【作者】 张驰；

【导师】 谢庆红；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 流通经济学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 在我国,大型零售商的品牌效应以及渠道优势越来越明显,其主导产业链的地位已经呈现。出于对社会平均利润率的追逐,大型零售商已经从简单的购物场所转变为集成制造商与消费者服务的双边市场平台。而平台企业能够有效运转的首要问题便是设计合适的机制使制造商与消费者接入到平台中来,并通过内化他们的组间网络外部性而盈利。在供大于求的买方市场中,制造商对于消费者的依赖程度远远大于消费者对供应商的依赖程度,即消费者给制造商带来的组间网络外部性远远大于制造商给消费者带来的组间网络外部性,导致零售平台设计的接入机制更需要优先考虑消费者的接入规模。在现实生活中,大型零售商实施着各种价格与非价格接入机制,通过节约消费者购物过程的交易成本,创造、满足与提高消费者购物价值,优先将消费者接入到平台中。零售平台为实现消费者优先接入的四种机制设计为：向消费者倾斜的接入定价机制、制造商品牌与自有品牌协同发展机制、实体与网络渠道协同运营机制以及品牌价值门槛机制。这些机制的实施旨在通过提高消费者购物价值吸引消费者接入到平台中。这四种机制实现吸引消费者优先接入的机理是什么；如何设计；机制实施的影响因素或条件有哪些；对政府与企业有何借鉴意义等,无论在理论还是现实方面都是值得研究的重要课题。从产业特征的视角来看,零售产业已经成为具有“双边市场特征”的产业,制造商和消费者之间存在着双边“组间网络外部性”。本文基于“双边市场”理论抓住了零售产业双边市场的产业特征,系统地研究了零售产业所设计四种接入机制的接入机理、影响因素、实施条件以及对政府与企业的借鉴意义。并对一些涉及传统经济理论且具有较大争议的诸如通道费经济效应与政府规制、自有品牌发展等问题,从双边市场的视角给出了进一步的解释。基于双边市场理论的零售平台接入机制研究将在理论层面对传统零售经济理论进行补充,同时也是“双边市场”一般理论具体产业应用的延伸和扩展,在实践中对零售产业经营与管理以及政府产业政策的实施具有理论指导意义。本研究内容包含八个章节：第一章,绪论部分。首先提出本研究的现实基础,提出亟待解决的关键问题,及这些研究问题的理论及现实意义,并对相关重要概念进行了界定；其次阐述了本研究的具体内容、建立了逻辑分析框架,概述本文的研究方法；最后提出研究创新与研究不足。第二章,国内外相关问题研究综述部分。首先,辨别了单边市场与双边市场。然后,梳理了目前双边市场研究的主要内容与研究领域,并对现有研究进行了述评。再次,在单边市场视角下,对零售商主要实施的几种策略性行为目前的研究重点进行了整理与归纳。第三章,零售平台及其接入机制概述。首先,对零售产业微观结构特征进行分析,从理论上论证了现代大型零售企业已演化成为双边市场平台,指出了零售平台对应的主要业态；其次,分析了大型零售商向双边市场平台演变的客观基础；最后,总结了平台企业的主要竞争策略,指出零售平台的竞争策略主要依托于倾斜式接入定价机制、品牌协同机制、双渠道协同机制、品牌价值门槛机制的实施。第四章,接入机制一：倾斜式定价机制设计。本章构建了垄断零售平台与竞争性零售平台的定价模型,推导出了零售平台双边定价的决策依据及其价格构成要素。解释了在现实生活中零售平台向制造商收取通道费而向消费者不收费的经济原理；从价格结构与价格总水平两方面对倾斜式接入定价设计的经济效应进行了评价；考察了双边用户组内网络外部性对零售平台接入定价的影响,发现双边用户组内网络外部性的不同组合将产生不同水平的制造商接入价格；最后基于研究结论对零售平台定价策略及政府通道费规制问题提出了对策建议。第五章,接入机制二：品牌协同机制。自有品牌的开发会使零售商形成差异化优势,形成两种品牌间的共生与协同,吸引消费者接入。本章构建了双边市场模型并确定了自有品牌开发与制造商产品引入的最优边界,以及该边界收缩与扩张的影响因素；采用纵向差异化模型证明了自有品牌的开发动机及其经济效应；最后指出,我国自有品牌发展程度较低将影响品牌协同机制的作用效果,解释了我国自有品牌发展程度较低的原因并预测了其未来发展趋势。第六章,接入机制三：双渠道协同机制。本章分析了双渠道协同机制实现消费者优先接入的运作机理；构建了竞争性零售平台实施双渠道协同机制的演化博弈模型,验证了零售平台实施该机制的驱动因素；对零售平台渠道发展策略进行了分析。第七章,接入机制四：品牌价值门槛机制设计。本章分析了品牌价值门槛吸引消费者接入的基本原理；在双边市场理论框架内,构建了垄断零售平台实施品牌价值门槛的模型,确定了在供应商品牌价值呈均匀分布情形下的最优品牌价值门槛及其影响因素；将模型扩展到竞争的情形,推导出竞争性零售平台实施品牌价值门槛机制的选择决策；对零售平台如何实施品牌价值门槛机制给出了建议。第八章,研究结论与研究展望。该部分将首先对本文的主要研究工作和成果进行详细的梳理和总结；指出本文不足之处及未来研究展望。本论文有以下创新之处：第一,突破了传统经济理论利用单一市场结构分析纵向结构关系的局限。本研究基于大型零售商已转变为双边零售平台的经济现实,结合与之相匹配的新兴理论前沿——双边市场理论框架,将制造商、零售平台、消费者三个参与方同时纳入到统一的分析框架,同时考虑到了制造商与消费者对零售服务的有效需求以及不同服务之间的互补性与替代性。相对于仅考虑消费者单边有效需求的传统经济理论,基于双边市场理论的研究更有利于从社会总福利的角度分析纵向结构关系,给出更加贴近经济运行现实的解释。第二,将零售平台运营策略凝练为接入定价、品牌协同、渠道协同与品牌价值门槛四种接入机制的设计,并采用规范的双边市场理论模型进行了实证分析。目前,从双边市场视角并运用其理论模型研究零售平台接入机制设计的文献仅仅局限在通道费定价策略上,且理论成果较少。缺乏将四种接入机制设计纳入统一框架中进行分析的系统性研究。本文构建了消费者优先接入机制的双边市场理论模型,规范研究了四种接入机制,拓宽了针对零售平台的研究范围。第三,给予了双边零售平台行业特征新的理论解释。首先,发现了组内网络外部性将对零售平台的定价策略产生重要影响。其次,得出了品牌协同机制的边界。再次,获取了传统零售平台企业实施双渠道协同机制的均衡条件。最后,得到了制造商品牌价值呈线性分布时,零售平台的最优品牌价值门槛设计及其影响因素。本文研究不足：一是从研究方法上来看,对于四种接入机制的研究主要采用规范化的数理模型研究,而没有使用数量模型进行计量检验；二是品牌协同、渠道协同与品牌价值门槛机制均可能涉及到反不正当竞争、反垄断的问题,本文限于篇幅并没有进行深入的探讨,这也是未来的研究方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 In reality, large retailers implement different types of pricing and non-pricing mechanisms for access. They attract customers to the platform by reducing the transaction costs, and satisfy customers by creating or improving customer value. Specifically, there are four access mechanisms for retail platforms that give customers priority:the access mechanism of skewed pricing, the mechanism with collaboration of national-brand and private-label products, the mechanism of collaboration of physical and online channels, and the mechanism with a minimum brand value requirement. All these mechanisms are designed to attract more customers to the platform.What is the rationale of those four mechanisms that offer customers priority access? How to design those mechanisms? What are the factors and conditions which affect