【作者】 张日旭；

【导师】 王立国；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 2008年的国际金融危机使我国部分行业产能过剩问题显现出来,引起各方的高度重视。为应对金融危机对我国的冲击和影响,引导产业健康发展,2009年国务院批转了国家发改委等部门《关于抑制部分行业产能过剩和重复建设引导产业健康发展的若干意见》,其中指出了我国钢铁、水泥、平板玻璃、煤化工、多晶硅以及风电设备等行业产能过剩的情况,并从环保、土地、项目审批等诸多方面提出了具体的产业发展导向和抑制产能过剩的对策措施。其实,产能过剩一直是国家宏观调控的重点之一,近年来,国家出台的抑制产能过剩的相关政策几乎没有间断过,产能过剩问题仍然反复出现。从产能过剩的成因来看,地区的经济发展以及企业的投资决策会受到地方政府极大地影响,所以,本文从地方政府行为的角度,研究我国现阶段的产能过剩问题。本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法以及案例研究法等,力图将研究建立在严谨的理论分析与坚实的经验研究基础上。以公共选择理论的基本研究方法为基础,结合产业组织理论、福利经济学、政府经济学中的过度竞争理论、过度进入、过度投资、政府干预与政府失灵等相关研究成果,并进一步结合我国的财政分权制度与政府官员政绩考核制度,从基本理论与制度背景出发,研究地方政府行为诱发产能过剩的作用机理、产能过剩中地方政府间以及中央政府、地方政府与企业间的博弈。以我国2005～2011年地区上市公司为研究样本,采用面板数据分析方法,结合固定效应模型、分组检验等,探讨地方财政自给度、地方GDP增速对企业过度投资行为的影响以及国有企业的过度投资情况。同时,对电解铝行业的产能过剩状况进行研究,最终,结合本文的分析提出缓解产能过剩问题的具体对策建议。具体来说,本文共分为八个部分。第一部分是引言,概述了本文的研究背景、研究方法与研究意义、研究思路与分析框架、研究的创新点与不足等内容。第二部分是文献述评,主要内容包括：对产能过剩的概念进行了界定；从经济周期、企业决策、体制因素三方面,总结了产能过剩的形成原因；从产能过剩问题是否需要政府的介入加以解决的角度,归纳了缓解产能过剩的对策措施。第三部分是研究产能过剩与地方政府行为的理论基础,包括：过度竞争、过度进入与过度投资理论；公共选择理论；政府干预与政府失灵理论。第四部分是地方政府行为诱发产能过剩的机理分析。1994年以来,我国实施的分税制财政体制改革,使得地方政府拥有了更大的财权、事权,增加了地方政府参与经济发展的积极性,同时也形成了地方政府间的竞争。由于我国高度集权的政治制度同样渗透在财政制度中,虽然进行了分税制改革,但是,目前绝大部分财权仍集中于中央,地方政府并没有相应的财权,即地方政府实际拥有的事权与财权并不匹配,由此,导致了地方政府间的恶性竞争愈演愈烈,各地方政府均竭力向制度外发展、寻求制度外资源。为了在激烈的竞争中胜出,地方政府可能会以土地、资源、环境等为代价来换取地方经济的增长。通过使企业内部成本外部化的方式,干预企业投资决策与市场运行机制,导致了部分行业产能过剩问题加剧。另一方面,现阶段我国的以GDP为核心的政府官员政绩考核制度,也使得地方官员将地区发展过度地集中在了GDP的增长率上。在晋升博弈中,只有有限数量的地方政府官员可以获得晋升,某一个地方政府官员获得晋升会直接降低其他地方政府官员晋升机会,这种具有零和博弈特征的政治锦标赛模式,势必会将地方政府间的竞争转化为为了政治收益而不计经济成本和社会成本的恶性竞争。因此,现行的政府官员考核与晋升制度也成为地方政府过度干预企业投资决策的动力之一,从而导致了产能过剩问题的加剧。正是出于对地方财政收入以及官员政绩两方面的考虑,使得地方政府间形成了一定的相互竞争的关系,由于相应体制、制度的不健全,这种竞争关系愈演愈烈,导致了地方政府不惜以土地、环境、资源等作为所谓的“优惠条件”,对辖区内的企业投资行为进行过度地干预。具体措施包括：使企业内部成本外部化以及风险外部化。在企业内部成本外部化方面,一是以土地优惠为手段的企业内部成本外部化。由于地方政府具有双重性的特点以及部分土地的模糊产权,使得地方政府通过土地的形式对企业实行补贴成为可能。二是以环境为手段的企业内部成本外部化。我国的环境监督管理部门实行的是双重管理体制,即各地区的环境保护局,既要接受地方政府、地方党委的领导,又要接受上级环境保护部门的监督指导,其中以地方管理为主。在这种管理体制下,地方政府在很大程度上主导了该地区环保部门的工作。三是以税收优惠为手段的企业内部成本外部化。在竞争过程中,地方政府往往会以低税率、较少的税种作为吸引企业投资的优惠条件,从而在市场和资源的竞争中获得优势。在风险外部化方面,首先,一方面地方政府作为该地区城市商业银行的大股东,对这些商业银行有着较强的控制力,并对全国性商业银行在该地区的分支机构也有一定的话语权,使得银行的信贷容易受到地方政府的影响和干预；另一方面,我国的国有控股银行仍然具有一定的垄断地位,存贷款利率并没有实现市场化,银行能够以极低的成本获取资金。两方面因素相结合,使得地方政府能够帮助企业从商业银行得到低成本的贷款。第二,政策性贷款的成本往往非常低且期限较长,地方政府会利用各种手段从政策性银行获取贷款后,再以直接或间接的方式让企业使用资金,例如,利用地方政府的融资平台获取资金,帮助企业完成原应由投资企业自己来承担的建设任务等。此外,土地的模糊产权使得地方政府能为企业投资提供大量实质性的补贴,金融体系的预算软约束使得地方政府能够帮助本地企业转嫁融资成本和风险,即使得投资成本和风险外部化,投资者的私人成本远小于社会成本,从而导致企业投资的激励结构和企业的投资行为扭曲。相应地,地方政府行为诱发的产能过剩问题会带来诸多负面影响,包括：对居民利益的影响、对税收制度的影响以及对金融风险的影响等。第五部分是产能过剩中的各方博弈。对地方政府竞争行为的理论分析,主要是从博弈论的角度解释地方政府间以及地方政府、中央政府与企业间决策的相互影响机理。地方政府间的博弈主要包括：地方政府间的财政竞争博弈以及官员晋升博弈。对地方政府、中央政府与企业间的决策博弈,主要研究在经济平稳期以及经济发展出现过热时,地方政府利用制度外竞争手段(文章中仅对地方政府利用违规税收优惠吸引企业投资的情况进行研究,而不考虑地方政府利用土地、金融等手段进行引资的情况)对企业投资决策的影响。第六部分是实证研究与案例分析。在实证研究方面,文章利用面板数据的固定效应模型,通过对上市公司2005～2011年数据的分析,从地方财政自给度、地方GDP增速以及国有企业三个方面考察了地方政府行为影响下的企业过度投资情况。验证了三个假说,包括：①地方财政自给度与企业过度投资行为呈负相关关系,即财政自给度越低的地区,企业过度投资行为越严重；②地方GDP增长率与企业过度投资行为呈正相关关系,即GDP增速越快的地区,企业过度投资行为越严重；③无论是地方国有还是中央国有企业均存在过度投资情况。由此,建议对于缓解由地方政府干预所诱发的过度投资现象,可以主要从财政体制的健全和完善、弱化GDP增速对地方政府的影响以及政企分开等几方面进行治理。例如,在财政体制方面,健全和完善转移支付制度有利于实现社会公平、宏观经济稳定、财政能力均等化等目标；在弱化GDP增速指标的影响方面,重点是要改革现行的以GDP为核心的地方政府官员政绩考核体系,将体系中引入能够从不同角度反映地区实际发展状况的多种指标；在对国有企业的影响方面,通过转变地方政府的干预方式等手段,明确地方政府的角色定位,提高企业的投资效率。在案例分析方面,本文以电解铝行业为例,对我国目前行业产能过剩状况进行具体的案例分析。通过对电解铝行业产能过剩状况的研究,总结出行业产能过剩的特点与成因,即虽然目前行业的产能过剩状况受到了经济周期波动的影响,但体制性因素才是引起产能过剩加剧的主要原因。再一次印证了本文的观点。第七部分是对策建议。基于本文对我国目前行业产能过剩状况的研究,主要从健全制度、完善规制以及明确地方政府角色定位三个方面提出了具体的对策建议,包括：在健全财政制度以及官员晋升制度方面,加快财政体制改革；健全财政制度安排；优化政府官员政绩考核指标体系。在完善中央政府规制方面,保障中央政策执行力；抑制地方保护行为,提供公平竞争环境；完善监管体系、加强对地方政府的监管力度；在明确地方政府角色定位方面,要转变地方政府干预方式,建立“有限政府”；引导地方政府由竞争走向竞合；健全行业信息发布制度,提高地方政府服务意识等。