【作者】 王果；

【导师】 冯俭；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 企业管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 中国证券市场经历20多年的发展后,上市公司数量不断增加,其总市值也在以超乎常规的速度递增。但在快速发展的过程中,证券市场中层出不穷的违规事件,不仅使得投资者遭受极大的损失,而且严重妨碍了证券市场资源配置功能的发挥,同时也不断敲击着监管部门脆弱的神经,使得公司违规成为各方关注的焦点。面对这一重要问题,学者们从不同角度,采用不同的数据及研究方法研究公司违规行为,希望能找出影响公司违规的最根本原因。作为市场重要参与者的市场监管方,一方面力图通过相关法律法规来约束上市公司违规行为,另一方面通过呼吁各方(包括媒体、投资者)加强对上市公司行为的监督,对出现有违规行为的公司予以坚决处罚,希望以此通过严厉的处罚措施增加上市公司违规成本,以此达到降低上市公司违规的目的。虽然监管方为彻底制止公司违规绞尽脑汁,但中国证券市场中上市公司违规却并未得到有效的遏制,甚至在相当长的一段时间内,上市公司违规比例呈现出逐年增加的态势,以至于到2001年的时候,公司违规比例竟高达10%左右。即使在这以后,公司违规比例出现一定程度的下降,但与欧美发达国家相比,中国上市公司每年出现违规的比例仍然较高；同时,中国上市公司中股东违规从无到有,且其违规比例呈现出逐年增加的新趋势。面对这样的现实状况,我们不仅要思索,到底是市场监管不力,还是公司治理不完善,抑或是其他原因所导致。本文以沪深两市A股市场1992-2011共计20年全样本数据,依据相关研究的理论分析,重点采用2003-2009年的面板数据进行实证研究。首先,从终极控制人角度出发,研究终极所有权、分离度对公司违规行为的影响,重点分析终极所有权、分离度在终极控制权-终极所有权发生分离与否条件下,分别对经营层违规、股东违规的影响,不仅实现了对第一类和第二类委托代理理论进行实证检验的目的,且结论为相关政策的制定提供了极其重要的参考依据。其次,以董事会为核心的公司治理机制作为缓解委托代理问题重要的工具,以往的研究大多集中于研究其变量对公司违规的影响,从既有的研究来看,对公司治理机制与违规的研究缺乏深入研究,本文不仅研究以董事会为核心的公司治理机制对公司违规行为的影响,同时在多个模型中间接实现对其稳健性的检验,使最终得到的公司治理机制与公司违规关系的结论才更能经得起考验。再次,制度环境作为公司经营所在地环境变量,在一定条件下能对公司起到治理的作用,从既往的相关研究文献来看,研究制度环境对公司违规的影响缺乏深入剖析,鲜有同一文献研究多种外部环境变量对公司违规的影响；本文选取的制度环境变量不仅包括有经营所在地现代的经济发展水平,同时包括有市场化进程总指数、市场法律制度环境、政府干预程度。以此研究制度环境对公司违规的影响,有助于达到对制度环境治理作用的全面而且深入的研究。为此从问题的提出→研究背景及其回顾→理论分析及研究假设→计量结果及其分析→研究结论,几个层面逐步展开相关研究。第1部分“引言”明确提出了本文所研究的问题,并对所研究问题进行了陈述,详细说明了本文的研究方法及结构。第2部分“文献综述及评析”,回顾终极控制人终极所有权及分离度与公司经营行为、以董事会为核心的公司治理机制及制度环境与公司违规的相关文献研究,梳理了这几方面已有的研究成果,并对相关的研究给出了述评,这为本文进一步研究奠定了坚实的理论基础。第3部分“研究的市场背景及其现状”,详细列举了中国证券市场上公司严重违规事件及其最终处罚结果,并通过图表的方式详细展示了中国上市公司整体违规比例、违规类型、违规程度、违规主体的变化趋势及现状；对中国证券监管的发展做了详细的描述,并对中国上市公司治理机制的变化及改进进行了细致的梳理。第4部分“理论分析及研究假设”,在结合相关研究文献的基础之上,对本文的几个方面的研究,进行了理论分析,并对相关变量与公司违规之间的关系提出了相关假设研究。第5部分“研究设计”,详细说明了本文研究所用数据的来源,及重要数据的获取方式；对文章研究所涉及到的每一个变量进行了具体的定义与测度；给出了在每一个具体研究问题中,所用到的计量模型。第6部分“计量结果及其分析”,首先对本文研究中所涉及的终极控制人终极控制权、终极所有权、终极控制权-所有权分离度,以董事会为核心的公司治理机制变量、制度环境中的各个变量进行了描述性统计分析；其次研究了终极所有权、分离度,公司治理机制变量及制度环境变量与公司违规之间的关系；重点研究了终极所有权、分离度与经营层违规、股东违规之间的关系,并对相关模型结果进行分析,针对论文所提出的研究假设进行验证。第7部分“结论”,主要包括本文研究的结论及政策涵义,研究的局限及进一步研究的方向。通过上述的研究,本文主要得到以下结论：(1)终极控制人所有权、分离度均对公司违规起到遏制作用,但终极所有权比例的作用更明显；终极控制人的性质对公司违规行为没有显著的影响,而公司的行业属性是影响公司治理机制的重要原因,在竞争性行业中,终极控制人所有权比例、分离度与公司违规均显著负相关,但在行政性垄断行业中,终极控制人所有权比例、分离度与公司违规均不显著。(2)终极控制权与终极所有权的分离,明显弱化了终极控制人所有权比例对上市公司经营层违规概率的影响；终极控制人控制权与终极所有权的分离度加剧了企业股东违规概率,而终极控制人所有权比例对股东违规概率的的作用则不明显,同时在此条件下公司治理未能发挥应有的作用。(3)从公司层面分析,公司治理机制变量中第一大股东持股比例能对公司违规起到抑制作用,其余的以董事会为核心的公司治理机制并未发挥应有的作用,表现出与公司违规行为不相关。(4)公司经营所在地的部分制度环境变量对公司违规行为具有显著的遏制作用,经济发展水平越高对公司违规概率有显著抑制,而市场化指数、市场法律制度、政府干预程度对公司违规行为影响不显著。(5)通过进一步的分析发现,在国有控制的上市公司中,特别是行政垄断性行业的上市公司,控制性股东持股比例过高是影响公司治理机制作用发挥的决定性因素。通过相关的分析,本文的创新之处主要有：(1)采用中国证券市场20年全样本数据,全面展示了中国上市公司违规行为变化趋势及现状,并从终极控制人角度出发,重点应用了2003-2009年共7年面板数据,研究公司违规行为与终极控制权、终极所有权及分离度之间的关系,弥补了相关研究的不足。(2)首次对公司违规按违规主体进行划分,将其分为经营层违规与股东违规,进一步研究终极控制人所有权比例、终极控制权-所有权分离度与经营层违规及股东违规之间的关系；重点研究了在两权发生分离与否条件下,终极所有权、分离度分别对经营层违规、股东违规的影响,并为研究终极控制人与管理层(经营层)之间的第一类委托代理问题(激励效应),终极控制人与中小股东的第二类委托代理问题(壁垒效应)提供了机制性的实证检验,并对相关模型进行了稳健性检验,使所得结果更具有说服力。(3)通过进一步深入研究,挖掘出了最终影响中国上市公司治理机制构建及作用发挥的原因,为从根本上解决中国上市公司治理问题提供了新的证据。本研究虽经作者认真努力,但由于自身能力和客观条件的限制,本研究尚存在一定的局限性：(1)尽管本文的研究想以自中国证券市场成立到2013年底的所有上市公司为样本,但由于从公司违规到被监管层发现、处罚,到最后做出处罚公告,在这过程中存在有时间延迟,使得我们从数据库能获得的最新公司违规数据仅到2011年,迫使我们不能对最近几年公司违规情况做出一个比较清晰了解。(2)在研究中,由于数据收集及样本大小的关系,对于那些在一个会计年度内出现2次及以上违规的公司,我们并没有对其进行更细致的单独研究,也没有进一步研究其与只发生一次违规行为公司之间的关系。(3)公司治理数据的收集,从数据库获得的最早公司治理数据是从2000年开始,同时终极控制人所有权、分离度的数据从2003年才开始有完整数据,市场化指数最新数据仅到2009年,这使得我们的相关研究仅能采用2003-2009年7年的面板数据,因此本文的研究样本还应该在更大样本下继续进行研究,这样得到的结论说服力将会更强。更多还原

【Abstract】 In China, more than two decades’ development of stock market has witnessed an increasing listed companies whose market value have been aggregating along with excessively. Emerging from the fast development, unceasing irregularities of listed companies has not only brought huge loss to investors, hold back the stock market’s function to allocate efficiently market resources but also frustrate the relative regulatory authorities, which altogether brought irregularities of listed companies into the spotlight. Confronting such a big problem, scholars have dived into the irregularities of listed companies from different aspects, adopting varied date and methods, hoping to find out the fundamental cause. In order to restrict irregular market behaviors, market regulatory authorities, as an indispensible participator, on the one hand have resorted to laws.On the other hand, they have been calling for a tighter supervision from relevant parts (including mass media, investors) to listed companies and merciless