the implement of mechanisms? What are the management insights for both government and enterprise? All these questions are the important issues to study.From the industry’s perspective, the retail industry is the one with the feature of "two-sided market", there are so-called "cross-group network externality" between manufacturers and customers. Based on the "two-sided market" theory and the characteristics of retail industry, this dissertation systematically studies the fundamental rationale, impact factors, implementing conditions, and the implications of four access mechanisms. In addition, it provides detailed explanation for traditional disputes, such as slotting allowances and related government regulations, and the development of private label. The research on the access mechanisms of retail platform based on the two-sided market theory is not only a supplement of the traditional retail economic theory, but also an expansion of the applications to general theory of bilateral market. Most importantly, it offers important theoretical implications for government as well as enterprises in operations and management.The specific research contains eight chapters as follows:Chapter1, Introduction. This chapter first provides motivations of this research, raises key questions to study, elaborates the theoretical and practical significance of these research questions, and defines the important concepts; secondly, this chapter describes the specific content of this research, establishes of a logical framework for analysis, outlines the research methods; and finally, this chapter highlights the contribution of this research and points out limitations.Chapter2, Literature Review. This chapter first distinguishes one-sided market from two-sided market. Secondly, this chapter summarizes the main subjects and key areas in two-sided market researches, and reviews existing research. Finally, this chapter organizes the main strategic behaviors of the retailers from the perspective of two-sided market.Chapter3, Introduction of retail platform and access mechanisms. Firstly, this chapter analyzes the micro-structure characteristics of the retail industry, demonstrates that the modern large retailers have already been transformed into the two-sided market platform theoretically, and point out the corresponding retail states. Secondly, this chapter analyzes the objective basis of the transformation mentioned above. Finally, the main competitive strategies have been summarized, which depend on the implement of access mechanisms including the skewed pricing, the brand collaboration, the dual-channel collaboration and the minimum requirement of brand value.Chapter4, Access mechanism one:skewed pricing. This chapter constructs monopoly and competitive retail platform pricing model, and deduces theoretical basis for two-sided pricing and the composites of that price. And this chapter explains why in our real life the retailer always charges the manufacturers the slotting allowances instead of the consumers. Then evaluates the economics effect of skewed pricing design from the price structure and the sum of two-sided price, analyzes the effects of intra-group network externality on pricing strategies of retail platform, discovers different combinations of two-sided customers will produce different manufacturers’price. Finally, this chapter provides countermeasures and suggestions for pricing strategies and regulations on slotting allowances based on above analysis. Chapter5, Access mechanism two:Brand collaboration mechanism. The development of private-label which produced differentiated advantage with national-label makes retail platform more attractive to consumers. The chapter