首都圈省际经济利益协调机制研究

【作者】 齐子翔；

【导师】 祝尔娟；

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 区域经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 区域协调发展,既包括区域内部诸要素(资源、环境、人口、产业等)之间的可持续发展,即区域协调；也包括减少区域间发展差距,消除区域间利益冲突,即区际协调(魏后凯2009,范恒山,孙久文2011)。本文的研究属于区际协调。区际协调要以区际利益协调为主线(陈秀山,杨艳2008)。为简化研究,本文站在政府的层面,仅研究不同省(直辖市)之间的经济利益协调。如无特殊说明,本文所涉及的省际协调均指省际经济利益协调。首都圈范围界定为：北京市、天津市、河北省全境,即京津冀三省市全域(李国平2004；谭维克,赵弘2011；祝尔娟2012)。本文所提首都圈均指京津冀三省市全域。省际经济利益非均衡是首都圈区域协同发展面临的核心矛盾,具体表现为：产业同构与恶性竞争、区域市场分割与地方保护、省际公共物品供给不足、贫富分化与生态恶化、政绩竞争与重复建设等若干方面。造成首都圈省际经济利益非均衡的直接原因是区域经济一体化的客观要求同行政边界刚性约束的矛盾,根本原因是地方政府的有限理性和市场的不完全性。基于上述原因,省际经济利益协调机制的建立显得尤为必要。省际经济利益协调机制是一种区域利益再分配机制。这种机制不仅对于缩小省际差距十分重要,还是化解省际经济利益矛盾,推进区域经济一体化必不可少的工具。本文的理论意义旨在突破行政边界刚性约束的羁绊,冲破地方政府利益固化的藩篱,破除制约首都圈区域协同发展的机制障碍,以经济的内在联系为基石,进行省际经济利益协调。本文使用空间计量经济学局域自相关(Moran指数Ii)方法,通过实证分析发现：2004年至2012年间,首都圈地区经济空间溢出效应明显。首都圈的经济空间溢出效应已经突破了省际行政边界,如果再基于行政边界研究省际利益协调,可能并不十分合理,而是亟需建立能够突破行政边界羁绊的省际协调机制。经济的空间溢出是经济的客观规律。它说明了省际协调需要突破行政边界羁绊的必要性。省际经济利益强调区际关系,它侧重于经济利益的再分配。省际经济利益是指特定的省(直辖市)从其他省(直辖市)或国家获得的排他性收益,属于社会福利再分配范畴；是生产要素不完全流动性,市场不完全竞争性,地方政府不完全理性所表现出的空间优势。省际经济利益具体表现为产业省际转移税收分享、省际基础设施共建成本分摊、省际生态补偿等。省际经济利益协调机制是以专门联合委员会制度为协调形式的一种省际经济利益让度与分配的长效机制,是解决省际经济利益冲突的规则,是地方政府间的合同,是一类利益分配函数,是一个省际经济利益再分配的过程；在此过程中,区域经济协调权威机构被国家授权对各区域利益主体的立场加以评定,并作出对各方在执行过程中具有法律约束力的量化仲裁决定。省际经济利益协调是一场博弈,是策略依存的。首都圈省际经济利益博弈主体是京津冀三地政府。省际经济利益协调机制不需要每个博弈主体的策略在任何情况下均是最优的,只要博弈主体的策略是针对对手采取策略基础上的最优策略即可,则省际纳什均衡是省际经济利益协调机制突破行政边界刚性约束的理论基础。省际纳什均衡是指省际经济利益协调中每个博弈主体都不能也不想单方面改变自己的策略而增加收益；每个博弈主体所选策略均是对其他区域所选策略的最佳利益分配。省际纳什均衡是各省间相互让渡利益的结果；区域考核指标一体化是省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态的前提条件；当且仅当区域考核指标一体化时,省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态。首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的顶层设计包括五个分机制,分别是协商机制、仲裁机制、分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制。基于经济空间溢出效应的视角,京津冀三地政府可以通过市长联席会议进行跨界横向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即协商机制；基于地方政府有限理性和市场不完全性的视角,当地方政府自组织式的横向协调无法达到省际纳什均衡时,中央政府通过设立超越地方行政区划的权威仲裁机构进行纵向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即仲裁机制；基于财税机制改革的视角,首都圈产业转移的省际纳什均衡是横向分税制,即分享机制；基于投资机制改革的视角,首都圈跨界基础设施共建的省际纳什均衡是横向成本分摊制,即分摊机制；基于自然资源资产产权制度改革的视角,首都圈生态联防联控的省际纳什均衡是财政横向转移支付制,即补偿机制。五个分机制中,协商机制、仲裁机制体现协调的形式和程序,而分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制体现协调的具体内容。仲裁机制属于纵向协调,保证了协调的公平；协商机制属于横向协调,保证了协调的效率。首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的路径选择是纵横结合。五个分机制共同作用发挥合力,才能突破行政边界羁绊,促进区域协同发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Regional coordinated development includes the sustainable development of the internal factors (like resources, environment, population, industry), which is regional coordination. It also includes the narrowing of inter-regional development gap and the elimination of inter-regional interest conflict, which is inter-regional coordination (Wei Hou-kai2009, Fan Heng-shan, Sun Jiu-wen2011). The coordination of inter-provincial economic interest in this paper belongs to inter-regional coordination, focusing on the governmental level. Inter-regional interest coordination should be the main theme of inter-regional coordination (Chen Xiu-shan, Yang Yan2008). To simplify research, this paper will analyze the coordination of economic interest in the provincial (or municipal) governmental level. Without special mention, the inter-provincial coordination in this paper refers to the coordination of inter-provincial economic interest.The Capital Metropolis area includes Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province, or the so called The Capital Metropolis (Li Guo-ping2004; Tan Wei-ke, Zhao Hong2011; Zhu Er-zhuang2012).The key conflict of the Capital Metropolis is the imbalance of inter-provincial economic interest, which is demonstrated in the following: similar industries and vicious competition, regional market segmentation and local protection, insufficient supply of inter-provincial