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物流服务供应链企业间管理控制机制研究

Interfirm Control Mechanisms between Logistics Service Supply Chain Enterprises

【作者】 李毅斌

【导师】 董千里;

【作者基本信息】 长安大学 , 物流工程与管理, 2013, 博士

【摘要】 物流服务供应链(LSSC)是随着企业物流外包深入发展出现一种新兴的物流运作组织形式,对LSSC管理问题的研究也在过去十年中也取得了重要进展。然而,针对物流服务供应链管理控制问题的研究还极其有限。另一方面,作为供应链管理环境下的一个重要研究主题,企业间管理控制机制的理论研究还很不成熟,有着极大的理论拓展空间。因此,本文的研究不仅有着重要的现实意义,也具有一定的理论价值。首先,针对学术界出现的对LSSC内涵指代不一致的问题进行了分析,进一步明确了LSSC的组织构成,借鉴企业间管理控制模式类型分析的研究成果,定性分析并构建了LSSC企业间管理控制关系总体框架模型,分析得出了LSSC企业间管理控制机制研究的主要企业间管理控制关系,即:物流外包方(LO)与集成物流服务商(LSI)以及集成物流服务商(LSI)与伙伴物流服务分包商(LSS)两个层次的企业间管理控制。随后,根据企业间关系管理研究的基础理论及相关研究成果,提出了影响企业间管理控制的前因变量、控制手段变量、控制目标变量间作用关系的理论假设及概念模型。最后,利用LO对LSI以及LSI对伙伴LSS两层企业间管理控制问卷调查数据,进行了实证检验。研究发现:⑴交易内容的复杂度、供方能力、对供方的依赖度和合作经验是影响LSSC企业间管理控制手段选择四个主要前因变量,而四个前因变量对三种控制手段的影响却各不相同;⑵合同控制对制度控制有负向作用,对社会控制有正向作用;制度控制对社会控制的正向促进作用在物流外包中表现显著,在物流分包中不显著。⑶合同控制、制度控制及社会控制在LSSC两层企业间伙伴关系管理控制中均会对合作绩效产生显著的正向影响,但合同控制与制度控制在两层关系中的作用强度却有着较大差异。其中:在LO对LSI的管理控制中,制度控制对合作绩效的影响最强;而在LSI对LSS的管理控制中,合同控制对合作绩效的影响最大。⑷从两层管理控制关系的修正模型路径系数对比可知,合同控制和制度控制的不同组合所构成的正式控制对合作绩效的影响大于社会控制的影响。因此,企业间管理控制模式类型中的混合控制应该更多的是指合同控制与制度控制的不同组合,而不是正式控制与社会控制的不同组合。与己有的国内外相关研究相比,本文的创新之处体现在以下几点:⑴构建了LSSC企业间管理控制关系总体框架模型。在对物流外包形态演变情况、LSSC的组织构成及企业间关系深入剖析的基础上,对LSSC企业间管理控制模式类型进行了定性分析,构建了LSSC企业间管理控制关系总体框架模型。这一理论成果有助于LSSC管理相关研究中对基本概念术语使用的规范化,也有助于对LSSC企业间管理控制基本概貌的认识。⑵细化了正式控制的内涵,厘清了正式控制与社会控制的边界。从企业间管理控制的基准依据出发,识别并明确提出了制度控制是企业间正式控制的一种重要手段,从而将企业间管理控制手段中的正式控制分为了合同控制和制度控制,并与社会控制一起构成了企业间管理控制手段的三种基本形态。这一分类进一步明确了正式控制与社会控制的边界,细化并拓展了对企业间正式控制手段的认识。⑶完善了企业间管理控制机制理论模型。用LSSC中的两层企业间管理控制的问卷调查数据,对本文提出的理论假设进行了检验,对构建的LSSC企业间管理控制机制模型进行了修正。由于模型在前因要素、控制手段及合作绩效三个方面均对已有的研究进行了一定的补充或细化。因此,除了对已有理论命题再次验证之外,本文也提出并实证检验了一系列新的理论命题。⑷修正了对正式控制与社会控制之间的相互作用关系的争议性认识。已有研究结论中对正式控制与社会控制之间究竟是替代还是互补关系存在着争议,本文在明确区分出三种控制手段的基础上,用LSSC企业间管理控制的经验数据研究证实:“正式控制中的合同控制与制度控制在对合作绩效的影响中是替代关系”,而“正式控制与社会控制在对合作绩效的影响中是互补(正向促进)关系”。当然,这一结论还有待其他行业的企业间管理控制研究做出进一步的证实。

