. The existence of transaction costs is an illustrationof contractual imperfectness in the enterprise theory, while property rightstheory is part of the contractual rights allocation theory. Theprincipal-agent problem involves contractual optimization. Contractualimperfectness stems from uncertainty and complexities of theenvironment, limited rationality of people, imperfect and asymmetricaldistribution of information, opportunistic trends and the existence oftransaction costs. The imperfect nature of mutual fund contracts makesthe allocation of contractual rights a critical issue. How the residualclaims and control are allocated between human capital and non-humancapital depends on the result of their gaming. The allocation process isnot constant, but rather dynamic. Chapter Ⅱ. An economic analysis of mutual fund. In essence, mutualfund is a special contract between various non-specific, non-humancapital factors and a human capital team organized as a body corporate.The economic characteristics of mutual fund can be viewed in threedifferent facets: First, it is a financial contract; Second, it is a relationshipcontract; Third, it is a special contract between non-specific non-humancapital and a human capital team as a body corporate. Human capital ismost important in a fund management company, and in fact non-humancapital can not assume risks nor can th更多还原