【作者】 焦晓钰；

【导师】 姚先国；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 劳动经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 工资集体协商制度旨在提升劳动者福利与地位,但在实施过程中却争议不断。本文试图深入剖析其运行机理,量化评估制度实施效应,以期为提高该制度的有效性提供借鉴。工资集体协商制度本质上是劳资之间的利益博弈。本文认为,这一组织化的议价博弈制度的有效运行即改善劳动者权益目标的实现需要一定条件,这体现在制度边界与制度运行两个层面。前者与制度作用对象的异质性有关,奠定了制度有效运行的可能性；后者则与劳方利益代表组织相对于资方的议价博弈力量有关,决定着制度目标的实现程度。因此,本文围绕这两个层面,立足包含职工、工会、雇主和政府四方参与人的中国工资集体协商制度特色,分别从制度作用对象——劳动者的异质性、相关制度安排、工会行为和政府干预四个维度剖析劳资双方在一定约束下相互作用于均衡议价解的内在机理,并借鉴集体行动理论和公共选择学派的政府行为理论重点探讨劳动者异质性对该制度内生边界的制约(问题一)和政府干预行为对该制度运行效率的影响(问题二)。在实施效应评估中,本文基于企业-职工匹配的微观数据作了三方面的实证研究：一是使用均值回归和分位数回归考察工资集体协商制度对企业基层员工工资的影响,并对制度工资效应的异质性进行讨论,这也是对问题一的验证；二是使用Probit模型考察该制度对企业员工非工资福利的影响,这可检验该制度的实施是否会造成员工非工资福利对其工资福利的替代；三是使用OLS回归和工具变量法分析该制度与企业雇佣量之间的关系,并分析比较了这一效应在不同类别企业中可能呈现的差异化表现,这可为问题二的理论分析提供证据。本文研究得出的主要结论有：第一,工资集体协商制度具有内生边界。其有效运行的必要前提一是参与主体具有共同的利益诉求：二是参与主体集体行动的边际收益大于其边际成本。故当激励机制不健全或缺乏强制性约束时,只有在同质性较高且可替代性较强的劳动者群体以及这类劳动者相对密集的领域实施该制度才可能实现其目标。第二,在满足边界条件的基础上,工资集体协商制度改善劳动者福利目标的实现及实现程度主要取决于劳方相对于资方的集体议价力量,而这又与相关制度安排和集体议价中的工会、政府行为表现有关。其中,地方政府的介入是中国集体议价制度不同于西方的一个典型特色。地方政府的干预行为主要取决于其官员在自利性动机支配下对政权稳定和提高政绩“双重目标”的权衡。当前一目标占据主导时,地方官员会为获得尽可能多的劳动者拥护而选择增强劳方议价力量的干预行为,从而使均衡解表现为较高的议价工资；反之则会(变相)助长资方的议价力量,从而产生一个较低的议价工资与较多的劳动雇佣的低效率的议价均衡。第三,工资集体协商制度在改善基层员工工资福利上发挥的作用不尽理想,并且该工资效应与员工异质性有关。该制度对位于收入分布较高分位、原始劳动力较强、人力资本较高或具有专业技术的员工的工资产生了更大或更显著的负效应。这为该制度有效运行存在内生边界提供了证据。第四,工资集体协商制度的实施使基层员工享受部分非工资福利的概率显著提高,这表明这一组织化议价制度对强化劳动者权利保护起到了一定积极作用,但同时也在某种程度表明劳资双方讨价还价过程中存在雇主试图以非工资福利诱使员工在议价工资上妥协的可能。此外,从福利内容看,这种正效应主要体现在那些较低层次的、占用企业成本相对较低的非工资福利上。第五,工资集体协商制度对扩大企业雇佣规模表现出稳健的正效应。可见,在当前劳动力总量过剩、局部短缺的背景下实施该制度有助于增加劳动者就业。鉴于该制度的工资效应表现,雇佣量的扩大很可能是以牺牲员工部分工资福利为代价。同时,根据机理分析,这一结果可能也与政绩考核压力下的地方官员在干预劳资集体议价时倾向于偏袒资方不无关系。此外,值得注意的是,分企业类别比较可发现,该制度扩大雇佣量的正效应其实主要集中在“弱资本与弱劳动”相结合的企业。本文的政策含义是：实施工资集体协商制度要充分尊重人的异质性,合理界定实施范围；加强劳方协商主体培育,不断提高其博弈对话能力；在资强劳弱的市场环境下,明晰界定政府干预工资集体协商的权限与方式,使其在不降低集体议价原有效率的基础上,真正起到提升劳方议价能力的作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 The objective of collective wage consultation system is to enhance the welfare and status of workers, but there are full of controversies. This paper attempts to in-depth analyze its operation mechanism, and evaluate its implementation effect in order to provide reference for improving the effectiveness of collective wage consultation system.Essentially, collective wage consultation system is a game for benefit between employers and employees. This paper argues that efficient operating of the system builds on some appropriate conditions, which mainly lay in boundary field and operation field. The former is related to heterogeneous characteristic of objects of system, which determines the possibility of effective operation of the system; and the latter is related to the change of relative collective bargaining power of the labors’organization, which determines the degree of realization of the system efficiency. Therefore, from the two fileds and based on unique feature of collective wage consultation system in China which contains four paticipaints of employee, labor union, employer and the government, this paper from four respects of labors’ heterogeneity, institutional arrangement, labor union behaviour and government intervention, analys the mechanism that labors and employers who are under some constraints interact with each other and determine the equilibrium solution of collective bargaining. Especially, the paper uses the collective action theory and government behavior theory from the school of public choice to mainly discuss two problems which are the constraint of labor heterogeneity on endogenous boundary of the system (problem1), and the effect of government intervention on operating efficiency of the system (problem2).As to the effect evaluation, this paper has done three positive analysis based on the enterprise-employee matched micro data:first of all, examines the general impact on the wage of collective wage consultation system by using mean regression and quantile regression, and meanwhile analysis the heterogeneity of wage effect. The work is the verification of probleml; secondly, analyzes the impact on the nonwage welfare of this system by using Probit model, and examines whether the system will produce that nonwage welfare effect substitutes