论银行在公司治理结构中的作用

【作者】 周睿；

【导师】 陈琦伟；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 世界经济， 2000， 博士

【摘要】 自1932年贝利-米恩斯在其创造性的实证研究中提出“所有权和控制权分离”的命题以来，对由此而产生的股份公司中所有者和经营者利益的不一致所出现的委托一代理矛盾成为经济学者研究的重心，也成为80年代中期以来掀起热潮的公司治理结构研究的核心问题。建立怎样的公司治理结构，成为各国特别是转轨经济国家关注的热点。从目前各国公司治理结构模式看，主要有以德、日为代表的银行基础型和以美、英为代表的市场基础型，这两种模式运行所显示出的绩效表明，两者都既有优势，但又都有缺陷。而80年代末日本出现的泡沫经济和持续至今的经济萧条以及德国统一后出现的两位数的失业率和经济低速增长，使不少人怀疑这是否与其银行基础型的公司治理结构模式有关?十几年来的改革使我国企业的激励机制有了根本性改进，但是随着改革的不断深入，“内部人控制”现象也愈益严重，使得我国公司治理结构表现为政府干预下的内部人控制(吴敬琏，1995) 。建立怎样的公司治理结构，来控制“内部人控制”， 已被看作是“保护国有资产，实现改革目的的重大现实问题”(陈清泰，1995) 。为此，研究“银行在公司治理结构中的作用”目的有二：一是从一般意义上探讨银行在公司治理结构中的作用机制；二是为我国公司治理结构模式的选择提供可供借鉴的经验。全文共分五个部分：第一章：引言部分，主要说明本文的研究缘起及目的；研究思路及主要内容；主要结论与创新；分析方法及一些概念的界定。第二章，主要从公司治理结构的源起、涵义、理论基础、机制、公司融资与公司治理等五个方面对公司治理结构进行了概述性分析，为本文主题提供一个分析背景。第三章，从理论上对银行控制机制进行了分析，主要从马克思主义者的金融资本理论、金融中介理论、金融约束理论、金融机构控制论、银行控制的权力基础等方面论证了银行有较强的控制功能，为分析银行在公司治理结构中的作用提供有力的理论基础。第四章，银行在公司治理结构中作用的比较分析：主要采用比较制度分析方法，从公司治理结构的制度基础、作用机制、绩效及评价等方面比较了德国、日本、美国银行在公司治理结构中作用的不同特点。由于各国制度基础不同，法律环境不同，使得银行在各国公司治理结构中的作用也有所不同。各种公司治理结构模式，都有其内在运行的逻辑，可以说各国公司治理结构的模式具有典型的“路径依赖”特性。第五章，从我国企业改革历程和银企关系的变迁分析了银行在我国公司治理结构发挥作用的可能，但产权不明晰和地方政府的过多干预，使我国银行不能很好发挥监控功能，为此提出了一些相关性政策建议。 本文的主要结论是：从银行控制角度分析了银行与企业的关系，对银行监－ 控能力从理论和实证两方面进行了全面、深入的分析，进而认为银行对企业有 较强的监控能力，这一权力基础来自于债权或股权，即银行作为债权人或大股 东，这种监控能力为其在公司治理结构中发挥作用奠定了基础。由于信息不对 称，银行的债权控制具有不完全性，这就要求银行债权控制须与企业破产机制 相结合，也对中央银行加强监管提出了要求。由于各国制度基础不同、法律环 境不同，各国银行在公司治理结构中的作用特点也不同，德国银行主要是以股 权基础在公司治理结构中发挥作用，并同其它大股东（主要是工商企业）及职 工在德国公司治理结构中发挥着同样重要作用；日本银行主要是以债权基础在＿ 公司治理结构中发挥作用，主银行制的失灵原因主要在于制度性因素和主银行＿ 债权控制的内在缺陷；美国银行在公司治理结构中具有“超然”地位，显示出－ 一 一种相机性治理。各国公司治理结构模式都有其内在逻辑体系，这就要求各国 在进行治理结构变革时要充分考虑内在逻辑的延续（或关联）。作为转轨经济国 家的我国，建立银行为主导的监控机制似乎是“路径依赖”的必然，但产权不 明晰和政府的过多干预，使我国银企之间显示出债权软约束特征，阻碍了银行 监控功能的发挥，所以当务之急是深化产权改革，建立公平竟争环境，为我国 银行发挥监控功能创造条件。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the year of l932 the proposition ’t Separation of ownrship and control"was preseoted by A. Berle and G. Means in his initiated practical research, it has keptbeing one of the most importam aspects fOr the research of the colltradcton ofprincipal-agent of the interest of ownr and manager in corporation caused by theproposition. It also becomes the core problem in the research of corporate govemanceWhich reached the high tide since the middle of 80’ s. In order tO satisfy theshareholders and interest grouPs in corporation management, Various cotheiesespecially transitional economies make great effOrtS tO seeking a proper fOrm ofcorporate govemance.At present, corporatC govemance in differeflt cotheies manifests mainly in twOstyles, bank-oriented in JaPan and Germany being the model and markct-oriethed inthe United States and England being the typical case. However, it is hard tO give adeterminative evalwtion tO say whch is bther. The fac that bubble economy sincethe end of 80’s and the lasting economic dePression in JaPan and tWo digits ratC ofunemPloyment and low economic grow after the union of Germany gives a rathergood nUmer of scholars strong hints: do they have relationship in some degree withtheir bankng-oriented corporate govemance?After more than ten years development, corporations in China undergo a series ofrefOrms, al1 these reform measures fundamentally imProve the incentive system ofcorporations in our coUntry but as refOrm gOes deePer, the Phenomena of "InsiderCondol" becomes more serious. So the corporatC governance in China behaves asthe "Insider Condol" Under the governance illtCrvelltion. It becomes the focus ofour govemance work and theory research hoW to establish a proper corporategovemance to cofltTol the "Insider Cofltrol" so as to promote our coUntr’scorporation refOrm and tO sPeed uP the eStablishmeni of modern corporation syStem.From two asPects I stlldy the role of conunercial bank in corporate governance inthe thesis. In one hand I discuss the mechansm of bank in corporate govemance, inthe other hand I try to present a method using fOr a reference to help the choice ofstyles of efficient corporate govemance in our coUntry. It consists of five parts.As an introduction in chaPter one, the research excitation and its purpose isstated, research method, research expeCtations and some terminology also present.From five aspects including the origin, the meaning, frame of reference, themechanism and corporation financing of corporate govemance the principle analysisis performed. It conStrUcts the analytical background of the thesis in chaPter tWo.After that, in chaPter three theoretical analysis of the function of bank control isdone. Basing Marxism financial caPita theory financial intermediary theory financialrestrain, financial Institution control theory, the basis of bank control, I demonstrate that bank has strong control function. This presents the theoretical evidences for my work.Applying the analysis method of comparative institutions in chapter four the different roles of banking in corporate governance in Germany, Japan and the America are compared referred to the system foundation, the mechanism, the performances and the evaluation of corporate governance. In the last chapter, the possible role that banking plays in corporate governance in our country is discussed through the analysis of the courses of enterprise reforms in China and of the variances of relationships between banking and enterprise. And I present some relative policy suggestionsIn the point of view of bank control the relationships between banking and enterprises are analyzed, the complete analysis both in theory and in practice are carried about the capacity of banking control. Banking has strong control on corporation by credit and shareholder equity. Because of asymmetric information, bank’ s credit control intends to become weak. This needs the co-operation of bank’ s credit control and mechan更多还原