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亲属法的伦理性及其限度研究

Research on Ethics and Its Limits of Domestic Relations Law

【作者】 曹贤信

【导师】 陈苇;

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 , 民商法学, 2011, 博士

【摘要】 法律与道德的关系是法哲学上的永恒主题和难解之谜,其理论魅力和实践价值在中国法治进程中日益凸显。在我国确立法治立国之举和强调法律至上的今天,如何理性审视并严格把握法律与道德的限度关系,充分发挥各自的独特功能,是我国现阶段立法必须谨慎处理的一对重要关系。当然,本文并不拟从宏观上来野心勃勃地论辩这一法哲学问题,而是从亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理的关系问题这一独特视角来加以探讨。应当看到,婚姻家庭是否具有伦理性与亲属法是否具有伦理性是两个不同的命题。但这两个命题所统摄的“伦理性”的交集在哪里?范围和程度又如何?职是之故,我们必须在厘清亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理之关联的基础上,区分法律道德化与道德法律化之间的限度,并针对亲属法所内含的伦理类型提出立法标准及立法规则,以实现对婚姻家庭关系的良法之治。对于亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理关系这一具体法哲学问题的探讨,虽然远不及宏观论辩那么棘手,但法律与道德限度之迷思仍是本文必须面对且必须解决的最大难题。总的来说,对亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理之关系这一具体法哲学问题的探讨,要比宏观上思考法律与道德的关系,更具理论意义和实践价值。除导论外,本文分上下两篇,每篇各三章。上篇(第一章至第三章)提出“亲属法伦理性的描述性命题”,拟以“亲属法伦理性之实然面向”为主题,试图对该命题所含的亲属法“是不是”具有伦理性以及如何体现伦理性的问题作出回答,即旨在描述现行亲属法的伦理本质、伦理价值、伦理规范等实存状态。下篇(第四章至第六章)提出“亲属法伦理性的评价性命题”,拟以“亲属法伦理性之应然面向”为主题,试图对该命题所含的亲属法“应当不应当”具有伦理性以及“应当怎样”具有伦理性的问题进行评价和论证,即旨在判断亲属法伦理性的妥当性及评价亲属立法的伦理限度。第一章探讨亲属法的伦理基础。本文首先必须回答的问题是:民众为什么要遵守现行亲属法?现行亲属法的效力和权威源于何处?因此,厘清亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理的共同的出发点源于何处是回答这些问题的关键。虽然亲属法的伦理性与婚姻家庭伦理不具有同质性,但二者在价值目标内涵、行为规范等方面存在着某种程度的同构性。如果纯粹以婚姻家庭伦理分析亲属法的伦理性,一般只能很好地说明这些规则是如何维持的,却无法解释这些规则是如何产生的,更无法解释亲属法正当性的根源。而从人性与道德的关系这一伦理学基本范畴着手分析,考察婚姻家庭伦理的产生机理,则有利于厘清亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理二者之间的共同的、原初的出发点和对象。人性乃人生而固有的普遍属性,涵盖“人的动物性”和“人的特性”两重性,统摄人的生理需要和精神需要这两个层次。任何一种可以称为“婚姻”的两性关系形式,总是与某种或某些“禁忌”联系在一起。无禁忌便无婚姻,更无婚姻伦理。婚姻伦理虽以规范人的动物性的性禁忌为基础,以规范体现包括情感、意识在内的人的特性的性禁忌为最终目的,但其内涵已远非性禁忌本身。无论社会如何变迁,只要还存在着由两性构成的人类,就会有人类对“性爱”精神的不懈追求,因而使得这种规范“人的特性”的婚姻伦理才具有文化传承性。对于家庭而言,与人性两重性相对应的是其生物目的和社会目的。家庭伦理是规范人类自身生产的行为的需要,是使夫妻性结合的利益与家庭利益相一致的决定因素。家庭成员的关系全都由一种道德观念组成的义务之网加以严密规定,家庭伦理难免会强加给亲属间一些强制性的道德义务,而这正是道德法则的特征所在。因此,婚姻家庭伦理是规制人性两重性的必然和必要。然而亲属法又在何种程度上体现或蕴涵以人性为基础的婚姻家庭伦理呢?只有基于婚姻家庭伦理上的正当性才是亲属法正当性的本源含义,而提供这种正当性的恰恰是根植于人性深处的一种理性本能。亲属法的正当性来源于婚姻家庭伦理的人性基础。质言之,人性基础是亲属法伦理正当性的逻辑起点。亲属法的伦理正当性深层论证既不能仅从抽象层面寻求实质正义,也不能仅从具体层面诠释形式正义,而是两者的结合。因此,很重要的一点是要处理亲属法自身的及其伦理性中的形式和实质问题。第二章探讨亲属法的实质伦理。亲属法的实质伦理是由不同层次的范畴构成的,主要为两大类别:一是亲属法的伦理价值,其又可分为高值价值(伦理价值取向,即正义目标)和低值价值(伦理价值体系,即正义要素)这两个层次;二是亲属法的伦理原则亲属法的伦理价值和伦理原则涉及到的是其存在的真正根据,也就是亲属法的伦理正当性。亲属法的这种真正根据是支撑和确证亲属法是否具有“合理性”与“合法性”的终极性原因。亲属法的正义目标就是在满足个体生理需要和精神需要,满足家庭的生物目的和社会目的的需要的同时,维续婚姻家庭生活所必需并达致个体幸福与家庭和谐的理想状态。亲属法正义目标的实现离不开其本身所具有的实体价值(即实质正义要素)和秩序价值(即形式正义要素)的支撑,而此两大类价值即构成了亲属法的伦理价值体系。亲属法的实质正义体现了一种诉求,即要求亲属法以目的价值来确立一些伦理原则(如平等原则、自由原则和人道原则),经这些伦理原则转化为立法原则,进而调整婚姻家庭关系。亲属法的基本法律原则是亲属法在目的价值上对所有婚姻家庭规范的归纳和提炼。第三章探讨亲属法的形式伦理。尽管伦理价值和伦理原则是亲属法的核心和灵魂,但只有通过亲属法的形式伦理才能形成稳固的形态。亲属法的形式伦理是指对亲属法形式方面的道德要求,表现为道德上的对结婚、离婚以及夫妻、亲子等关系的具体行为规范。质言之,亲属法的形式伦理受三大伦理原则的规定和制约,是伦理原则在具体亲属法律制度上的具体化,是评价和判断家庭成员行为善恶美丑的具体标准。亲属法的形式伦理也是一个以“人伦之理”为基础所表达的体现家庭成员间交往习惯、方式、约束、禁忌及其理解与解释等生活规范的总体概念。在具体法律制度上,亲属法的形式伦理表现为为结婚法中的伦理契约、伦理能力、伦理禁忌和伦理公信,夫妻关系法中的人身伦理和财产伦理,亲子法中的权责伦理,以及离婚法中的伦理调适和伦理关怀等内容。第四章探讨亲属法的伦理限度模式与立法模式。完善抑或是建构亲属法都应当思考其伦理“含量”的限度,而思考这一问题还是得先从宏观上把握法律与道德的限度以及关联模式。法律与道德之争的背后实际上是哲学与法律之争。法律实证主义研究的是“法之实然”,而自然法则兼顾“法之应然”和“法之实然”。自然法理论和法律实证主义的“最低限度的自然法”有助于确证亲属法的道德命题,但同时也给出了亲属法在立法完善上的伦理限度之难题。亲属法的道德命题只是个前提性的立论,如需证成这则道德命题,则尚要厘定亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理的关系模式。本章根据自然法理论和法律实证主义的有关学说大致划定了亲属法与婚姻家庭伦理之间范围的关联模式,以便为后两章具体限定实质伦理和形式伦理在立法上的“含量”提供一种思考依据。以婚姻、血缘为基础的婚姻家庭伦理规范与以权利义务为架构的亲属法律规定,其实并不必然相称。亲属法的伦理性并不当然等同婚姻家庭的伦理性,亲属立法的伦理是有限度的,更不能因婚姻家庭的独特性而以法律手段强制推行婚姻家庭的伦理建设,以达到所谓的“保存并发扬中华民族优秀传统文化”的目的;同时,婚姻家庭关系的伦理本质并不会因“回归民法”转变成为平等主体之间的契约关系,而民法也不会因其私法属性而不具有伦理性。第五章探讨亲属立法的实质伦理限度。亲属法的实质伦理是由不同位阶的范畴构成的,因而对实质伦理的立法限度也应当有所不同。善法作为立法活动的逻辑结果,其创制必须依循一定的伦理之“应然”,但这种立法之“应然”,更为重要的是区分其道德层次。伦理价值取向体现了亲属法理性规制婚姻家庭秩序的终极目标,这种目标是以直接性的道德宣示条款出现还是以一种柔性的立法措施来加以保证,亲属立法应当以道德层次区分论为依据给出合理性的制度安排。