【作者】 王颖；

【导师】 饶育蕾；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 随着国内固定资产投资持续高位增长,微观层面的公司投资行为逐渐成为管理界和学术界关注的热点领域。然而现实中公司投资并非总是有效的,存在着多种非理性投资行为,减损了公司价值。尽管上市公司非理性投资行为的研究十分重要,但迄今为止系统性研究尚不多见,只是零散地探讨个别投资异象,未能形成完整适用的理论分析构架,而且对于投资行为中的代理冲突的理解,集中于经理人经济利益形式,对经理人获取良好职业前景的私利动机的理解不够深入,缺乏严谨的实证研究方法和全面翔实的经验检验证据。论文立足于中国上市公司非理性投资的异象,提出了基于经理人职业生涯关注视角的研究思路,首次将多种非理性投资行为如短视投资、过度投资、非理性多元化投资,纳入到一个完整的研究构架之中,并以上市公司经理人作为研究对象,探索经理人职业生涯关注的作用机理,检验了制度背景对上市公司非理性投资行为的影响。通过上述研究,论文在探索我国经理人的职业生涯关注对公司投资行为的影响上取得了以下结论：第一,经理人职业生涯关注来源于业绩压力、个人在组织中的经历以及经理人市场。业绩越差的经理人越有可能失去工作机会,而经理人在组织中的经历可以缓解这种压力,经理人通过兼任董事长或持有公司股票或长期服务于公司,可以淡化强制性变更的压力。相对公司内部晋升上来的经理人而言,经理人市场聘任的经理人受到强制性变更的威胁更小。第二,经理人职业生涯关注与短视投资行为呈正U型关系,处于职业生涯关注高和低状态的CEO,短视投资行为更突出,而处于职业生涯关注中间状态的CEO则具有更长的投资倾向。公司规模越大,短视投资冲动越强。高科技公司中经理人持股可以抑制短视投资行为,而非高科技公司中由于经理人持股比率过低而没有表现出这种抑制作用。第三,经理人职业生涯关注与过度投资行为呈正U型关系,即处于职业生涯关注高和低状态的CEO,过度投资行为更突出,这种关系又以中央控股公司中最明显,地方政府控股公司次之,民营企业最弱。民营企业的自由现金流制约着公司过度投资行为,国有产权性质的公司则不受影响。公司治理抑制国企的过度投资行为,但没有影响民营企业的过度投资。第四,经理人职业生涯关注与多元化投资行为呈正U型关系,即处于职业生涯关注高和低状态的CEO,多元化投资行为更突出,这种关系以地方政府控股公司中最明显,中央控股公司次之,民营企业最弱。公司融资约束能显著抑制公司多元化投资行为,尤其表现在民营企业中。地方政府对上市公司的控股权越高,上市公司多元化程度也越高,而在央企和民企之中不存在这一关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the continued growth of domestic investment in fixed asset, Micro-level companies’investment has become the focus of attention of management and academic areas. However, in reality companies’ investment is not always effective; there are a variety of irrational investment behaviors which detract from companies’value. Although irrational investment behavior of listed companies is very important to study, the related research is still rare, only scattered to explore individual investment vision, unable to form a complete theoretical analysis framework. Besides, researches focus on managers’economic interests to explain agency conflicts in investment behaviors, neglects to understand from managers’intention to get good career prospects, and lack rigorous empirical research methods and comprehensive empirical evidence.Based on Chinese listed companies irrational investment, from the perspective of CEOs’career concerns, The paper propose firstly a whole analysis framework of studying irrational investment behavior, such as investment myopia, over-investment and irrational diversification. The paper analysis mechanism of managers’career concerns affecting investment in three dimensions of time, volume and risk. To China’s listed companies as samples, the paper tests the ownership nature in irrational investment behaviors. Through the exploring of Chinese managers’career concerns affecting investment behavior, the paper gets conclusions following.(1) Managers’career concerns come from performance stress, experiences in companies and managers market. The worse performance, managers is more likely to lose their jobs, experiences in companies can alleviate this pressure, in the form of managers serving as chairman in the same time, or holding companies’shares, or serving for a long time in the company, which can dilute pressure of forced turnover. Compared to internal managers who promoted from company inside, managers from outside market face smaller pressure of forced turnover.(2) There is there is an U shape relation between CEO career concerns and investment myopia, specifically, both CEO in the high and low career concerns are tended to act more short-sighted investments, and executives in mid-career-concerns may have more long-term thinking. The larger of the corporate, the stronger of myopia impulse. In Hi-Tech companies managers’ shares holding can suppress investment myopia, while in non hi-tech companies managers’shares holding is too low to suppress.(3) There is there is an U shape relation between CEO career concerns and over-investment, specifically, both CEO in the high and low career concerns are tended to invest more. This relation is strongest in listed companies controlled by central government, followed by listed companies controlled by local government, and less in privately-owned companies. Furthermore, privately-owned companies are restricted to free cash flow, while state-owned companies not. Corporate governance inhibits over-investment of state-owned companies, while privately-owned companies not.(4) There is there is an U shape relation between CEO career concern and diversification, specifically, both CEO in the high and low career concerns are tended to invest more diverse. This relation is strongest in listed companies controlled by local government, followed by listed companies controlled by central government, and less in privately-owned companies. Furthermore, corporate financing constraints significantly inhibit diversification, especially in privately-owned companies. The higher ownership of local government, the more diverse of listed companies, while this relation neither exist in companies controlled by central government nor privately-owned companies.更多还原