for wage effect; thirdly, investigates the impact on the scale of employment, and discusses the heterogeneity across different enterprises, this section will provide some evidence for problem2.The conclusions drawn by this paper are as follow:Firstly, collective wage consultation system has endogenous boundary. Necessary prerequisites for the effective operation of the system are paticipaints should have two characteristics:first, there is a common interest demands; and second, marginal revenue of paticipaints from their collective action should be greater than marginal cost. So when there is no perfect incentive mechanism or mandatory constraint, only in labor groups who have high homogeneity and strong substitutability between each other, and labor-intensive areas could the collective wage consultation system achieve its targets.Secondly, based on boundary condition, the degree of realization of the target that collective wage consultation system promot the welfare of workers depends largely on the bargaining power between the labor and capital, which are related to relevant institutional arrangements, and behavior of labor unions and government in collective wage consultation. Intervention behavior of local governments is a typical characteristic of Chinese collective consultation system. Intervention behavior is detennind by the officials judging and weighing "double goals" that are to enhance stability of the regime and to improve their performance in term of their self-interest motivation. When the former goal dominates, the officials will make to enhance the bargaining power of the workers in order to win their support as many as possible which will bring out a high wage. Conversely, they will prefer encourage the bargaining power of employers which is likely to generate a low efficiency bargaining equilibrium with lower wage and more labor employment.Thirdly, the role of collective wage consultation system in improving the wage of grass-roots employee is not optimal, and the wage effect is related to the employee heterogeneity. There is a larger or more significant negative effect among those employees located in higher quantile of income distribution, with stronger original labor ability, with higher human capital, or with professional skills. This result supplys empirical evidence for efficient operating of this system need meet boundary condition first.Fourthly, the implementation of collective wage consultation system improves the nonwage welfare of grass-roots employees, which implys that it plays some positive role in enhancing labor right protection of grass-roots employees. At the same time, it maybe indicates that employers try to use nonwage welfare to induce employees to make a compromise on bargaining wage during the collective bargaining. Moreover, this positive effect mainly exist the nonwage welfares which belong to lower levels or occupying relative low cost of enterprise.Fifthly, Collective wage consultation system has a robust positive effect on expanding employment scale, which means in the background that the labor force is excess in totall but shortage in local, it benefits to increase employment. But in view of its wage effect, the system expands employment scale at the expense of employees’some wage welfare. According to the mechanism analysis of the system, this is because local officials’intervention behavior more favours employer under the press of improving government performance. However, positive effect of expanding employment scale is mainly concentrated in the enterprises where "weak capital and weak labor" are matched.The policy implications of this paper are:the implementation of collective wage consultation system should fully respect human heterogeneity, reasonably definite of the scope of this system; we need to constantly strengthen labor negotiators’bargaining ability; in the circumstance of strong capital and weak labor, we must clearly definite the right limits and patterns of government intervention in collective bargaining between employers and employees, and make it enhancing employees’ bargaining power without reducing the original efficiency of collective bargaining.更多还原