constructs two-sided model and comes to the optimal boundary between private label and national-label and its influencing factors, demonstrates the motives and economic effects of private label, explains the reasons why private label in china are locked in low degree of development and foresees its trend.Chapter6, Access mechanism three:dual-channel collaboration mechanism. Firstly, how the dual-channel collaboration mechanism acheieve the customers’ priority access is analyzed; Secondly, the writer builds the evolutionary game model of the dual-channel collaboration mechanism on the competitive retail platform. Finally this chapter analyzes the retail platform channel development strategies.Chapter7, Access mechanism four:minimum brand value requirement. First, the rationale of access mechanism to attract consumers is discussed. Secondly, a monopoly model is built to determine the optimal brand value requirement and its conditions as well as the impact factors. Thirdly, the model is expanded to derivate the equilibrium conditions of the brand value requirement mechanism on the competitive retail platform. Finally, suggestions are provided for implementing the access mechanism with a minimum brand value requirement.Chapter8, Suggestions and Recommendations. This chapter organizes and summarizes the main findings in details, points out the limitations, and provides several directions for future research.There are three contributions of this dissertation:First, this research extends the traditional economic theory with unilateral market structure to a bilateral market. It combines the realistic foundation with two-sided market theory which not only enables manufacturers, platforms and consumers to get into a unified framework, but also takes considerations to two-sided customers demand and complementarities and substitutes between them. Based on two-sided theory, this research provides a better explanation to analyze the vertical channel structure from social welfare perspective.Second, this research designs four mechanisms for operating:access mechanism, brand collaboration, channel collaboration, and minimum brand value requirement, then builds analytical models based on two-sided market theory. To the best of my knowledge, from the two-sided market point of view, the existing research is limited to the study on slotting allowances pricing strategy, and lack of papers that systematically study the four access mechanism in a unified framework. This dissertation builds theoretical models for customer-driven access mechanism under two-sided market theory, discusses the details of four access mechanism, and expands the scope of research of retail platforms.Third, this research provides a new explanation of the two-sided retail platform theoretical explanation. First, this study characterizes the significant impact of intra-group network externalities on retail platform pricing strategy. Secondly, the boundary of brand collaboration mechanism is obtained. Thirdly, the equilibrium of traditional retail platform for enterprises to implement the dual-channel coordination mechanism is calculated. Finally, it finds the optimal minimum brand value requirement and impact factors when manufacturer’s brand value has a linear distribution.Some limitations of this dissertation:first, from a methodological point of view, the four access mechanisms are studied analytically not empirically, due to the difficulties in obtaining data in the field; second, the brand collaboration, channel collaboration, and the minimum brand value requirement might involve unfair competition and antitrust issues, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation but worthwhile for future study.更多还原