批发市场交易模式下农产品质量安全研究

【作者】 刘小兰；

【导师】 张悟移；

【作者基本信息】 昆明理工大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 农产品质量安全关系着千家万户,是政府乃至全社会关注的焦点问题。在我国,70%以上的农产品经由批发市场流入消费者的“菜篮子”,批发市场已成为我国农产品流通的主渠道。批发市场上频发的农产品安全事件不仅牵扯面广、危害大,而且暴露出我国农产品质量安全管理存在固有缺陷,如何保障批发市场交易模式下的农产品质量安全成为亟待解决的问题。有鉴于此,本文以“批发市场交易模式下农产品质量安全研究”为题开展了本研究工作,旨在分析农产品质量安全的影响因素,并基于这些影响因素,探讨批发市场交易模式下农户、批发商、批发市场和政府的策略选择行为,以达到低成本、高效率地保障批发市场上所销售农产品质量安全的目标。本文以批发市场交易模式下农产品质量安全为研究对象,总结对农产品质量安全产生影响的宏观因素和中微观因素,并将收益作为最重要的影响因素,研究农户和批发商组成的农产品供应链质量安全协调问题,分析农户和批发商达成安全生产收益惩罚共享契约的条件,基于博弈理论探讨批发市场农产品安全事件频发原因,以调动批发市场规范管理的积极性,基于CAS理论研究政府最优监管策略,并鉴于信息通畅是实现农产品“安全溢价”的基础,建立批发商主导型农产品质量安全可追溯系统,通过七章内容的层层深入分析来完成整个批发市场交易模式下的农产品质量安全研究。首先分析了论文的研究背景与研究意义,介绍了本文中农产品和农产品质量安全的概念界定,即本文中的农产品质量安全内涵为农产品符合国家强制性标准和要求,对消费者不会产生危害与潜在危害,进而引出本文拟研究的主要内容,简要介绍论文研究的技术路线,并指出论文的创新点。通过文献研究,总结农产品质量安全产生影响的宏观因素包括法律法规体系、标准体系、检验检测体系、监管体系,以及中微观因素包括供应链组织模式、信息传递、收益分配、认知与意识、知识与技术、信誉。建立农产品质量安全影响因素模型,进行宏观因素与中微观因素关系评述,通过分析指出收益对于供应链上各方的质量安全行为最具有激励作用,而信息的传递是实现农产品“安全溢价”的基础。在简要介绍供应链协调相关理论的基础上,基于收益分配,进行了“批发商+农户”供应链质量安全控制与协调研究。研究对象为由一个农户和一个批发商组成的二级供应链,运用供应链协调相关理论方法,探讨农户和批发商在不合作、合作以及使用收益惩罚共享契约三种情形下供应链成员的行为决策问题。农户与批发商达成的是安全还是不安全收益惩罚共享契约,视具体情况而定。与合作情形相比,采用收益惩罚共享契约对供应链整体利润的改善虽还有一定差距,然而与不合作情形相比,采用共享契约能够使农户和批发商的收益都有所提高。除了生产领域中农户和供应商收益惩罚共享契约对农产品质量安全产生影响外,流通领域中批发市场的行为选择也会影响农产品安全。基于博弈理论,分析了批发市场农产品安全事件频发的原因,指出现有市场机制的无效性和法律法规的缺陷导致批发市场选择不规范管理,而批发市场的“不作为”行为将诱使供应商(包括入场销售农产品的农户和批发商)提供不安全农产品以获得更多收益。为改变这种状况,给出相应建议以充分发挥批发市场安全管理作用。以上农户和批发商供应链协调以及批发市场和供应商博弈分析都属于静态研究,然而政府、批发市场和众多供应商都是具有自身目标、偏好和主动性的“活”的主体,政府的目标是农产品的抽检合格率高于一定水平,而批发市场和供应商作为经营主体,目标是追求利益最大化,它们构成的农产品质量安全系统表现出强烈地不确定性和动态演变特性,是一个复杂适应系统。在进行农产品质量安全复杂适应系统分析的基础上,构建了政府Agent、批发市场Agent和供应商Agent模型,通过对模型属性和规制进行设定,探讨了不同政府监管策略下的农产品安全状况,提出政府最优监管策略以低成本、高效率地保障农产品质量安全。安全农产品供应链上收益的增加来源于农产品“安全溢价”,而农产品“安全溢价”的实现取决于信息的有效传递。农产品质量安全问题的产生正是其供应链上的信息不对称和逆向选择所致,建立批发商主导型农产品质量安全可追溯系统,可有效传递批发市场上所售农产品相关信息,实现信息对称。本文通过批发商主导型农产品质量安全可追溯系统建设的理论分析,设计了包括市场信息系统和农产品质量安全信息追溯平台两大部分的批发商主导型农产品质量安全可追溯系统,并提出其建设路径,以充分调动市场中各主体的主观能动性,使该系统高效、可行。本文分别采用供应链协调理论、博弈理论和复杂适应系统理论,探讨了批发市场交易模式下农产品质量安全所涉及的农户、批发商、批发市场和政府的行为策略选择,并建立了批发商主导型农产品质量安全可追溯系统,以期为我国批发市场交易模式下的农产品质量安全管理提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Agricultural products safety has respect to millions of households and is the focus of the government and the concern of the whole society. In China, more than70%of agricultural products through the wholesale market inflows consumer’s "basket" and the wholesale market has become the main channel for the circulation of agricultural product. However, agricultural products safety incidents occurring frequently not only cover a wide range and have great harm, but also expose inherent flaws of agricultural products safety management in wholesale market. How to protect agricultural products safety under the wholesale trade mode has become a serious problem. In view of this, the paper using "agricultural products safety under the wholesale trade mode" as the subject of the research work aims to analyze the factors affecting the safety of agricultural products and explores the farmers, wholesalers, wholesale market and the government’s strategy choice behavior under the wholesale trade mode based on these factors to achieve the goal of ensuring agricultural products safety by low cost and high efficiency.This paper chooses agricultural products safety under the wholesale trade mode as research subject and summarizes the macro factors and micro factors affecting safety of agricultural products and point outs that income is the most important factor. The coordination problems of supply chain composed of a farmer and a wholesaler are studied and the terms of reaching revenue and penalty sharing contract between the farmer and the wholesaler are analyzed. Furthermore, the reasons of safety incidents of agricultural products in wholesale occurring frequently are discussed based on game theory and optimal regulatory strategy are researched based on CAS theory. And considering patent information is the basis of achieving agricultural "safety premium", the wholesaler-dominated agricultural products safety traceability system is designed and construction path is proposed. It can be seen that the entire researches of agricultural products safety under the wholesale trade mode are completed through seven chapters.First, the research background and significance are analyzed and the concepts of agricultural products and agricultural products safety are introduced. In this paper, agricultural products safety means that the safety of agricultural products is in line with national mandatory standards and requirements and will not cause harm and potential harm to consumers. Thus the main content of this paper and brief technical route are led and the innovation points are pointed out.Through literature review, the macro factors and micro factors affecting agricultural