第八部分是结论与展望,总结了本文的主要研究内容,并提出了未来的研究方向。综上所述,本文从地方政府行为的角度,揭示了产能过剩形成与加剧的作用机理,指出我国现阶段部分行业产能过剩加剧的根本原因在于相应体制、机制的不健全,使得地方政府对地方经济以及企业投资行为的过度干预。并有针对性地提出缓解产能过剩问题的对策建议。本文的主要创新点包括：①指出了目前部分行业产能过剩问题产生与加剧的根本原因。本文从地方政府行为的角度,揭示了其对产能过剩形成与加剧的作用机理,指出我国现阶段部分行业产能过剩加剧的根本原因在于相应体制、机制的不健全,使得地方政府对地方经济与企业投资行为的过度干预。②验证了地方政府行为影响下的企业过度投资情况。本文利用面板数据的固定效应模型,通过对上市公司2005～2011年数据的分析,从地方财政自给度、地方GDP增速以及国有企业三个方面考察了地方政府行为影响下的企业过度投资情况。并提出可以主要从财政体制的健全和完善、弱化GDP增速对地方政府的影响以及政企分开等几方面缓解产能过剩问题。③提出了产能过剩新的分类方式。本文从经济周期、企业行为与政府行为的视角,按引起产能过剩的原因,将产能过剩的种类重新归纳总结,提出了产能过剩可分为周期性产能过剩、战略性产能过剩以及体制性产能过剩三类。更多还原

【Abstract】 The international financial crisis makes China’s overcapacity problem in some industries emerged in2008, which is highly attached by the government, experts and scholars. For dealing with the impact of this problem and guiding the industries healthy development, the State Council approves and transmits the opinions of Development and Reform Commission. It’s pointed out the overcapacity problem in iron and steel, cement, plate glass, coal chemical, polysilicon and wind power equipment industries. Furthermore, it puts forward the relevant strategies and measures from the factors of environmental protection, land management, project approval for the issues. In fact, the overcapacity problem has been a focus of national macro-control, the relevant policies of suppression excess capacity problem promulgated by the state almost without interruption in recent years. However, the overcapacity problem still repeats. From the causes of overcapacity problem, the region’s economic development and corporations’investment decisions are affected by local government’s behaviors greatly. Therefore, the dissertation researches on overcapacity problem from the perspective of local government’s behaviors.This dissertation uses normative research method, empirical research method and case study method. It bases on the research methods of public choice theory, and combines with industrial organization theory, welfare economics, excessive competition theory, excessive entry theory, excessive investment theory, government intervention theory, government failure theory, etc. and further integrates the fiscal decentralization system and government officials’performance assessment system, studies on the mechanism of overcapacity which causes by local government behaviors, the game between local governments and among local government, central government and enterprises. It’s making China’s2005-2011listing corporations as research samples, using the panel data analysis method, combining with the fixed effect model and group inspection, discussing the relationship among local financial self-sufficiency degree, local GDP growth rate, state-owned enterprises and overinvestment. At the same time, the dissertation studies the overcapacity of electrolytic aluminum industry. Finally, it puts forward some specific suggestions to alleviate the overcapacity problem.Specifically, there are eight parts. The first part is introduction. It provides an overview of the research background, research methods and significance, analysis framework, innovations and deficiencies.The second part is literature review. The main contents include:defining the concept of overcapacity; summarizing the causes of overcapacity from the aspects of economic cycle, enterprises’ decisions and institutional factors; summing up the mitigation measures of overcapacity.The third part is theoretical basis of overcapacity and local government behavior. It Includes:excessive competition theory, excessive