【作者】 王河森；

【导师】 陈凌；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 华人家族企业集团在中国以及东南亚地区等新兴市场中广泛存在,它们往往规模甚巨,同时在不同的产品市场进行着广泛的多元化经营。为什么这些家族企业能够不断地实现成长,在一定程度上破解华人家族企业“富不过三代”的魔咒?毋庸置疑,治理结构是至关重要的影响因素。而随着上世纪七八十年代中国大陆以及东南亚地区华人经济的崛起和华人企业的巨大成功,华人家族企业的治理结构也成为家族企业研究中的核心问题之一。华人家族企业集团的治理模式表现出明显的双重治理特征。然而已有家族企业治理研究中的主流文献大多忽视了“家族”这一根本性的研究变量,只注重企业系统的经济契约分析,研究的逻辑思路停留在家族涉入如何影响企业绩效的问题上,将企业身后的家族同质化、符号化,对决定家族涉入的影响机制却语焉不详。本文遵循“制度—行为—绩效”的研究思路,以“华人家族企业集团的双重治理”作为全文的研究主线,按照“家族—集团—企业”的论述层次,力图探究以下三个紧密相连的问题：第一,华人家族企业集团的形成过程及其微观基础。第二,华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论内涵、作用机制及其变迁过程。第三,“家族—公司”双重治理模式与整个企业集团中所有企业绩效的关系及其影响路径。本文的研究通过将家族涉入影响企业绩效的逻辑链条向前推演一个层次,以期对家族企业的治理理论进行拓展和完善。本文通过回顾相关理论文献,首先对家族企业治理的基本理论问题进行了梳理,界定了华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论框架。在此框架下,有针对性地收集中国台湾地区(337位家族成员—20强家族企业集团—1665家企业)、中国大陆(572位家族成员—187家狭义上市家族企业集团—406家企业)以及东南亚地区的华人家族企业集团(37位家族成员—1个已实现四代传承的百年企业集团—30家企业)的资料进行分析。一方面,虽然海外的华人家族企业集团与中国大陆的家族企业集团在制度环境、生命周期等方面存在显著差异,但“本是同根生”的中华文化使其具有共性；另一方面,与中国大陆不同,海外华人的家族制度得到了长时段的延续,并未中断。并且,虽然同为海外华人家族企业,相较于东南亚地区,中国台湾已历经现代化进程的洗礼,这又使得三者具有特性。通过三者的比较研究,可更加全面地揭示华人家族企业集团双重治理的机制所在。对应本文提出的三个问题,本文的主要结论如下：(1)就华人家族企业集团的形成过程而言,两个微观基础均发挥了相应的作用。家族社会性契约的“嵌入”和企业层面的经济理性促成了企业集团的形成(对应问题一)。(2)华人家族企业集团的治理模式呈现出双重治理的特征,在其构成上有别于主流研究中第二代公司治理文献的研究框架和研究结论。在家族治理中,家族是被治理的对象,是客体；在公司治理中,家族是治理的主体,并在企业集团层面上形成家族化的治理模式(对应问题二)。(3)从静态的视角观察,三者的双重治理既有相似点也有差异。相似点表现在对家族成员内部权力配置结构的治理机制、金字塔式的控股结构等方面；差异体现在家族传承、持股方式等方面(对应问题二)。(4)从动态的视角观察,双重治理模式在海外华人家族企业集团中长时段延续,钱德勒式的单线型管理革命难以在华人企业中产生(对应问题二)(5)实证分析发现,在同一企业集团中,“业主+其他家族成员”管理的分子企业绩效最优,业主单独控制的企业绩效较优,非业主家族成员管理的企业绩效次之,无家族成员管理的企业绩效再次之。集团内上市企业的绩效显著优于非上市企业,分子企业的绩效与层级负相关,并与核心公司对分子企业的两权分离度负相关,核心公司在分子企业中的所有权对绩效的影响不明确(对应问题三)。本文主要的创新之处在于：第一,深入家族内部,从理论上构建了华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论框架。第二,从实证上分析了双重治理对同一企业集团中所有企业绩效的影响机理,跳出了单纯比较家族企业和非家族企业绩效优劣的窠臼。第三,研究资料的创新,在国内首次采用中国台湾地区大型华人家族企业集团的数据,以及通过实地调研获得的东南亚华人家族企业集团的一手资料。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chiness family business groups are very common in emerging markets such as China and Southeast Asia, also they are very big companies and very diversified in various industries. Why these family business can accomplish growth from time to time. It is no doubt that the governance structure is very important, and the governance model of Chinese family business have become the hot spot both in academic cirles and practical circles because of the rise of Chinese economy.Dual governance structure is the most and foremost characteristics of Chinese family business, but the main literatures of family business governance neglect the "family" variable, which is foremost and key to family business. And the logic idea only focus on how the family involvement affect firm’s value and performance, but did not research the mechanism which determine the involvement of family.This paper is following on the research structure based on "Institution-Behavior-Performance" method. The main theme is aroud the subject of "the dual governance of Chinese family business groups", illustrating the theme by "Family-Business groups-Firms". The entire research is defining on the following questions:First, the formation of the Chinese family business groups and their micro structure bases. Second, the theorical meaning, effecting mechanism and the change process of the dual governance. Third, the relationship between the dual governce model and business groups performance. This paper can enrich the family governance theory