【作者】 袁玲；

【导师】 杨兴全；

【作者基本信息】 石河子大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 多元化经营与公司价值的关系，一直是财务领域备受争议的话题之一。以美国等发达市场经济国家为研究背景，多元化经营是增加还是减少公司价值的理论和和实证研究的结论远未达成一致。一方面，转型经济国家可信度高的法律体系、有效运行的要素市场的缺乏增加了企业的交易成本，多元化经营所形成的内部市场有助于企业通过替代和模仿外部市场功能来促进交易和提升价值；另一方面，转型经济国家资本市场不发达，投资者法律保护水平低下的制度背景又使得控股股东或管理者更容易为攫取私利而进行多元化经营，多元化经营未必能够克服外部市场的低效率，反而有可能产生代理问题，导致代理成本上升，从而抵消不发达市场条件下的多元化经营优势，多元化经营对企业价值的影响在转型经济国家亦尚无定论。我国上市公司普遍是由控股股东控制的公众公司，且国家控股公司占主导地位，掌握控制权的控股股东与外部中小股东之间的利益冲突是我国公司治理的主要矛盾，由此而形成的代理成本对多元化经营与公司价值的关系必将产生影响。本论文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的研究方法，在对控股股东控制对公司多元化经营的影响进行初步分析的基础上，探讨控股股东对多元化经营与公司价值关系的影响，具体而言，从控股股东的股权结构特征对多元化经营与公司价值的影响及控股股东控制下的多元化经营对公司价值产生影响的具体途径两个层面，从控股股东的控制权与现金流权的分离、控股股东的政府控制性质、控股股东的实际攫取私行为、控股股东对多元化经营缓解融资约束作用的影响等四个方面展开研究，以期为我国上市公司是否存在控股股东为获取私利而进行多元化经营的动机提供证据，更进一步地剖析控股股东控制下的多元化经营对公司价值产生影响的内在机理，从理论上丰富有关多元化经营与公司价值关系的相关研究。通过对上述问题的研究，本文得出如下主要结论：第一，确实存在控制权与现金流权分离下控股股东为获取私人收益进行过度多元化经营的可能性，对控股股东控制与多元化经营的的统计特征描述验证了此推论。然后，在控制多元化经营内生性及影响公司价值的系列特征的基础上，对多元化经营与公司价值的关系进行了一般性检验，结果发现公司多元化经营的代理成本大于不完善外部市场条件下多元化经营公司内部市场替代功能所带来的收益，总体来看，我国上市公司的多元化经营对公司价值呈现负面影响。进一步地，通过考察市场发育程度不同地区的多元化经营的价值效应，发现在要素市场发育程度低的地区，多元化经营的折价程度更高，研究结果充分说明转型经济时期的控股股东和中小股东间的代理问题对多元化经营与公司价值的影响起着主导作用。第二，控股股东的两权分离程度在一定程度上强化了多元化经营对公司价值的负面效应。控股股东拥有公司的绝对控制权时，其两权分离程度显著恶化了多元化经营与公司价值的关系，公司的多元化折价现象更加显著；在具有高自由现金流量、地方政府控制上市公司中，控股股东的两权分离对多元化经营与公司价值的负面影响更显著。第三，控股股东的政府控制性质强化了多元化经营对公司价值的负面影响。与非政府控制上市公司相比，政府控制上市公司的多元化经营呈现出更显著的折价现象；在政府控制上市公司内部，不同的控制权实施主体与控制链层级下政府干预力度和内部人控制程度的此消彼长对多元化经营与公司价值的关系产生不同的影响，具体来讲，政府干预虽然表现出一定程度的负面性，但在转轨经济条件下其能起到抑制内部人机会主义行为的作用，因而在政府干预较强的的上市公司中，多元化经营虽然呈现出折价现象但不显著。第四，通过研究控股股东的实际侵占行为对多元化经营与公司价值产生的影响，本文发掘了控股股东控制下的多元化经营有损于公司价值的影响途径，即公司多元化经营是否为控股股东的私利攫取提供了便利条件。研究结果表明，控股股东的实际攫取私利行为对多元化经营与公司价值产生了负面影响；政府控制性质加剧了控股股东攫取私利对多元化经营与公司价值的影响；市场化进程程度越低，控股股东攫取私利对多元化经营与公司价值的负面影响越强；随着投资者法律保护程度的加强，法治化水平的改进在提高多元化经营与公司价值的同时，还抑制了控股股东攫取私利对多元化经营与公司价值的负面影响。第五，在多元化经营形成的内部资本市场发挥“配置资本”及“产生资本”的作用下，公司的融资约束得以缓解。但是由于控股股东与中小股东代理冲突的存在，使得多元化经营缓解融资约束的作用弱化，即控股股东因转移占用公司资金等代理问题减弱了多元化经营缓解融资约束作用的发挥，从而对公司价值产生负面影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 The relationship between corporate diversification and firm value has alwaysbeen one controversial topic in financial field. Research conclusions about it is farfrom agreement in the developed countries. On the other hand, corporatediversification will help to promote its value through replacement of external capitalmarket in the transition country where lacking of high credibility of the legal systemand effective operation of the factor market. On the other hand, corporatediversification make the controlling shareholders or managers for grabbing gain moreeasily under the background of underdeveloped capital markets and investors legalprotection system of low levels. Therefore, corporate diversification may not be ableto overcome the low efficiency of external market and agency cost problem causedwill offset the advantages of corporate diversification. The influence of corporatediversification on firm value in the transition countries also remains unclear. Now, theconflict of interest between controlling shareholders and outside minorityshareholders is the main contradiction of corporate governance on condition that thelisted companies in China which is generally controlled by large shareholders anddominated by state-controlled firms. That means, agency cost between controllingshareholders and outside minority shareholders will have an important effect on therelationship between corporate diversification and firm value.Based on the preliminary analysis about the influence of controlling