public goods, polarization between the rich and the poor, ecological deterioration, political performance competition and repeated construction, etc. The direct reason for the imbalance of inter-provincial economic interest is the conflict between the objective needs of regional economic integration and the administrative boundary segmentation, and the basic reason is the bounded rationality of local governments and the imperfections of market. Based on what’s mentioned above, it’s obviously important to set up the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest among the Capital Metropolis. The theoretical significance of this paper is to break the regional administrative boundary segmentation and the interest curing of local governments, and design the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest by the intrinsic link of economy to balance the inter-provincial economic interest.This paper uses spatial econometrics Moran’s I and finds out by empirical analysis that in2004, economic spatial agglomeration of the Capital Metropolis only fell on some individual areas like Xicheng district, Haidian district, Chaoyang district, Binhai New Area, Tangshan, Langfang, etc., but in2012, it fell on Haidian district, Chaoyang district, Dongcheng district, Xicheng district, Fengtai district, Shi Jingshan district, Changping district, Shunyi district, Tongzhou district, Daxing district, Gu’an county, Langfang, Wuqing district, Beichen district, Hedong district, Hexi district, Hebei district, Heping district, Nankai district, Hongqiao district, Dongli district, Xiqing district, Jinnan district, Baodi county, Binhai New Area, Tangshan, Zunhua, Xianxi county, Xian’an, Qin Huangdao. Chengde, Shi Jiazhuang, Baoding, etc. In just8years, the spatial spillover effect of the economy of the Capital Metropolis was quite obvious, which has broken the inter-provincial administrative boundaries. Therefore, it seems not reasonable to research on the distribution and coordination of inter-provincial interest based on the research on administrative boundaries but to set up immediately an inter-provincial coordination mechanism which breaks the barriers of administrative boundaries. The spatial spillover is the objective law of economy, which illustrates the necessity of breaking administrative boundaries when doing inter-provincial coordination.Inter-provincial economic interest stresses the inter-regional relationship, focusing on the redistribution of economic interest. It means the exclusive benefits that a specific province (or municipality) gets from other provinces (or municipalities), and falls on the category of the redistribution of social benefits. It is the spatial advantage demonstrated by the incomplete liquidity of productive factors, incomplete competition of the market and the incomplete rationality of local governments, and it takes the form of tax sharing for inter-provincial industry transfer, cost amortization of inter-provincial infrastructure co-building, inter-provincial ecological compensation, etc.Coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interests is a long-term mechanism for the transfer and distribution of inter-provincial economic interest, which takes the form of specific joint committee system. It is the rule to solve the dispute of inter-provincial economic interest, the contract among local governments and a function for interest distribution. It is also a process for the redistribution of inter-provincial economic interest where the reputed agency for regional economic coordination is authorized by the country to evaluate the position of region and make quantitative legally decisions. Coordination for inter-provincial economic interest is the redistribution of inter-provincial economic interest, so the equilibrium of this coordination is