entry theory and excessive investment theory; public choice theory; the theory of government intervention and government failure.The fourth part is mechanism analysis of overcapacity caused by local government behavior. The reform of tax-sharing fiscal system, in1994, makes local governments own more power and increase the enthusiasm of local governments in economic development. At the same time, it also forms the competitions among local governments. Because of China’s highly centralized political system also exists in the financial system, local governments do not get the corresponding financial power, in other words, at present the most financial powers are still concentrated in the central, duties and responsibilities of the local governments actually do not match. That’s leading to the vicious competitions among local governments intensified, and then local governments have to find more resources out of the system. In order to win in the fierce competitions, the local governments may take land, resources and environment in exchange for local economic growth. By transforming the enterprises’ internal costs to other aspects, local governments intervene in the investment decisions of enterprises and the operational mechanism of market. Thus, the overcapacity problems in some industries exacerbate. On the other hand, local governments focus on the GDP growth rate excessively, also because of present government officials’ performance assessment system which takes GDP as the core. In the promotion game, only a limited number of local government officials can promote. The promotion of one local government official will directly reduce the other local government officials’ promotion chance. This political tournament mode has the features of zero-sum game. It will become a vicious competition which is only for political gains without regarding to economic and social costs. Therefore, the current government officials’ assessment and promotion system becomes one of the power that local governments intervene in enterprises’investment decisions excessively, and then leads to the industries’ overcapacity problem seriously.Transferring the enterprises’internal costs and risks to other aspects are the measures of local governments’intervention. In the matter of enterprises’internal costs externalization, it includes three aspects. The first approach is land benefit, due to local governments’dual nature and part of land’s fuzzy property rights, local governments could give subsidies to enterprises through the form of land benefit. The second approach is environmental conditions. The environmental supervision and management departments implement the dual management system. In other words, environmental protection department of the regions not only accept management of superior environmental protection department, but also accept local government’s management. In such system, environmental protection departments are affected by the local government a lot. The third approach is tax benefit, in the process of competition, local governments tend to use lower tax rate, less tax categories as preferential conditions to attract the investment of enterprises, so as to obtain the advantage in the market and resource competitions. At the risk externalization aspects, firstly, local governments which are the shareholders of city commercial banks have a strong control of the commercial banks, and can intervene in commercial banks’credit business. Secondly, policy loans’costs are often very low and the term of the loan is long, local