punishment should be given to those who are found guilty so as to decrease the irregularity rate by increasing their irregularity cost.True as it is that the regulatory authorities have racked their brain to prevent irregularity from happening, irregularities of listed company in China have not been effectively stopped. It is even safe to say that irregularities will be increasing year by year in a quite long period of time, which can be proved that in2001irregularities increased to10%. Since then, though irregularity rate in China did decreased somehow, it kept to be higher than that in the developed countries in Europe and America. Meanwhile, shareholder irregularity in Chinese listed companies has grown out of nothing and it tends to grow year by year. Those real and complicated situations have pushed us to think what is the cause, lack of supervision, fragmented company management or other uncovered cause?Narrowing down to the20-year databases of both Shanghai A share market and Shenzhen A share market, referring to related theories and adopting empirical research on both Panel data and Cross section data.First of all, it starts from ultimate controlling shareholder to find out the influence of ultimate ownership and separation degree upon irregularity and importance is attached to the respective of influence of ultimate ownership and separation degree upon management irregularities and shareholder irregularities when ultimate control and ultimate ownership are and aren’t separated. This could not only empirically test the first and second type of principal-agent, but also could provide valuable reference for policy making. Secondly, the management mechanism usually with a board of directors as the heart of a company has been used as an important tool to solve or relive agent problems and researches used to focus on how its variables influence the irregularities. But from the existed researches, it is noticed that a sound study of organization management and irregularities is wanted. Not only analyzing how the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism influences irregularity, this dissertation but also examines indirectly its stability in a multi-modeled environment to further text the conclusion derived from research. Furthermore, as the geographic variable, system environment will do well to organization management, but no sound analysis of system environment’s influence upon irregularities could be found in the existing research paper. And few if any documents have made enough research to the influence of environmental variables upon irregularities.Using empirical method, this dissertation has made research on the following levels in order:posing problem, reviewing research background, analyzing research theory and assumption, measuring and analyzing results, concluding research. Part one, Introduction, clearly poses and states the problem concerned in this dissertation, as well as lists the research structure. Part two focuses on reviewing documents on ultimate controlling shareholder, ultimate ownership, separation degree, the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism, systematic environment as well as irregularities, and further sorting up and commentating the existing research results for a solid theoretical base. Part three is mainly concerned with reviewing the research background by listing the bad irregularities and the punishments going to them with a detailed chart used to demonstrate the irregularity rate, the irregularity type and the change trend and status of irregularity subjects. In addition, it also spares space for a detailed description of history of supervision systems of stock in China and a minute sorting up of the change and improvement of the management mechanism of Chinese listed companies. Part five focuses on research design. In this part, the source of date concerned and the way of access are elaborated; every variables defined and measured, and all measuring models concerned clarified. Part six is titled as measured result and its analysis. It starts from analyzing descriptively all variables of ultimate controlling shareholder, ultimate ownership, separation degree, the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism as well as systematic environment, and then it follows up the analyzing of interrelationship between irregularities and ultimate controlling shareholder, ultimate ownership, separation degree, the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism, systematic