the equilibrium of this redistribution. The integration of regional evaluation indicators is the precondition of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest to break the barriers of administrative boundaries.The inter-provincial economic interest game is strategy dependent, and the coordination for inter-provincial economic interest is just a game. The coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest doesn’t require that the strategy of each region is the best under any circumstance, but is the best compared with that of the opponent. Therefore, Inter-provincial Nash Equilibrium is the path choice of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest to break the barriers of administrative boundaries. Inter-provincial Nash equilibrium means that in coordination for inter-provincial economic interest, each game subject cannot and wouldn’t like to change its own strategy unilaterally to increase benefits; each strategy chosen by the individual game subject is the optimal interest distribution compared with those of other regions. In other words, the Nash Equilibrium point must be found to break the segmentation and barriers of administrative boundaries and realize the coordination for inter-provincial economic interest in the market with imperfect competition. It is a good strategy for all.The top-level design of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest includes five sub-mechanisms, namely arbitrage mechanism, negotiation mechanism, sharing mechanism, amortization mechanism and compensation mechanism. From the perspective of spatial spillover of regional economies, local governments need to make cross-border and horizontal negotiation through joint meeting of mayors, which is negotiation mechanism; based on incomplete rationality of local governments and the incompleteness of market, the central government needs to set up an authoritative arbitrage authority above local administrative boundaries to make vertical coordination when self-motivated negotiation of local governments cannot reach consensus on some cross-border cooperation and key projects, which is arbitrage mechanism; from the perspective of fiscal and taxation system reform, the horizontal tax sharing mechanism should be set up for cooperation on profitable products, like inter-provincial transfer of industries, which is sharing mechanism; from the perspective of investment and financing mechanism reform, cost amortization mechanism should be established for cooperation on quasi-public goods, like co-building of cross-border infrastructure, which is amortization mechanism; from the perspective of reform on property right system of natural resources, ecological compensation mechanism should be set up through horizontal financial transfer payment for pure public goods, like water, ecological environment, etc., which is compensation mechanism. Among the five sub-mechanisms, arbitrage mechanism and negotiation mechanism demonstrate the form and procedure of coordination while sharing mechanism, amortization mechanism and compensation mechanism show the contents of coordination. Arbitrage mechanism belongs to vertical coordination, ensuring its fairness; negotiation mechanism belongs to horizontal coordination, ensuring its efficiency. Coordination for inter-provincial economic interest should be both vertical and horizontal. The path choice for the inter-provincial economic interest coordination mechanism is vertical and horizontal integration. Only when the five sub-mechanisms work together can they break the barriers of administrative boundaries and make inter-provincial coordination. To ensure its effectiveness, coordination mechanism should be designed in the form of contracts, which endows legal effect on it and ensures its enforceability and rigid binding force.更多还原