【作者】 梁益琳；

【导师】 张玉明；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 随着经济全球化进程加快,以自主创新为表征的创新能力竞争已成为全球范围内竞争的主导因素。创新型中小企业作为国家经济发展的微观载体,正以强烈的创新动机、专业化的创新技术以及快速灵活的成长机制成为国家创新体系建设的重要支撑。创新型中小企业尽管所占比重较小,却创造了大多数的新技术、新产品和新专利等科技成果,同时在优化产业结构、催生高新技术企业、推动科技创新发展等方面发挥着关键作用。然而,在其高速发展的繁荣背后,企业资金短缺、外部融资困难等问题始终未得到有效缓解,甚至在金融危机及“后危机”时期越发严峻,成为创新型中小企业难以突破的成长瓶颈。因此,结合创新型中小企业成长的复杂性生命体特征,根据其成长演化机制及银企信贷合作的共同演化机理建立与其成长过程相匹配的银企信贷融资体系,不仅为化解创新型中小企业融资约束推进其持续成长提供了新的理论视角,同时具有重要的实践意义。演化经济学以有限理性为前提假设,将复杂系统理论等内嵌于创新、选择和扩散的分析框架,关注持续、复杂的企业成长系统的长期动态演化,以及企业非最优化行为的可能性,同时借助演化博弈理论分析演化主体间的策略互动,契合了创新型中小企业作为复杂性生命体的研究要求。但是演化经济学的理论体系极其庞杂,本体论和方法论的研究还处于“理论竞争”的多样化阶段,特别是将演化理论范式应用于企业成长的融资问题研究还十分薄弱。由此,如何构建创新型中小企业成长融资约束的演化分析框架,解析创新型中小企业成长与商业银行信贷的演化机制,揭示银企信贷博弈的演化过程和稳定策略,促进企业实现可持续成长仍有待深化。基于以上思考,本文以演化思想为主线,从银企演化层面对创新型中小企业成长的融资约束及信贷策略展开研究,主要内容包含以下方面：第一,创新型中小企业成长规律和融资结构的基本问题界定与演化框架构建。在剖析创新型中小企业与传统中小企业差异性的基础上,对创新型中小企业成长的基本问题进行界定,分析其在不同成长阶段的融资结构与融资需求特征。并结合我国商业银行结构及信贷体系演进过程,解析创新型中小企业成长中的银企信贷合作关系,建立银企信贷融资的演化经济学分析框架。第二,创新型中小企业成长的融资约束现状分析。结合数据统计分析,描述现阶段我国创新型中小企业的发展状况及存在的融资问题,剖析创新型中小企业的融资环境与银企关系,揭示创新型中小企业融资约束的根源。同时以中小板及创业板企业为样本,实证检验商业银行信贷体系发展对创新型中小企业融资约束的影响进而与创新型中小企业成长的关系。第三,创新型中小企业成长与商业银行信贷的演化机制。运用演化经济学理论与复杂性系统方法,分析创新型中小企业和商业银行两类群体在成长及信贷创新过程中的演化行为与演化策略,提出两者的演化方式及演化路径。基于此,运用共同演化理论分析创新型中小企业与商业银行的共同演化及互动结构。第四,创新型中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈与信贷融资策略。基于演化博弈理论构建创新型中小企业与商业银行的信贷演化博弈模型,揭示银企信贷行为的基本演化规律,提出银企双方的信贷稳定策略。在此基础上进行模型改进,探讨政府政策支持、信用担保机构等多方主体的引入对银企信贷合作的影响。第五,银企信贷融资体系的演化仿真。在阐述多主体建模原理、工具及建模过程的基础上,根据演化机制和演化博弈模型,设计创新型中小企业与商业银行信贷演化过程的建模与仿真步骤,建立银企信贷演化的仿真模型,模拟在不同演化条件下创新型中小企业和商业银行的动态演化过程。基于上述分析内容,本文主要得到如下五点研究结论：第一,基于创新型中小企业与传统中小企业的本质差异,从企业演化视角重构创新型中小企业的成长内涵、成长特征与成长模式,运用综合评价与神经网络方法建立创新型中小企业成长性评价与预测模型,并以此为基础确定创新型中小企业的金融成长周期。第二,以我国创新型中小企业为样本,采用实证研究方法检验商业银行与我国创新型中小企业成长融资约束的关系。实证结果显示,较高的外部融资成本使企业受到较大程度的融资约束；银行发展水平、竞争程度与企业信贷可得性具有正向关联；完善商业银行信贷体系有助于降低银企间信息成本和监管成本,增加对创新型中小企业的资金支持,推动企业实现持续成长。第三,运用演化经济学理论,从演化要素、演化路径、演化过程等方面构建了创新型中小企业成长的演化机制和商业银行信贷创新的自组织演化机理,提出在企业创新与外部环境共同演化的状态下,如何匹配企业创新速度与银行信贷支持程度是企业持续成长的关键。第四,考虑创新风险与监管奖惩两个维度的银企演化博弈模型分析表明,银企双方均对高收益策略有模仿倾向,但创新型中小企业在与银行的长期合作中会对违约行为具有抵御性；研发创业期企业所受融资约束最高,当且仅当创新成功率高于最小下限时银行才考虑与企业发生信贷关系；政府、信用担保等外部力量与内生要素的相互制衡对实现银企信贷稳定具有重要作用。因此,进一步建立多元结构的银企信贷融资系统演化博弈模型,结果显示在政府完善的政策扶持体系和银行严格的监管机制下,银企信贷融资系统最终能够形成演化稳定策略。第五,银企信贷融资系统演化的动态仿真显示,创新型中小企业和商业银行群体在长期信贷演化过程中会不断反思原有策略,在演化机制推动下银企两类群体逐渐达到演化稳定状态；提升企业创新成功率对促进银企信贷合作具有正向作用；商业银行在选择设立监管机制时,应根据自身规模、企业状况和预期收益等,投入合理的监管奖惩成本；同时,在银行、政府和信用担保机构三方共同监管作用下银企间合作策略明显占优,并能够在较短的演化时期内达到稳定均衡状态。本文以演化经济学和演化博弈理论为基础,从复杂、动态视角构建创新型中小企业与商业银行的演化机制以及信贷演化博弈模型,突破了以往在理性、均衡假设下机械静态的研究局限,主要创新体现在以下方面：第一,解答创新型中小企业成长的基本问题,建立银企信贷融资的演化分析框架。从演化理论视角,运用系统科学思维方式,以企业仿生学理论、演化经济学理论及复杂适应系统理论为主要分析工具,重构创新型中小企业成长的基本概念。在此基础上,理清创新型中小企业成长融资约束的根源,从银企群体演化角度建立银企信贷融资的理论分析框架,这为运用演化理论研究创新型中小企业成长与融资问题提供了有意义的借鉴。第二,解析银企双方的演化机理,形成银企之间多层次的共同演化机制和互动选择模式。考虑到银企两类群体的多样性、异质性等特征以及两者间的相互反馈关系,选择应用演化经济学理论探讨创新型中小企业成长与商业银行信贷创新的演化方式和演化过程,识别创新型中小企业在微观、中观及宏观各层次与商业银行的共同演化机理,进而从企业成长演化阶段、银行信贷创新演化阶段及企业信贷可得性三个维度形成银企之间的互动结构和选择模式。第三,利用演化经济学与演化博弈的互补性,将两种理论有机结合系统分析创新型中小企业成长中的融资约束问题。演化博弈理论有效弥补了演化经济学理论缺乏严格数理模型的不足。在演化经济学理论推演的基础上,利用演化博弈方法分析银企信贷关系及信贷融资系统的演化规律,说明银企信贷合作的演化过程、信贷策略选择及政府、担保机构等的支持协调作用,从而为揭示创新型中小企业成长融资问题形成新的研究路径。第四,根据银企演化博弈和建模仿真的创新性研究结论,提出银企信贷稳定策略。本文研究表明,造成创新型中小企业融资约束的根本原因既有企业自身创新机制和经营管理模式的不足,商业银行服务意识的欠缺,也有国家战略和政策方面的缺失。