environment; but more research space has been given to the following three aspects:the relationship among ultimate ownership, separation degree, irregularities on management level as well as shareholders, the analysis of modeling results and the testing of research assumption raised in this dissertation. And Part seven is to conclude this dissertation mainly including the research result and its policy significance, the limit of this research and the direction for further research. Based on the study above, it comes to the following conclusion:(1)Though ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree are helpful in restraining irregularity, the rare of ultimate ownership is more efficient and effective in evidence but with ultimate controlling shareholder having no obvious affect upon irregularity. Meanwhile, the nature of business is a key to influence organization management, as the ownership rate of ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree are negatively or slightly concerned with irregularity in rivalry businesses as well as in administrative monopoly industry respectively.(2)The separation of ultimate control and ultimate ownership has obviously weakened the influence of the rate of ultimate controlling shareholder ownership upon the management irregularity of listed companies. Both the control of ultimate controlling shareholder and the separation degree of ultimate ownership are positively related to shareholder irregularity rate on which, however, the rate of ultimate controlling shareholder ownership has no evident influence.(3)Among the variables of organization management, the share rate of the first major shareholder can be suppressive to irregularity while that of the rest of the-board-oriented management mechanism has not played its due role and has nothing to do with irregularity.(4)The systematical environment in which the organization operates is keenly effective to suppress irregularity. To be more specific, the higher economy develops influence irregularity.(5)Further analysis has found that the excessively high rate of controlling shareholder of state-owned listed companies has severely hindered the full play of the organization’s function.Starting from irregularities of listed companies and based on relevant theories on organization management, this dissertation has made the following contributions to related fields:(1) The research firm irregularities By starting from ultimate controlling shareholder.(2)Against the subjects, an irregularities has been classified into management irregularity and shareholder irregularity so as to study their relationships between ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree. And this allows us the most direct and favorable access to study another two important aspects concerned:one is the first agent problem between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the management, the other is the second agent problem between the ultimate controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Reviewing the existing documents, it turns out that none has brought this two agent problems into one paper to study.(3)Through elaborated work, this dissertation has also dug out the fundamental cause that baffled the building-up and the function of the management mechanism, which can provide brand new solution to the management problems of Chinese listed companies.Though the author worked hard enough, there are still ceilings to be break:(1)It planed to cover all irregularities from the found of Chinese stock market to2013but failed because it’s usually a long process from finding out to punishment and to final punishment report, which unavoidably brings postpone. Therefore, the latest data of irregularity we could get is only updated to2011, which failed us to have a clearer overview of the recent years since then.(2)During the research, considering the relation between data collection and sample size, we did not do individual study to those twice-reported irregularity companies in a yea, neither to its relationship to those once-reported companies.(3)Date collecting turned to be not easy at all for the earliest available management date started only from2000, ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree2003; and the date of marketization index only updated to2009which only allowed us7years (2003-2009) of panel data. If enough samples were given, this research would be more persuasive.更多还原