【Abstract】 Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC) is a new form of supply chain emerged under theconditions of the rapid development of logistics outsourcing, and researches about LSSCmanagement has made great progress in the past decade. However, there has been extremelylimited research that studies for the management control of LSSC. On the other hand, theresearch of management control in interfirm relationships is still in its infancy, and there hasgreat theoretical space to be developed.As there were two Inconsistent interpretations about the meaning and structure of LSSCin previous literature, this paper first reanalyzed what is the really meaning and reasonablestructure of LSSC in according to the progress of logistics outsouring practice, thenconstructed an overall framework model of management control between LSSC enterprises.We extracted out two important levels of intefirm management control relationships in LSSCenterprises from this framework model, namely: logistics outsourcer (LO) with logisticsservice Integrator (LSI) and logistics service Integrator (LSI) with logistics servicesubcontractor (LSS). Subsequently, this paper proposed an interfirm management controlmechanism model between two levels enterprises in LSSC and a series of theoreticalassumptions. And then, we conducted structural equation modeling analysis with the surveydata of management control of LO to LSI and LSI to LSS.Empirical research gained four key findings. First, there are four main factors couldaffect the management control strategy of logistics buyer, they are transaction complexity,supplier’s capability, dependency to the supplier and the experience of cooperation, and theimpact of these four variables to contract control, institutional control and social control aredifferent; Second, the result shows that contract control has negative effect on institutionalcontrol and positive effect on social control. Institutional control has positive effect on socialcontrol in LO controls on LSI, but this effect is not significant in LSI controls on LSS. Third,the path coefficients in the revised structural model suggests contract control, institutionalcontrol, and social control all have significant positive effect on cooperation performance bothin the control relation of LO to LSI and LSI to LSS. As for the effect degree, institutional control is the strongest factor in the control of LO on LSI, and contract control is the strongestfactor in the control of LSI on LSS. Fourth, in general, the impact of formal controls oncooperative performance is greater than social control.The study has four main theoretical or managerial implications. First, we reanalyzed thestructure of LSSC in according to contradictory interpretation about the meaning and structureof LSSC in previous literature, then constructed an overall framework model of managementcontrol between LSSC enterprises based on interfirm management control patterns researchliteratures. This contribution may help us to clearly recognize the practical meaning of LSSCand lay a consolidate foundation to LSSC management-related researches. Obviously, thecontrol relationship of LO on LSI and LSI on LSS are the two most import relationship ofinterfirm management control relationship in LSSC.Second, we clearly proposed institutional control as one form of formal control measuresand extend the notion of formal control in interfirm management control into contract controland institutional control. This clarification not only offers insights on the operationalmeasurement of the concept of formal control and social control, but also paves the way toverify the dispute opinions on whether the relationship between formal control and socialcontrol is substitute or complement.Third, this paper extended the theoretical model of interfirm management controlmechanisms in review of previous studies, then tested this theoretical model by survey data oftwo levels of interfirm management in LSSC enterprises. Since most of the model elementsand theoretical hypotheses were proposed for the first time, the testing result gives out manynew conclusions to interfirm management control mechanism theory and offers concreteinsights to LSSC management.Fourth, based on the empirical analysis by interfirm management control date in LSSC,we found that institutional control is a substitute to contract control and social control is acomplement to formal control in achieving cooperation performance goals. These finding willhelp to revise the dispute about the relationship between formal control and social control.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 长安大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2014年 07期
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