【作者】 郑兴有；

【导师】 顾庆良；

【作者基本信息】 东华大学 ， 企业管理， 2014， 博士

【副题名】基于电信运营商与代理商合作博弈分析

【摘要】 随着营销渠道理论研究重心的演变,学者们的关注重点已经从渠道结构转向渠道冲突和渠道行为。其中,渠道冲突管理在市场营销中的作用显得越来越重要。渠道冲突管理已成为学术界和企业界日益关注的话题,探讨如何化解渠道冲突,实现渠道中双方或多方的互利共赢,正成为渠道利益相关方的共同诉求。渠道权力是渠道行为研究中的重要内容,其研究成果目前主要集中在发达的市场经济体,国内学者对于渠道权力的研究,整体上还显得相对不足且多以理论研究为主,具体到某一特定行业的研究相对比较缺乏。电信行业是国民经济中的重要行业,在工业化和信息化协同发展的今天,其地位更加凸显。经过电信行业的多次重组和电信行业3G牌照和4G牌照的陆续发放,电信行业格局有望得到持续优化,各运营商之间的市场竞争也会随之更加激烈。各运营商在经营活动中均把营销渠道布局和渠道关系治理摆在了至关重要的位置,渠道满意是渠道关系治理的重要目标,运营商应树立以渠道满意推动渠道绩效、以渠道满意推动客户满意的意识,着力于构建长期稳定、互惠共赢的渠道生态关系。本文以电信运营商与代理商之间的博弈冲突研究为基础,以电信行业为例,研究运营商渠道权力运用策略与代理商信任值的相关关系,在一定程度上弥补了电信行业内此类研究的不足,具有一定的理论价值和实践价值。同时,当前移动互联网技术的蓬勃发展和电信行业内渠道权力转移的相关背景,赋予了本研究在电信市场发展阶段上的时代特征。本文首先综述国内外学者关于渠道冲突、渠道权力及其运用策略、渠道成员满意度、权力策略与满意度的相互关系等方面的研究情况,结合电信行业实际提出本文的研究思路,并建立相应的研究模型和研究假设。然后,运用Matlab进行运营商与代理商之间的冲突的具体仿真,得出强制使用渠道权力对运营商来说是一把双刃剑,虽然可以帮助运营商在短期内提升自身的收益,但是从长期的发展趋势来看,会降低博弈双方的信任,引发“囚徒困境”而无法跳出,最终导致双输的结果。如果代理商在市场中能够自由的更换自己钟意的运营商,那么,越少使用渠道权力的运营商将会最终在市场中胜出,即使短期内会受到一定的收益增长上的损失。同时代理商的串货、养卡等弄虚作假的行为也会最终冲击到市场,造成“公共地”的悲剧,进一步恶化整个市场的环境。为了能够在运营商与代理商之间在长期的交往中互相形成良好的信任,运营商应认真考量并慎用渠道权力这把双刃剑。本文主要解决了运营商与代理商之间的信任博弈问题,并构建出一个完整的运营商与代理商之间的基于相互之间信任值变化的仿真系统,得出代理商能够自由选择的市场才是一个良性的市场,也发现了强制渠道权力对于运营商与代理商之间信任的破坏性影响。此外,还从更加微观的层面来发现运营商与代理商之间博弈的每一个消费周期的信任值、销量、代理商弄虚作假的次数,运营商抽查的次数,以及整个市场的串货的累积数量等。在此基础上,结合电信运营实际,探讨了电信内部承运人或称为内部代理人对渠道运营的影响。从长期激励的角度研究了电信运营商所采用的内部代理人制度的收益,建立了长期激励模型,通过增加长期激励约束、贴现率和收益增长率,求出了长期激励模型的解。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the evolution of marketing channel theory, scholars have shifted focus channel structure to channel conflict and channel behavior. Conflict management of channel has been increasingly important, an how to resolve channel conflict and realize a win-win goal has become interest and need of stakeholders. Channel power is the most important part of channel behavior, and their research is mainly concentrated on the developed market economies. As for channel power, related theory especially industry-specific empirical research is still inadequate and more theoretical research-based.With the development of industrialization and information technology, as an important industry of the national economy, telecommunications industry has been playing more and more evitable role. After the third restructuring of telecommunications,3G license issuance as well as incoming4G issuance, the telecommunications industry structure is expected to be optimized and the market competition among operators will be more intense. Each operator tends to place distribution of marketing channels as well as governance channel relationships in a critical position, where channel satisfaction is an important goal of channel relationship management. Operators should establish awareness that channel satisfaction is able to promote channel performance and further customer’s satisfaction, focusing on building long-term stability, mutual benefit and ecological channel relationships.In this paper, based on research paradigm of conflict game of telecom operators and agents in telecommunications industry, the relation between the use of power of operator channel and a sense of credibility of agents is studied, which is used to compensate for the lack of studies in this field, creating theoretical and practical significance. Meanwhile, this study bases on channel power transfer, which features the characteristics of times. This article first summarizes domestic and foreign scholars’research on theory of channel conflict and channel power, channel member satisfaction, the relationship between power strategies and satisfaction. Combined with the background of telecommunications industry, appropriate research model and research hypotheses are proposed. Then, through simulation of conflict game between operators and agents, we are able to conclude that the use of channel power is a double-edged sword, on one side, it would help operators to enhance their profit in a short term, however, on the other side, and it will reduce the credibility of both sides, causing "Prisoner’s Dilemma" and a lose-lose result. If the agents in the market can freely change their favored carriers, operators that use less channel power will eventually win in the market, despite there is some short-term losses on revenue growth. Apart from that, illegal behaviors like hidden transactions of agents will ultimately impact the market, resulting in the "public land" tragedy and further deteriorating the market environment. To be able to form a good reputation among operators and agents, operators should take caution to consider using channel power; Otherwise the weapon will hurt the other as well as yourself.This paper addresses the credibility of the game between operators and agents and builds credibility system based on the game between operators and agents, finding that (1) the market which agents enable freely to choose is ideal market;(2) Forced channel power exerts devastating effects on sense of credibility between the agents for the operators;(3) parameters such as credibility in one cycle, sales volume, the number of fraud agents, frequency of inspections from carriers as well as the cumulative number of products of the entire market are being studied.Based on that, by consideration of practice, the influence of inner agent on channel operation is further studied. From the prospective of long-term motivation, profitability of inner agent mechanism is constructed. Through adding long-term motivation constraints, discount rate, earnings rate, long-term motivation model is developed.更多还原