【作者】 熊万胜；

【导师】 曹锦清；

【作者基本信息】 华东理工大学 ， 社会学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 本文思考的问题是：我国粮食市场秩序的结构基础是什么。市场秩序的最终反映是价格的稳定,但价格的背后是市场主体之间的复杂关系。笔者发现,在我国的粮食市场中,一些新型的社会结构因素已经形成,这些新的结构因素对价格的形成具有至关重要的影响。笔者用“体系”一词来概括新出现的社会结构。所谓“体系”指的是社会系统结构在权力与资源分布上的一种不平衡状态,它通常是一种中心—边缘结构。粮食市场体系是一个粮食生产、经营和管理主体之间的多层次多维度的中心—边缘体系,包括中心结构、中间结构和边缘结构。粮食市场体系的中心结构是国家管理粮食工作的科层体系；中间结构主要是由储备粮系统、全国性和区域性的粮食批发市场、各种规模的粮食国有企业以及民营企业中的粮食产业化龙头企业构成；边缘结构则由未能成为国家重点扶持对象的农民集体、基层农业服务部门、中小粮食企业、个体户和种粮农户组成。在体系的内部,中心结构、中间结构与边缘结构之间存在主从关系,这种主从关系逐渐被制度化了。体系的出现是粮食市场化改革的结果。在粮食市场化的改革过程中,市场稳定与粮价放开是一对尖锐的矛盾,其中,市场稳定是粮价放开的前提,构成了矛盾的主要方面。正是体系的形成使得这对矛盾的化解成为可能。在粮食市场化改革的过程中,中央集权化、市场统一化和市场主体多元化是同步发展的,三者之间互为条件。从实现市场统一的目标出发,可以认为粮食市场化改革存在两种路径,在2001年以前,实施的是以地方为重心的市场统一化方案,但改革遭到了失败,于是,中央转向了强化中央有关行政管理部门以及中央级国有企业在全国统一大市场中的控制能力,并通过地方国有粮食企业的产权改革,有效地瓦解了地方的政企合一关系。在粮食市场化的过程中,与粮食产业相关的行政管理部门得到了保留,其上层还在强化宏观调控机制的过程中得到了强化,它们形成了粮食市场体系的中心结构。新出现的那些中央级国有粮食企业以及相关企业构成了粮食市场体系中间结构的上层部分。随着国家财政支农力度的增大,从1994年开始实施的扶持农业产业化龙头企业的政策对于民营粮食企业经营行为的影响越来越大,在政府与民营龙头企业之间形成了一种相互依赖关系。这些民营龙头企业和在改革中保留的地方国有粮食企业一起构成了粮食市场体系中间结构的中下层部分。在国家专注于推动粮食市场化特别是强化市场的统一性的过程中,乡村社会中的那些微小的生产经营主体和最基层的农民集体逐渐地被边缘化,它们成为粮食市场体系的边缘结构。在全国统一大市场形成以后,市场经营的风险大增,各种新老农民经济合作组织的发展环境同时趋于恶化。更为重要的是,自从上世纪九十年代初期以来,国家发展粮食生产的方式发生了根本的转变：从依靠基层组织发动农民,越来越转向了指望企业与个体户带动农户。这个根本转变使得农户和农民经济合作组织越来越深刻地受到权力与资本的联合控制。体系对龙头企业和粮食经纪人的扶持,在短期内可能是帮助了农民,但长期地看,也排挤了组织经营农户的专业经济合作组织和组织承包农户的农民集体经济组织。与此同时,小规模的承包农户向适度规模的经营农户的自发升级通道还存在障碍,经营农户在与雇佣农场的竞争中也不占优势。结果,农业家庭经营制度——作为我国农村的基本经营制度——的前途日趋模糊。体系的形成与运作对于粮食价格的稳定起到了重要的作用,其作用机制有三个层面,第一,体系内部各要素的完整,使得不同部分之间可以相互支撑,较好地实现了经济系统的基本功能；第二,体系内主体间关系的制度化,使得粮食市场主体之间的关系成为有序和稳定的；第三,体系促进了供需平衡。因为,在粮食供应略微偏紧和体系结构还比较完整的前提下,有关部门确实可以通过加大投入来刺激生产,而且可以大致地预见这种投入的增产效果。依托粮食自给政策、储备粮系统、全国批发市场和其它国有粮食企业,体系结构对于流通的控制能力是强大的。近十年来,我国粮价避免了大起大落,保持平稳增长的态势,与体系的形成是有关系的。体系的出现带来了粮价的稳定,但是,体系自身却是不稳定的。如果体系沿着既有的逻辑继续强化自身,有可能威胁体系自身的可持续性。因为,体系的形成不完全是理性设计的结果,而是出于多种行动者的自主行动的复合作用,它整体上必然是无意识的,它的稳定也具有偶然性。进一步需要思考的问题是：如果需要自觉地对体系进行改进,那么,这种自觉改进的方向是什么?更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper is to think about:What is the structural basis of China’s grain market order? Market order is ultimately reflected on the stability of price, but behind the price, there is complex relationship between market subjects. I found that in China’s food market, some of the new social structure factors have been formed, and the new structure factors definitely have a crucial impact on the formation of price.I use the "TIXI"(体系)to summarize the newly-emerging social structure. The so-called "TIXF"(体系)refers to a non-equilibrium state of the social system structure existing power and resource distribution. It is usually a center-periphery structure. TIXI(体系)in grain market is a multi-level and multi-dimensional center-edge of the system between grain production, operation and management subjects, including the central structure, the intermediate structure and the periphery structure. The central structure of the grain market "TIXI"(体系)is a bureaucratic management system in national grain work; intermediate structure is mainly formed by the food lay system, national and regional food wholesale market, state-owned food enterprises of all sizes and the leading private enterprises; edge structure can not be supported by the state including the object of collective farmers, mil-small food businesses, the self-employed farmers and grain farmers. There is a master-slave relationship during the "TIXI"(体系)of internal, central structure, intermediate structure and the edge of the structure. Because of non-equilibrium state between power and resource distribution, the master-slave relationship has been institutionalized.Grain market-oriented reforms resulted in the emergence of "TIXI"(体系).Before the grain market-oriented reform, each of our local area has a high degree of internal self-sufficiency. There is a relatively homogeneous honeycomb structure among these relatively independent local economies. The grain businesses are "managed by grain administration departments at different levels, and businesses in different levels are managed by the corresponding government grain departments. The process of grain market-oriented must break each relatively closed economy, to form a national unified and open market. This is a big challenge to form such a market, because such a large-scale food market has never appeared in our country, and how to ensure the basic stability of grain price during the marketing process is a totally new practice. During the grain market-oriented reforms, there is a contradiction between market stability and grain price