governments could obtain loans from the policy bank by various means, and then directly or indirectly give them to enterprises. In addition, because of fuzzy property rights of land, local governments can provide substantial subsidies for business investment. The soft budget constraint of the financial system makes local governments to help enterprises transfer costs and risks. The costs of private investors are far less than the social costs. It makes enterprises’investment incentive structure and investment behaviors distort. Accordingly, there are some negative effects, including impact on the interests of residents, impact on the tax system, effects on the ecological environment and financial risk.The fifth part is the games in overcapacity. The theory analysis of local governments’ competition mainly uses game theory to explain the influence mechanism between local governments and among local government, central government and enterprises. The game between local governments, mainly including:intergovernmental fiscal competition and the official promotion game. The decision games among local government, central government and enterprises, mainly research that local government uses outside-the-system competition means to affect enterprises’investment decisions.The sixth part is empirical study and case analysis. In the empirical study, the dissertation uses the fixed effect model of panel data to analyze the data of listed corporations (2005-2011), and to research the enterprises’excessive investment behaviors which are affected by local governments from three aspects. It validates three hypotheses, including:there is a negative correlation between local financial self-sufficiency degree and corporations’overinvestment behaviors; there is a positive correlation between local GDP growth rate and corporations’overinvestment behaviors; there are excessive investments whether in local state-owned or state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it suggests that alleviate overcapacity problem which is caused by local governments’ intervention can mainly from perfect financial system, reduction effect of GDP growth rate, separation of enterprise from administration.In the case analysis, the dissertation makes electrolytic aluminum industry as an example research present industry overcapacity problem. Through the study of electrolytic aluminum industry overcapacity situation, it sums up characteristics and causes of industry overcapacity. Although the industry overcapacity situation is affected by the economic cycle fluctuations, but the institutional factors are the main reasons. It confirms the view once again.The seventh part is suggestions. Based on the above study, it puts forward some suggestions, including:accelerating the reform of the financial system; improving the financial system arrangement; inhibiting local protection acts; strengthening the supervision behaviors, etc.The eighth part is conclusion and prospect. It summarizes the main research contents of this dissertation, and proposes the future research direction.To sum up, the dissertation reveals the formation and growing mechanism of overcapacity from the aspect of local governments’behaviors, points out the fundamental reasons of present overcapacity problem, and puts forward some relevant suggestions. The main innovations of this dissertation include:pointing out the root causes of industry overcapacity problem; verifying the overinvestment causes by local government behavior; putting forward a new classification method of overcapacity.更多还原