因此,从企业、商业银行、政府及担保机构等主体入手,结合演化博弈模型的稳定性分析与主体策略选择的模拟演化趋势,提出切实有效的信贷策略,为化解创新型中小企业融资约束,实现企业持续成长提供新的实践依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the acceleration of economic globalization, the competition of innovation capability charactering independent innovation has been the dominant factor in the worldwide competition. Innovative Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (ISMEs), as the micro carriers of national economic development, are becoming the important force in construction of national innovation system, with strong innovative motivation, professional innovative technology and flexible growth mechanism. ISMEs, who occupy small proportion in whole enterprises, create the most new technology, new products and new patents. Meanwhile, they play important role in optimizing the industrial structure, driving the birth of high-tech enterprises, and promoting technological innovative development. However fund shortage and external financing difficulties have never been relieved for ISMEs effectively. In the financial crisis and post-crisis, the above faults have been growth bottleneck of ISMEs, and also restrict seriously enterprise survival and long-term development. Based on the organism characteristics of ISMEs growth, according to growth evolutionary mechanism and coevolution mechanism of bank-enterprise credit, bank-enterprise credit financing system establishment matching the growth of ISMEs will provide new perspective for solving financing constraints of ISMEs, also have important practical significance.With bounded rationality acting as the hypothesis, evolutionary economics embed complex system theory in the analysis framework on innovation, choice, and diffusion. It pays close attention to long-term dynamic evolution of continuous and complex enterprise growth system, the possibility of non-optimal behavior for enterprise. Also, it fit study requirements of ISMEs as complexity organism, with evolution game theory analyzing strategic interaction of evolution between subjects. But theory system of evolutionary economics is extremely confused; study of ontology and methodology is still variegated in theory competition, especially the study of evolutionary theory use in financing problem of enterprise growth is still weak. So it remains to be deepening, how to construct evolutionary analytical framework of financing constraints for ISMEs, how to resolve the evolutionary mechanism of innovation and growth of ISMEs and commercial bank credit, how to reveal evolutionary process and stable strategy of credit game between banks and enterprises, how to promote the enterprises to realize the sustainable growth. Thus, this paper studies financing constraints and credit strategies of ISMEs from bank-enterprise evolutionary view with evolutionary idea as the main logical line. The main content includes the following aspects:Basic definition and evolutionary framework construction of ISME growth rules and financing structure:The paper defines basic problems of growth of ISMEs and analyzes financing structure and financing needs in different stage basing the difference between ISMEs and traditional SMEs.Then, the paper analyzes credit cooperative relationship between banks and ISMEs and forms analytical framework of evolutionary economicsAnalysis of financing constraint for ISME growth:Based on statistical analysis of data, the paper describes the status and financing problems of ISMEs at the present stage, analyzes financing environment and bank-enterprise relation of ISMEs and reveals the root of financing constraints in the ISMEs. Meanwhile, with ISMEs listed in SME board and growth enterprise board as sample, it is empirically checked for the effect of commercial bank development on financing constrains of ISMEs and thus the growth of ISMEs,Evolutionary mechanism of ISME growth and commercial bank credit:Using evolutionary economics theory and complexity system method, the paper analyzes evolutionary behavior and strategies in ISME growth and credit innovation of commercial banks, and puts forward evolutionary way and approach between them. Following it, this paper explores