【作者】 罗湖平；

【导师】 朱有志；

【作者基本信息】 湖南农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 作为财富之母的土地,能够尽快兑现其财富的“捷径”只能是改变用途或改变所有权。在中国土地资源配置过程中,不尽完善的土地治理结构、产权制度安排以及不尽规范的政府土地管制行为等共同作用,诱发着当事人在土地级差收益追逐中的机会主义行为——擅自走“捷径”以尽快兑现土地财富,由此,一种无序的、价格机制扭曲的、畸形发育的土地隐形市场在全国各地自发形成,成为当前的社会焦点和难点之一。所谓土地隐形市场,是指在我国特殊的土地产权制度下,各利益主体在土地产权权能流动过程中绕开现行土地法律法规擅自行动而形成的一切土地交换关系之和,通常是指当事人因利益驱使擅自改变原有土地用途或使用类型而形成的土地交易市场,它具有隐蔽性、自发性、非国家正式认可性、产权权能流动性和利益驱动性等特征。在我国土地资源配置中,主要包括农用地承包经营权隐形市场、农村集体建设用地隐形市场、农地非农化隐形市场、国有划拨土地隐形市场和有偿性国有土地隐形市场等基本形态。在新制度经济学的分析框架下,沿着资源配置效率改进路径,系统考察中国土地资源配置市场化进程中的治理结构效率和制度环境效率状况,发现曾经有效率的制度安排或契约设计正逐渐成为无谓损失之源,土地隐形市场正隐匿于其中。进一步研究发现,土地市场治理结构中的隐形市场出现因应了政府的双层垄断性,土地市场制度变迁中的隐形市场出现因应了产权制度的内在规定性,城乡建设用地隐形市场的出现因应了土地管制中的政府失灵。中国土地资源配置中的隐形市场有其存在的客观必然性,它既在微观、中观和宏观层面对土地有形市场造成了消极影响,也在一定程度上反映了市场经济的内在需求而成为诱发土地制度创新或变革的动力源。因此,在中国土地隐形市场显形化的路径选择中,既要强化土地行政,对刚性执法型土地隐形市场进行严厉打击和坚决取缔,又要对柔性执法型土地隐形市场进行正面引导,诱致土地制度改革和创新。由此,需要分层分类分阶段推进中国土地隐形市场显形化,一是在还权赋能的土地产权制度改革和创新中优化土地制度环境,二是在打破政府垄断和推进征地制度改革中优化土地治理结构,三是在规范政府行为和推进管理体制改革中优化政府土地行政系统。当务之急,是要积极推进土地确权、登记和颁证工作,这是中国土地隐形市场显形化效率选择的第一步。研究还通过动态建构无缝隙的产权制度变迁模型发现,我国土地资源市场化配置过程中的产权制度效率呈现出同一轨迹上“先增后减”的倒“U”型规律,同时又在不同轨迹上呈现出间断性的改进特征,有效率的无缝隙产权制度变迁周期将呈现出衰减规律。在中国经济社会转型时期,没有一劳永逸的产权制度变迁,有效率的产权制度变迁越来越依赖于产权制度变迁。在政府双层垄断的治理结构状态下,现行制度中带有模糊性质的所有权和相对独立的使用权等组成的土地产权结构早已陷入“路径锁定”的低效状态,呼唤着新一轮土地产权制度变迁的到来。更多还原

【Abstract】 The only shortcut of cashing the fortune of land, the mother of fortune, is to alter its purpose or ownership. In the process of land resource allocation in China, with the combined effects of continuously improved land governance structure, property system and the inadequately normative land control by the government, the parties concerned are induced to practice opportunism in the chase of differential earnings from land by taking a shortcut without authorization to cash the fortune of land. Thus, the invisible land market characterized by disorder, distorted price mechanism and abnormal development is spontaneously created all around the country, which becomes one of the current social focuses and difficulties.The invisible land market, by definition, means the combined total of land exchange relationship established by the interested parties who bypass the present land laws and regulations in the flow of the land property right functions under China’s special land property right system. The aforementioned market also often refers to the land exchange market created by the parties concerned who are driven by interests to alter the original land use purpose or type without authorization and characterized by invisibility, spontaneity, unauthorization by the state, flowability of the property functions, and interest-driven orientation. In China’s land resource allocation, the invisible market falls into the following basic types:market of the contractual rights of agricultural land, market of the rural collective construction land, market of the state-allocated land, market of the paid state-owned land.Under the framework of New Institutional Economics and with the approach to improving resource allocation efficiency, the thesis systematically examines the governance structure efficiency and institutional environment efficiency in China’s land resource marketization allocation, finding that the once efficient institutional arrangements or designs by contract have been becoming the sources of meaningless loss, among which the invisible land market is a hidden one. A further study indicates that the emergence of the invisible market in the land market governance structure responds to the dual monopoly, the emergence of the invisible market in the changing land market institution responds to the inherent prescription and the emergence of the invisible market of urban and rural construction land responds to the government failure in land control.There is inevitability for the existence of the invisible market in China’s land resource allocation. Its existence not only produces negative effect on the visible land market at micro, intermediate and macro levels, but also to some extent reflects the inherent demand of market economy and then becomes an impetus for creation or innovation of the land system. Therefore, in choosing the path to the visualization of China’s invisible land market, the government should not only strengthen the administration of land by cracking down on the rigidly administrated invisible land market or even resolutely banning it, but also guide the flexibly administrated invisible land market to a correct path of land system’s reform and innovation. Thus, the visualization of China’s invisible land market should be progressed according to levels, categories and phases:first, optimize the land institution environment by reforming and innovating the land property rights to return rights and endow functions; second, optimize the land governance structure by breaking government monopoly and promoting the reform of the institution of land acquisition; third, optimize the land administrative system of government by regulating governmental behaviors and promoting the reform of administrative system. The urgent matter in present is to progress the work of confirming land property rights, registering the rights and conferring the certificates, which is the first step in the efficiency choice for the visualization of China’s invisible land market.By dynamically constructing seamless models of property system changes, the research finds that the property system efficiency in China’s land resource marketization allocation is demonstrated graphically as an inverted U-shaped curve, increasing and then decreasing at the same locus while demonstrated to be discontinuously improved at the different loci, and the change cycle of the efficient seamless property system follows the law of attenuation. In the transitional period of China’s economic society, no change of property system can be terminated once and for all, and the change of efficient property system will rely more on the change of property system. In the governance structure of government’s dual monopoly, the current land property right structure composed of obscured ownership and relatively independent tenure has long been caught in inefficiency of path lock-in, and it calls for the occurrence of a new round of change of land property right system.更多还原