以“平等、自由、人道”为表征的亲属法外在道德作为亲属法本身的实体道德目标,还不足以使亲属法与其他法律相区别,还需要对这类实体目标(伦理原则)予以具体化。于是在立法的应然层面上,需要进一步厘清的问题就是“应当怎样”实现平等、自由、人道这三个伦理原则。要正视私人领域内的不正义,就要求对家庭关系进行实质性的法律调整。而如何消除男性在家庭内的支配原因或依据,则是亲属法对性别平等的立法目标。在限制个人自由问题上,将法律与道德截然分开或者将道德等同于立法强制的做法都是不切实际的。可行的做法是区分行为道德性的程度,以伤害原则和立法伦理主义原则为婚姻家庭行为划定自由的边界。亲属法还必须以人为起点和目的,以人伦道德为基础,承认人的自然本性,尊重人的尊严和人格独立,提倡人的自由平等,保障人的权利。以人为本的亲属立法理念强调在个人本位的基础上,更多的是要体现婚姻家庭内部的义务与责任、互助与和谐的精神。第六章探讨亲属立法的形式伦理限度。形式伦理之立法“应然”具体地表现为所立之法律形式的合伦理性和法律内容的合伦理性。首先,应当尊重婚姻家庭领域中的自然规律,以此为基点体现社会性的伦理内容。这种需要尊重的自然规律包括:性关系、婚配年龄、血缘联系上的自然规律。其次,应当明确亲属法中道德内容的客观性,应将“感情破裂”、“亲子情”、“婚外情”之类的主观情感客观化为可被法律规制的行为。再次,应当把握亲属法中“义务道德”的可实现性。最后,应当从立法“应然”上对所有与人性、婚姻、家庭有关的形式伦理作出区分,将可以纳入法律视野的形式伦理予以立法规制,不符合的则不予理会。因而如何确定亲属法与其形式伦理的临界点则至关重要。本章分析的这类临界点主要有二:婚姻定义与婚姻伦理的临界点以及家庭功能与家庭伦理的临界点。前者为性自由与婚姻的伦理难题及其立法规制,后者为家庭功能上的伦理难题与立法规制。

【Abstract】 The relationship between law and morals is an everlasting motif as well as abstruse problem in philosophical jurisprudence, and its theoretical significance and practical value becomes increasingly prominent in the course of establishing Chinese nomocracy. It must be handled carefully at this stage to take a rational look at the limits between law and morals and to fully develop their own unique features while China is moving to establish nomocracy and to found the importance of the supremacy of law. Of course, this paper will not debate upon the macro problem of philosophical jurisprudence in a grand view, but rather will take a step from discussing the relationship between domestic relations law and ethics of marriage and family. It should be noted that they are two different propositions when we say marriage and family or domestic relations law has an attribute of ethics. However, where is the "ethical" intersection of the two propositions? What is the definite scope? And to what extent? Therefore, we must first of all clarify the ethical nature of domestic relations law and family, and then try to distinguish the limits between moral law and legal ethics, and at last propose legislative standards and norms for the ethical types contained in domestic relations law so as to achieve good rules by Good Law upon marriage and family. It is not more difficult to explore the specific philosophical issues of the relationship between domestic relations law and ethics of marriage and family than discussing the philosophical problems, but what the biggest problem this paper must face and solve is the limits of law and morals. In general, it owns much more theoretical significance and practical merit to explore specific philosophical issues than to reflect macroscopically upon the relationship between law and morals.Except the introduction, this paper is divided into two parts, each with three chapters. The first part (chapters Ⅰ to Ⅲ) proposes a "descriptive proposition of ethical nature of domestic relations law" and a theme of "the ethical nature of domestic relations law as it is" which intends to answer the question whether domestic relations law has an ethical nature or not and how it reflects, so as to describe existential states of the existing domestic relations law, including its ethical nature, ethical values, ethical norms and so on. The second part (chapters Ⅳ to Ⅵ) puts forward an "evaluative proposition of ethical nature of domestic relations law" and takes "the ethical nature of domestic relations law as it ought to be" as its theme which intends to answer the question whether domestic relations law ought to have ethical nature and how it would possess the nature, so as to determine the appropriateness of the ethical limits in family legislation.The first chapter discusses the ethical basis of domestic relations law. First, questions must be answered are:Why do people have to comply with the existing domestic relations law? What is the origin