【作者】 李海凤；

【导师】 史燕平；

【作者基本信息】 对外经济贸易大学 ， 金融学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 提高资本的配置效率是促进经济增长方式转变和实现经济增长的重要途径，中国目前正处于经济改革发展的关键时期，资源的稀缺性尤为突出，资本配置效率的提高无疑会对改革的进程和经济发展的轨迹产生重要影响。因此，系统研究中国资本配置效率的影响因素对中国经济的持续、快速、健康发展有着重要的意义。本文界定了资本配置效率的内涵，介绍了资本配置效率的常用估计方法，并归纳总结已有文献中涉及的中国资本配置效率的影响因素。在此基础上，借鉴Wurgelr（2000）的资本配置效率模型，通过构建交乘效应检验模型，实证检验投资者的法律保护、上市公司的信息披露质量以及政治关联对中国资本配置效率的影响。论文的主要研究工作如下：1.阐述研究中国资本配置效率影响因素的现实意义，说明本文的研究内容,创新之处，并对相关文献进行了综述。2.明晰了资本配置效率的定义及分类，介绍了资本配置效率的两种常用度量方法，根据金融理论分析了资本实现有效配置的两个必要条件，并对已有研究涉及的中国资本配置效率的影响因素进行总结。3.基于委托代理理论以及法与金融学的相关研究成果，从理论上分析了投资者法律保护改善资本配置效率的内在机制，并结合中国特殊的经济环境，分析了政府干预是否会影响投资者法律是否会影响投资者法律保护改善资本配置效率的效果。进一步，以中国30个行政地区，以及36个国民经济工业行业2001-2006年的面板数据为样本，从地区和行业两个层面实证检验投资者法律保护是否对资本配置效率有正向效应，以及政府干预对这一效应的影响。研究结果显示：无论是地区层面还是行业层面，投资者法律保护程度与相应的工业增加值增长率的交乘项系数显著为正，说明投资者法律保护有助于提高资本配置效率，此外，我们还发现政府会通过干预相关法律的实施而弱化投资者法律保护改善资本配置效率的效果。研究的政策含义在于进一步完善投资者法律保护体系，减少政府对市场的干预,通过改善外部制度环境来提高资本市场的资本配置效率。4.基于信息不对称理论，分析了上市公司信息披露质量改善资本配置效率的内在机理，并以2003-2012年在深圳证券交易所上市的A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验信息披露质量的提高是否可提高资本的配置效率。实证结果显示，随着上市公司信息披露质量的提高，行业投资变动对其相应的资本产出变动更加敏感，这说明信息披露质量的改善可促进资本更快的由投资回报率低的行业向投资回报率高的行业转移，从而促进资本的有效配置。研究为进一步完善信息披露制度、加强对上市公司信息披露监管提供了政策依据。5.从政治关联企业的被动过度投资、主动过度投资和过高的非生产性支出三个方面理论分析了政治关联损害资本配置效率的机制，并以2003-2012年在深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所上市的A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验上市公司的政治关联是否会损害资本的配置效率。实证分析结果显示，行业的政治关联程度与行业资本产出增长率的交乘项的系数显著为负，说明政治关联降低了行业的投资变动对其资本产出变动的灵敏程度，一定程度上阻碍了资本从低效率行业向高效率行业的转移，从而损害了资本的配置效率。由于企业寻求政治关联的主要动因是政府对市场的干预能力，因此我们的研究为进一步推动市场化进程，减少政府对经济的过度干预提供了证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 The improvement of capital allocation efficiency is an important way topromote economic growth and realize the change of economic growth mode. Atpresent, Chinese economy is in the key period of reforming and developing，thescarcity of capital is prominent，it is no doubt that the improvement of capitalallocation efficiency will influence the reform process and the economic growthtrajectory deeply. Thus, a systemic discussion on the facors affecting Chinese capitalallocation efficiency is significant to the continuable, repaid and healthy growth ofChinese economy.In this paper, the definition of capital allocation efficiency is given, the commonmethods for estimating the capital allocation efficiency are introduced, the findingsabout the factors affecting Chinese capital allocation efficiency published inliteratures are also summarized. Then based on the estimation model proposed byWurgelr（2000）, we construct some interaction effect models, and test the effects oflegal protection of investors, quality of listed company’s information disclosures andpolitical connection on the Chines capital allocation efficiency. The major works aresummarized as following.1. The realistic meaning of discussing the influence facors on China’s capitalallocation efficiency is elaborated, the content and innovation of this paper isintroduced, and the related literatures is summarized.2. The definition and category of capital allocation efficiency are given, twocommon ways used to estimate capital allocation efficiency are introduced, and tworequirements for efficient capital allocation are analysted, furthermore, the influencefacors on China’s capital allocation efficiency that have been dicussed in literatursare summarized.3. The mechanism that the legal protection of investors can improve capitalallocation efficiency is analysted, with the agency by agreement theory and somerelated theories in law and finance fields, and given the special economyenvironment of China, we discuss whether the government could weaken thepositive effect of legal protection of investors on capital allocation efficiency byintervening the implement of related laws. Furthermore, the effect of legal protectionof investors on Chines capital allocation efficiency is tested, with data of Chinese thirty regions and thirty-six industries from the year2001to2006, and the role of theintervention of government is also considered. The findings indicate that in bothregional level and industrial level, the interactions of degree of legal protection oninvestors with value added growth rate have obvious positive coefficients, whichreveals that legal protection on investors can benefit the capital allocation efficiency.In addition, we find that the government could weaken the positive effect of legalprotection of investors on capital allocation efficiency by intervening the implementof related laws. The The findings imply that for improving the Chines capitalallocation efficiency, the legal protection system of investors should beconsummated and the intervention of government on market should be greatlyreduced.4. The mechanism that higher information discloure can improve capitalallocation efficiency is analysted, Asymmetric Information theory. Then the effect ofinformation discloure on capital allocation efficiency is verified with with data ofA-share companies listed in Shen Zhen Stock Exchanges from the year2003to2012.We find that with the increase in the information disclosures quality, the reaction ofindustry investment alteration to its capital output alteration becomes more sensitive,which means that information disclosures with higher quality promote capitaltransfer rapidly form lower returning fields to higher returning fields, thus realize theefficient allocation of capital. The findings provide theoretical basis for improvingthe information disclosure system and enhancing the supervision on listedcompanies’ information disclosure.5. The mechanism that political connection may reduce capital allocationefficiency is analysted, then we discuss whether the political connection will reducethe capital allocation efficiency, with data of A-share companies listed in Shen ZhenStock Exchanges and Shang Hai Exchanges from the year of2003to2012. Theregression analysis show that the interaction of political connection and capitaloutput growth rate have obvious negative coefficient, which means that politicalconnection prevents capital from transferring rapidly form lower efficiency fields tohigher efficiency fields, thus reduce the efficiency of capital allocation. The findingsprovide proofs for further advancing market reforms and reducing the intervention ofgovernment on the market. In addition, the findings also indicate that the informalsystem is inefficient.更多还原