coevolution and interaction structure between ISMEs and commercial banks with coevolution theory.Evolutionary game and credit strategies between ISMEs and commercial banks: According to evolutionary game theory, the paper builds up credit evolutionary game model between ISMEs and commercial bank, reveals basic evolution law in the credit behavior between bank and enterprise and puts forward credit stable strategy. On this basis, the part optimizes the models and explores the effect of the introduction of government policy support and credit guarantee agencies on bank-enterprise credit cooperation.Evolutionary simulation of bank-enterprise credit financing system:Based on evolutionary mechanisms and game models, the paper puts forward the modeling and simulation steps, and constructs simulation models on credit evolution between ISMEs and commercial banks. At the same time, Dynamic evolutionary process is imitated in different evolutionary conditions between ISMEs and commercial banks.Based on the above analysis, the following five conclusions are yielded:First, growth connotation, growth characteristics and growth patterns are reconstructed from enterprise evolutionary view by compositing the essential differences of ISMEs and traditional SMEs. Then, the paper establishes the evaluation and prediction model of ISME growth using the comprehensive evaluation and neural network methods. Basing on this, the paper forms financial growth cycle of ISMEs.Second, the paper tests the relation between commercial banks and financing constraints of ISME growth by empirical methods with the sample of ISMEs in China. The empirical results show that, the higher cost of external financing causes the higher degree of ISMEs’financing constraints; the development of commercial banks and level of bank competition have positive relation with credit availability of ISMEs; Improving commercial bank credit system helps to reduce information cost and regulatory cost between banks and enterprises, increase financial support for ISMEs and promote the sustainable growth of ISMEs.Third, the paper constructs the evolutionary mechanism of ISME growth and the self-organization evolutionary mechanism of commercial bank credit innovation in many aspects of evolutionary elements, evolutionary path and evolutionary process using evolutionary economics theory. Meanwhile, the paper presents that under the coevolution condition of business innovation and the external environment, how to match business innovation rate and the degree of bank credit support is the key for ISMEs to achieve sustainable growth.Fourth, evolutionary game models between commercial banks and ISMEs reveal several important results. Although both banks and enterprises have the tendency to imitate the high profit strategy, ISMEs can resist few companies’breach of contract. ISMEs in R&D and pioneering period suffer the highest degree of financing constraints. So commercial banks build up the credit relation with innovative SMEs only if enterprises’project success rate is higher than minimum lower limit value. Bank-enterprise credit stability has to depend on the mutual restriction of endogenous factors and external strength including government and financial intermediaries. Therefore, we further establish the evolutionary game model of bank-enterprise credit financing system based on the multiple structure. The results of multivariate model indicates that bank-enterprise credit financing system will form the evolutionary stable strategies eventually with government policy support system and bank supervision mechanismFifth, evolutionary simulation of bank-enterprise credit financing system shows