of the authority of existing domestic relations law? Therefore, the key point is to clarify the springboard where both domestic relations law and ethics of marriage and family start from. Although the ethical nature of domestic relations law and ethics of marriage and family are not homogeneous, there is a certain degree of isomorphism for them in value contents, conduct modes and so on. If we only analyze the ethical nature of domestic relations law from ethics of marriage and family, we generally could give a good illustration upon how these rules are maintained, however, neither could we explain how these rules generated nor could we find out the legitimacy source of domestic relations law. To investigate the generation mechanism of ethics of marriage and family viewed from the relationship between human nature and morals helps a lot to clarify springboard and objects shared between ethics of marriage and family and domestic relations law. Human nature is inherent and universal in human life, covering "human animality" and "human characteristics" and unifying human physical needs and spiritual needs. Any sex relationship called "marriage" always relates to a certain taboo or some taboos. That is to say, there is no marriage ethics without taboos. Marriage ethics contain sexual taboos based on "human animality" and emotions and consciousness based on "human characteristics", whose connotation is far beyond sexual taboos themselves. No matter how society changes, as long as there is human society composed by genders, human beings will persistently pursue the spirit of Eros, which makes marriage ethics governing "human characteristics" become a cultural tradition. The duality of human nature corresponds to familial biological purpose and familial social purpose. Family ethics regulating human production behaviors is a determinant combining interests of marital sex and familial interests. The relationships among family members are all regulated by a strict moral network which will inevitably impose some mandatory moral obligations upon relatives, and this is accurately the characteristics of moral law. Therefore, ethics of marriage and family could necessarily tame the duality of human nature. However, to what extent does domestic relations law reflect and embody ethics of marriage and family based on human nature? Legitimacy origin meaning of domestic relations law must depend upon ethics of marriage and family, and a rational instinct of human nature could accurately explain such legitimacy. The legitimacy of domestic relations law comes from the human basis of ethics of marriage and family. In another word, human nature is the logical start of ethical legitimacy of domestic relations law. For better understand the ethical legitimacy of domestic relations law, neither could we demonstrate real justice abstractly, nor could we interpret formal justice concretely, however, we could choose to combine these two ways. Therefore, it is important for us to deal with both substantive ethics and formal ethics in domestic relations law.The second chapter discusses substantive ethics of domestic relations law. Substantive ethics of domestic relations law is composed of two main categories:the first is ethical values which can be divided into high-values (ethical value orientation, which is justice goals) and low-values (ethical value system, which is justice elements); the second is ethical principles. Ethical values and ethical principles of domestic relations law relates to ethical legitimacy of domestic relations law. Domestic relations law is based on "rationality" and "legitimacy" that are ultimate causes to support and confirm. Justice goals of domestic relations law should not only meet individual