by pushing the logic chain of how family involvement affect business goups performance.With the literature review, the paper defines the theorical framework of the dual governance of Chinese family business groups. Following the framework. this paper collects the data of Chinese family business groups from Taiwan district(337 family members-20 biggest business groups-1665 firms), from China’s mainland(572 family members-187 real public business groups-406 firms) and from Southeast Asia(37 family members-a 112 years old family business gourps-30 firms), with the hope that we can discovery the dual governance of Chinese family business groups by detailed comparisons.Corresspongding to the above three questions, the main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1) For the formation the Chinese family business groups, the two micro bases have its effects respectively. The embeddness of the social contracts(the family contracts) and the economic rationality on the firm level have promoted the formation of Chinese family business groups. Which is the answer to question 1.(2) The governance strucrure of Chinese family business groups is a dual governance model, and its composition is different from the mainstream literature’s research structure and conclusions, which is guided by the second generation literature of coporate governance. In the family governance, the family itself is the object of the governance, but in the coporate governance, the family is the subject. Which is the answer to question 2.(3) From the static perspective, the dual governance structure of the Taiwan district, China’s mainland and the Southeast Asia not only have similarities, but also differences. The similarities are as follows:the governance mechanism of the allocation of the ownership, control and management between family members, the pyramidal holding structures et al. And the differences are as follows:the family succession, the way of how to holding et al. Which is also the answer to question 2.(4) From the dynamic perpective, the dual governance structure have continue in the overseas Chinese family groups for a very long time. The single-line of the management revolution which is mentioned by A.D.Chandler, is very hard to occur in the Chinese family business groups. Which is also the answer to question 2.(5) From the empirical studies, this paper finds that, the firm’s performance is best when it is managed by "owner+other family members", and less when it is managd by owner only, and less when it is managed by other family members, and less by the professional managers. Also the performance of public firms in the business groups are superior to non-public firms, the relationship between layer and firm performance is negative. And the core company’s ownership on the firm performance is not clear, but the separation of ownership and control of the core company on the firm have negative effect on its performance. Which is the answer to question 3.The innovations of this paper are as follows. Firstly, to explore the detailed family data, and to construct the framework of dual governance of Chinese family business groups. Secondly, to study the performance differences of the firms which are belong to the same business groups. Thirdly, for the first time, to use the business groups from Taiwan district in domestic studies, and the first data which is collectd by the field investigation.更多还原