shareholderson corporate diversification, the paper studied the influence of controllingshareholders on the relationship between corporate diversification and firm value.Specifically, we studied the impact of the controlling shareholder’s feature of equitystructure on the relationship between corporate diversification and firm value andexplored the impact way how corporate diversification controlled by controllingshareholder affects the firm value. Our goal is to provide evidence whether thecontrolling shareholder engaged in diversified business for the purpose of grabbingselfish and further analyse the inner mechanism of the impact of corporatediversification controlled by large shareholders on firm value so that we can enrichtheoretical reseach on the relationship between corporate diversification and firmvalue.We find that:(1)The controlling shareholders with a separation of control andcash flow right engaged in diversified business behavior to obtain private benefits.The agency cost caused corporate diversification is greater than the benefits broughtby the alternative function of internal market and diversification destroys value.Further, we found the degree of corporate diversification discount is higher in the areawhere the factor market is undeveloped. The findings provide the abundant evidence that the agency cost problems caused by the controlling shareholders plays a leadingrole on the relationship between corporate diversification and firm value.(2) The separation of control and cash flow rights strengthen the negative effectof corporate diversification on firm value to some extent. In the companies wherecontrolling shareholder has absolute control power and which has abundant free cashflow and which is controlled by local government, the separation of control and cashflow rights obviously strengthen the negative effect of corporate diversification onfirm value.(3)The government control quality strengthen the negative effect of corporatediversification on firm value. Neverthless, the relation between the governmentintervention and insider control play a different role on corporate diversification andfirm value within the government controlled companies. That is, although thegovernment intervention is harmful to some extent, It may restrain the insider’sopportunism behavior in the transition countries. So, the stronger of the governmentintervention, the weaker of the degree of corporate diversification discount is.(4) The actual grabbing behavior of the controlling shareholder has negativeinfluence on the corporate diversification and firm value. The government controlquality strengthen the controlling shareholder’s actual grabbing behavior on thecorporate diversification and firm value. The slower of marketization process, thestronger of the controlling shareholder’s actual grabbing behavior on the corporatediversification and firm value. With the process of rule of law accelerating, it improvethe relationship between corporate diversification and firm value and also inhibit thecontrolling shareholder’s actual grabbing behavior on the corporate diversificationand firm value.(5) The internal capital markets formed in the diversified companies has apositive impact on the ease of financing constraint. But, the proxy conflict betweenthe controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, such as occupation by themajor shareholders, may make the role of diversified companies’ alleviating financingconstraint weaken, to have a negative impact on the value of the company.更多还原