physical needs and spiritual needs, but also achieve family’s biological purposes and social purposes, so as to keep alive the marriage life and to attain an ideal state of individual happiness and family harmony. Justice goals of domestic relations law could not be dissociated from its own substantive values (that is elements of substantive justice) and its own order values (that is elements formal justice), thus these two major categories constitute ethical value system of domestic relations law. Domestic relations law reflects an appeal of enacting ethical principles (such as equality principle, liberty principle and humanism principle), then turns these ethical principles into legal principles for adjusting relations of marriage and family. Basic legal principles of domestic relations law are induction and extraction of norms of marriage and family in objective values.The third chapter discusses formal ethics of domestic relations law. Despite ethical values and ethical principles are the heart and soul of domestic relations law, domestic relations law crystallizes into a solid form only through formal ethics referring to moral behavioral norms to marry, divorce and for relationships of husband and wife, parent-child and so on. To put it bluntly, formal ethics of domestic relations law is constrained by three major ethical principles, and it is an embodiment of domestic relations law system, and a specific ethical criterion to evaluate family members’ behaviors. Formal ethics of domestic relations law is an overall concept that expresses and explains habits, methods, constraints, taboos and norms among family members based on "reason of human relationships". In the specific legal system, formal ethics of domestic relations law includes many things. For example, there are ethical contract, ethical capacity, ethical taboos and ethical credibility in marriage law, personal ethics and ethics of property in conjugal relation law, responsibilities of ethics in parent-child relationship law, ethical adjustments and ethical concerns in divorce law and so on.The fourth chapter discusses the patterns of ethical limits of domestic relations law. To improve and construct domestic relations law, we should think about "contents" of the ethical limits and still have to start thinking about the issue to grasp the associated patterns of limits of law and morals. Differences between law and morals actually hide in a "battle" between philosophy and law. Legal Positivism focuses upon "law as it is", but natural law takes "law as it ought to be" and "law as it is" into account. Natural law theories and "minimum natural law" of legal positivism can help domestic relations law to confirm its own moral proposition; meanwhile, they put forward difficult problems on ethical limits in perfecting legislation of domestic relations law. Moral proposition of domestic relations law is just a premise. To testify the moral proposition, domestic relations law is yet to determine the relationship patterns of ethics and law. Based on natural law theories and Legal Positivism, this chapter generally defines relevant relationship patterns between domestic relations law and ethics of marriage and family so as to qualify "contents" for the substantive ethics and the formal ethics in the following two chapters. Moral norms of marriage and family based upon marriage and consanguinity differ much from provisions of domestic relations law based upon right and obligation. Ethics of domestic relations law is not of course equivalent to ethics of marriage and family. The legislation of family ethics is so limited that we could not enforce the moral construction of marriage and family in light of its unique nature, which could not