that ISMEs and commercial banks will reflect on the original strategies in the long-term credit evolution and reach an evolutionary steady state gradually. Meanwhile, enhancing enterprises’innovation success rate has a positive role in the promotion of bank-enterprise credit cooperation. Commercial banks should set reasonable regulatory cost based on bank size, enterprise conditions and expected return. Moreover, bank-enterprise cooperation strategy is dominant and reaches a stable equilibrium in a shorter period of evolution.The paper constructs the evolutionary mechanisms and credit evolutionary game models of ISMEs and commercial banks from complex dynamic perspective based on evolutionary economics and evolutionary game theory, which breaks through the mechanical static limitations under the rational and balanced assumptions. According to it, innovation points of the paper are as follows:First, the paper defines the basic problems of ISMEs growth and establishes evolutionary analysis framework of bank-enterprise credit financing. Based on evolutionary theory view and system science thinking, the basic concepts of ISME growth is reconstructed using businesses bionics theory, evolutionary economics theory, evolutionary game theory and complex adaptive system theory. On this basis, the paper builds the analytical framework of bank-enterprise credit financing from the perspective of group evolution by illustrating the root of financing constraints in the development of ISMEs, which provides meaningful reference to the study of ISME growth and financing problem applying evolutionary theory.Second, the paper analyzes evolutionary mechanisms and forms multi-level coevolution mechanism and interactive selection mode between commercial banks and ISMEs. Considering the diversity, heterogeneity and mutual feedback of banks and ISMEs, we apply evolutionary economics theory to investigate evolutionary way and process of ISME growth and commercial bank credit innovation, and identify coevolution mechanism from macro-view, medium-view and micro-view. Then, interactive structure and selection mode are formed between banks and ISMEs in three dimensions of firm growth stage, credit innovation stage and credit availability.Third, according to theory complementarity, financing constraints problem of ISME growth is discussed systemically by evolutionary economics and evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory compensates for lack of evolutionary economics theory in the aspect of strict mathematical model. Based on the theoretical deduction of evolutionary economics, we study the credit relation between banks and ISMEs and the evolutionary rule of credit financing system using evolutionary game, and explain evolutionary process of credit cooperation, credit strategy selection, and support function of government and guarantee agencies, which put forward the new research approach about revealing the financing problem of ISME growth.Fourth, bank-enterprise credit stable strategies are put forward based on the innovative conclusions of evolutionary game and simulation. This paper shows that the root cause of ISME financing constraints involves the lack of both corporate innovation mechanism and management mode, the lack of bank service awareness, and also the lack of national innovation policies. Thus, we raise the effective credit strategies from the perspectives of enterprises, commercial banks, government, and guarantee agencies combining with evolutionary trend and evolutionary stability of game models, which provides new practical basis for defusing financing constraints of ISMEs and promoting their sustainable growth.更多还原