【作者】 袁江天；

【导师】 张维；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 金融工程与金融管理， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 创造性地运用企业理论关于“企业是一系列合同的纽结”的观点来重新审视改革开放25年来的国有企业改革历程，提出生产要素市场化是国有企业改革取得成功的必要条件，而在众多生产要素的市场化过程中，企业家才能的市场化成为当前中国国企改革的“短板”。企业家才能市场化的载体是有序运转的经理人市场，经理人市场所内含的隐性激励与约束机制是对以业绩报酬为基础的显性激励与约束机制的重要补充。运用委托代理模型，给出了经理人市场隐性激励机制对节约企业激励成本的定量分析结论。在综述国内外关于经理人市场隐性激励的研究文献的基础上，全面厘清了经理人市场所内含的隐性激励机制。并运用其所提供的模型框架对中国国有企业经理人的选择机制及其弊端作了分析。在国企经理行政性任命制度下，提出了国企经理的多任务假说，即经营性任务、政治性任务和满足上级偏好等三项工作任务，在此基础上构造了国企经理的总效用函数，推演出了国企经理效用最大化的两个条件并作了结论分析。运用多任务委托代理模型分析国企经理的激励问题后得出，若多工作任务努力的激励成本之间相互独立，那么激励相容条件下的各工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的，且最优业绩报酬是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数；而如果多工作任务激励成本是相互依存的，那么在激励相容条件下，政治性活动和满足上级偏好的最优激励合同为“门槛型激励合同”，即只有当国企经理所创造的业绩超过一定的“门槛值”时，对其的激励才是正向的，否则将是负向的。并且定量地给出了国企经理的“门槛型激励条件”，并通过激励条件分析得出建设国企经理人市场，实现国企经理市场化选择的结论。最后通过一个简化的经理人流动模型对中国经理人市场的建设提出了若干政策建议，并在分析当前MBO、ESO等国企改革新问题的基础上，提出了国企及其配套改革措施在改革次序上应遵循其内在逻辑次序的观点。更多还原

【Abstract】 After scrutinizing the reform history of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with firm theory that a firm is generally the nexus of a series of contracts, this study shows that the liberalization of production factors is the key to the further reform of the SOEs, and that managerial labor liberalization is the weakest point among all the production factors.An orderly managerial labor market is the carrier for the liberalization of managerial labor, whilst the implicit incentive from the managerial labor market is an important supplement to the explicit incentives which are based on the agent’s performance. By using the principal-agent model, this study draws a quantitative analytical conclusion of incentive cost saving through the implicit incentive system of the managerial labor market. After a literature review of the implicit incentive study, this study first clarifies the implicit incentive system, and then analyzes the SOEs’ manager selective procedure and its disadvantages based on the mathematic model provided. Under the superior-appointment select procedure, we present the SOE managers’ multitask hypothesis, it includes: 1) operation task, 2) political task, and 3) the superior’s preference. Then develop a total utility model for the SOE manager and get two maximal utility conditions.Using the multi-task principal-agent model, this study analyzes the SOE manager’s incentive issues in two aspects, the tasks are inter-independent or inter-dependent. And then comes to the conclusions that, while the tasks are inter-dependent, the incentive contract with a SOE manager is not only multi-tasked, but also threshed. That is, the incentive for a SOE manager is positive only that the SOE manager’s political performance and preference performance satisfy the threshed incentive conditions simultaneously; otherwise, it is negative. The threshed incentive conditions are thereby presented in this article. Under the incentive contract above, the SOE likely turn into a political bureaucracy, so market selection <WP=6>of SOEs’ managers, or managerial labor liberalization, is naturally the conclusion for the SOEs’ reform.Through a simplified model of managerial labor liberalization, this article put forward some recommendations for the construction of the Chinese managerial labor market. Moreover, based on the analysis of the present new issues of MBO and ESO, this article emphasizes that the reform of the SOEs should be implemented in its inherent logic order.更多还原