【作者】 满青珊；

【导师】 张金隆； 龚业明；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 移动互联网应用打破了以运营商为主导和核心的价值链结构,进而变革了移动商务合作伙伴的合作模式。如何构建稳定的、为企业增强竞争优势的、充分协调的合作伙伴关系对于移动商务参与企业具有重要的意义。本文以运营商、服务提供商、终端平台提供商的伙伴关系为研究对象,探讨以下问题：1)组织间协作、竞争和冲突对于移动商务伙伴关系稳定的影响；2)移动互联网环境下企业对于与其他伙伴的合作模式的选择；3)设计复杂合作模式下的移动商务伙伴关系的协调机制。针对上述问题,本文的研究工作和主要贡献集中在以下几个方面：首先,针对移动互联网的导致错综复杂的移动商务组织间关系,根据组织间协作、竞争和冲突的移动商务伙伴关系元素,基于Lotka-Volterra方程构建了移动商务伙伴关系自组织模型。根据模型的稳定点,发现了移动商务伙伴关系稳定的必要条件；并结合产业实例,将移动商务伙伴关系划分为,强运营商—弱服务提供商、强运营商—弱终端平台提供商、强终端平台提供商—弱服务提供商,弱运营商—强服务提供商,协作导向型伙伴关系。其次,针对移动互联网变革了移动商务伙伴合作模式的问题,结合中国移动通信产业实践,构建了基于博弈论的移动商务伙伴合作模式选择模型。以运营商和服务提供商的协作导向型双边伙伴关系为例,研究企业关于围墙、管道和双渠道三种合作模式下的选择行为,以及收入共享率对合作模式选择的影响。研究发现服务提供商增加移动互联网服务能为运营商带来直接和间接利润；企业选择合作模式时可综合考虑运营商的营销比较优势、移动互联网服务和合作移动服务的价值链单位流量收入比的关系。第三,针对企业在双渠道合作模式中的合作与竞争现象,基于博弈论构建了由运营商、服务提供商和终端平台提供商构成的移动商务多边伙伴关系模型,研究发现：1)运营商和服务提供商(或终端平台提供商)的均衡营销努力总是此消彼长的关系。2)在一定的竞争强度下,服务提供商和终端平台提供商的竞争会使得运营商的利润也会减少。3)服务提供商、终端平台提供商利润的增减取决于两者的营销外部性权重比、服务提供商相对于终端平台提供商的营销比较优势、两者在移动互联网服务上的竞争强度。最后,针对伙伴关系低效率问题,分别构建了基于单边转移支付、多重单边转移支付的协调机制,以协调不同参与主体的移动商务伙伴关系。研究发现：1)双重边际化存在于移动商务双渠道系统中,收入共享契约不能协调移动商务伙伴关系。2)基于单边转移支付的协调机制能够充分协调双渠道合作模式下的运营商和服务提供商的双边伙伴关系。3)提出了非对称“支付—接收”的多重单边转移支付机制,能够充分协调运营商和服务提供商、终端平台提供商的双渠道模式下的合作,以及服务提供商和终端平台提供商在移动互联网服务上的竞争。更多还原

【Abstract】 The application of the mobile Internet has broken down the value chain structure in which the mobile network operators (MNOs) are dominating and focal, and has changed the partnership modes for partners in mobile commerce. It is important to build stable, competitive advantage enhanced and fully coordinated partnership for mobile commerce companies. The research focus of the thesis is the partnerships between MNOs, service providers (SPs), equipment & platform providers (EPs), and the research questions are as follows:1) the influences of inter-organizational cooperation, competition and conflict for the stabilization of mobile commerce partnerships.2) The partnership mode selection of companies for cooperating with other partners in the circumstance of the mobile Internet. 3) Developing mechanisms to coordinate mobile commerce partnership in complicated partnership modes. To investigate the above questions, the main work and contributions of the thesis are as follows:First, aiming at the complicated inter-organizational relationships of mobile commerce caused by the mobile Internet, considering the inter-organizational cooperation, competition and conflict, which are elements of mobile commerce partnership, a model of mobile commerce partnership is constructed based on Lotka-Volterra equation. Based on the stable point of the model, the necessary condition of mobile commerce partnership’s stabilization is found, the mobile commerce partnerships are classified into five types based on the industry practice:powerful MNO - weak SP, powerful MNO - weak EP, powerful EP- weak SP, weak MNO- powerful SP and cooperation-oriented partnership.Second, aiming at the question which the mobile Internet changes the partnership mode of the mobile commerce, considering the practice in Chinese mobile telecommunication industry, a partnership mode selection model is constructed based on game theory. Taking the cooperation-oriented bilateral partnership composing of a MNO and a SP for example, The partnership mode (walled garden, dump pipe and dual-channel) selection behaviors of the MNO and the SP, and the influence of the revenue sharing ratio for partnership mode selection are researched. The research finds that, adding the mobile Internet service of the SP will brings direct and indirect profits to the MNO. While selecting partnership modes, companies can consider the comparative marketing advantage of the MNO, and the unit value chain-wide revenue ratio of the mobile Internet service to the cooperative service comprehensively.Third, aiming at the cooperation and competition of companies in the dual-channel partnership mode, a multilateral partnership model which composes of a MNO, a SP and an EP is constructed based on game theory. The research finds that,1) the relationship of the equilibrium marketing effort between the MNO and the SP (or the EP) are "as one falls,another rises".2) The MNO’s profit may decrease with certain competition intensities between the SP and the EP. (3) The entire companies profits of the SP and the EP depend on the marketing externality weight ratio of the SP to the EP, the comparative marketing advantage of the SP relative to the EP, and the competition intensity between the SP and the EP on the mobile Internet service.Finally, aiming at the inefficiencies in mobile commerce partnerships, coordinating mechanisms side-payment and multi-side-payments are proposed, so as to coordinate the mobile commerce partnerships with different partners. The research finds that,1) the double marginalization exists in the dual-channel systems of mobile commerce, and the revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the mobile commerce partnerships.2) The coordinating mechanism based on side-payment can coordinate the bilateral partnership with dual-channel partnership mode.3) An asymmetric "payment-reception" multi-side-payments mechanism is proposed, which can full coordinate the cooperation among the MNO, the SP and the EP in the dual-channel partnership mode, and the competition between the SP and the EP on the mobile Internet services.更多还原