do any anything to "saving and carrying forward traditional Chinese culture". Meanwhile, the ethical nature of marriage and family will not turn into a contractual relationship between equal entities, even Civil Code would not lack of its morality because of its private nature.The fifth chapter discusses the limits of substantive ethics of domestic relations law. Substantive ethics of domestic relations law contains different ranks and therefore its limits of legislation should also be different. Good Law is the logical result of legislative activities that need to follow certain ethical "ought" and it "should be" more important to distinguish its moral levels. Ethical value orientation of domestic relations law reflects its ultimate goal of rational regulation of marriage and family. Domestic relations law should be reasonably based on moral levels, and construct its legal system in a clear manner that demands an ethical declaration or a flexible legislative measure. Characterized by "equality, freedom, and humanity", domestic relations law takes these external ethics as its substantive moral goals. Even so, we also need to crystallize such ethical principles so as to distinguish it from other laws. So the question must be further clarified how we should achieve equality, freedom, and humanity in the legislature as "it should be". In order to look injustice within the private sector in the face, we should adjust domestic relations by law. How to eliminate male-dominance within family is a legislative goal of gender equality in domestic relations law. In limiting personal freedom issues, it is unrealistic that we cut apart the relationship of law and morals or equate moral mandatory to legal mandatory. The feasible approach is to distinguish the moral degree of behaviors and to delimit the boundary of behavior freedom of marriage and family by the Injury Principle and the Principle of Legislative Ethics. Domestic relations law must also be human-oriented, based upon morality, acknowledge human nature, respect human dignity and personal independence, advocate freedom and equality and protect human rights. The legislative idea of the law must manifest internal duties, responsibilities and spirits of mutual assistance and harmony within a family on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.The sixth chapter discusses the limits of formal ethics of domestic relations law. The legislation of formal ethics as "it should be" must display specifically for the ethicality of legal forms and legal contents. Firstly, the legislation should respect the order of nature including sex, marriage age, kinship in the field of marriage and family and manifest the sociality of the ethics contents as a basis. Secondly, the legislation should define moral contents to be objectivity and put feelings or emotions of "emotional breakdown","parent-child love","extramarital affairs" into the acts which can be regulated by law. Thirdly, the legislation should make "moral obligation" to be realized. Finally, the legislation should make a distinction upon formal ethics among human nature, marriage and family and should formulate rules that formal ethics can be incorporated into the legal field. Therefore, how to distinguish critical points between domestic relations law and its formal ethics becomes much significant. Such critical points analyzed in this chapter are two:the first is the critical point between the definition of marriage and marriage ethics which enact provisions for sexual freedom and other moral problems; the latter is the critical point between family’s functions and family ethics which guide us to solve ethical problems of family functions.

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