products safety are summarized. The macro factors include laws and regulations system, standards system, inspection and testing system, the regulatory system. The micro factors include supply chain organization model, information transmission, distribution of income, cognition and consciousness, knowledge and technology, reputation. Agricultural products safety factors model is established and the relationship of the macro factors and micro factors is commented. Analysis indicates that profit is the most incentive factor to the safety behavior choose of each party on the supply chain and the delivery of the safety information is the basis to achieve "security premium"After briefly introducing the coordination theory of supply chain, safety control and coordination research of supply chain composed of a farmer and a wholesaler is done based on the distribution of income. Using relevant supply chain coordination theories, the behavior decision of the supply chain members is analyzed in three different scenarios which include non-cooperation, cooperation and using revenue and penalty sharing contract based on a two-stage supply chain between one farmer and one wholesaler. The farmer and wholesaler reach a safe or unsafe sharing contract depends on the specific conditions. Compared with the cooperation situation, the situation using revenue and sharing penalty contract to improve profit of the supply chain isn’t satisfied. However, compared with the non-cooperation situation, the situation using the sharing contract make the profit of the farmer and wholesaler to improve.Not only revenue and penalty sharing contract between one farmer and one wholesaler in the production area would affect agricultural products safety, but also the behavior selection of wholesale in the circulation area would affect the safety. Based on game theory, the reasons for agricultural products safety events occurring frequently in the wholesale markets are obtained. It’s pointed out that the invalidity of the existing market mechanisms and defects in the laws and regulations make the wholesale market choose not to regulate the management, while this behavior will induce suppliers including farmers and wholesalers to provide unsafe agricultural products in order to get more revenue. To change this situation, the appropriate recommendations are given to maximize the security management role of the wholesale market.The above analyses of supply chain coordination and game theory are static. However, the government, wholesale markets and numerous suppliers are all "live" bodies having their own goals, preferences and initiative. The Government aims to produce a sampling pass rate is higher than a certain level, while wholesale and suppliers as business entities, the goal of them is to seek maximum benefits. The agricultural products safety system constituted by them is a complex adaptive system exhibiting strong characteristics of uncertainty and dynamic evolution. Based on the analysis of complex adaptive systems, the models of the government agent, wholesale market agent and supplier agent are built and the properties and regulation of each model are set. The situations of agricultural products safety are discussed under different government supervision strategies and the optimal government regulatory strategy is put forward to ensure the safety of agricultural products with low cost and high efficiency.The increase revenue of safe agricultural products supply chain is from agricultural products "security premium" and the realization of "security premium" depends on effective transfer of information. The arising of agricultural products safety problems precisely due to asymmetric information and adverse selection on its supply chain. Establishing the wholesaler-dominated agricultural products safety traceability system can transfer the information effectively and make information symmetry realize. In this paper, the theoretical analysis and design of the wholesaler-dominated agricultural products safety traceability system have been done and its construction path has been put forward. The traceability system has two parts that are the market information system and the agricultural products safety information traceability platform to fully mobilize the initiative of each agent in market and make the system run efficiently and feasibly.The paper uses supply chain coordination theory, game theory and complex adaptive systems theory to discuss the behavior policy choices of the farmers, the wholesalers, the wholesale market and the government under the wholesale trade mode and builds the wholesaler-dominated agricultural products safety traceability system in order to provide reference for agricultural products safety management under the wholesale trade mode.更多还原