liberalization. Grain market stability is a precondition for open gain price, which constitutes the main aspect of conflict. This paper mainly analyzes social structural factors,which is useful for the price stability.Grain market-oriented reform is the product of the integration of state-led and social spontaneous. During the recovery process of the bazaars, the farmers’spontaneous behavior is significant. The central government’s system design and promotion played a decisive role in the formation process of a unified national market. In the grain market reform process, centralization, market integration and market diversification develop simultaneously, and all three are the conditions mutually. There are two paths for grain market reform, before 2001, it’s a local-focused path, but the reform failed. Then, the state turned to strengthen the control capability of central state in the unified national market. Based on the reform of tax system to strengthen the central finance, the central government has established the central grain reserve system which is an independent on local grain procurement enterprises, its management is vertical; set up China Agricultural Development Bank which provides a special service to the grain market-oriented reform; established food risk fund which provides a special support for market-oriented reform; and then founded a number of national food wholesale markets which are based on policy and national network of competitive auction; and effectively dismantled the highly close relationship between enterprises and local governments through the local state-owned grain enterprises reform of property rights,. In the process of grain market-oriented reform, grain -related administrative departments have been retained, including upper management departments which are also strengthened during the macro-control mechanism strengthening process, they are the central structure of the grain market system structure. These emerging high-level business entities constitute the upper-level of the middle structure in the grain market system. With the increasing of state financial support for agriculture, the state has began to implement a policy to support the leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization since 1994, and it has had an increasing influence on enterprises. A kind of interdependent relationship between government and leading enterprises has been formed. These leading enterprises and the local retained state-owned grain enterprises formed the lower-level of the middle structure of the grain market system.During the process of promoting market-oriented reform, especially strengthening the unity of market, those tiny production and management subjects from the rural community and the most basic collective farmers were gradually marginalized. This marginalization is the cause of the "TIXI"(体系)formation, but also partly the result of its formation. As the mode of the nation develop grain production is changing from the traditional way of relying on grassroots organizations to mobilize farmers to expect companies to bring on farmers, making this marginalized structure controlled by the joint of power and capital in the middle of the structure. With the formation of a unified national market, the risk of market operation increases, the development environment of the Farmers Economic Cooperation Organization tends to worsen. "TIXI"(体系)supports for employment-type farms and grain broker, it is helpful to farmers in the short term, but in the long run, it also crowds out the Farmers Economic Cooperation Organization for operation farmers and Collective Economic Organizations for contract farmers. Moreover, the spontaneous upgrading path from contract farmers to operation farmers is rough, and operation farmers do not have advantages to compete in employment-typed farms. It may be inevitable or necessary for family operation activities from contract farmers are weak, but the problem that the future of the whole family-run agricultural system is blurred. The weakness of the family-run system, in turn, is possible to threaten the integrity of the architecture."TIXI"(体系)has played an important role on the stable grain price, and this role can be showed from three levels. Firstly, the integrity of the various elements within the "TIXI"(体系),making different parts support each other to better achieve the basic functions of the economic system; secondly, institutionalization of the relationship between the subjects within the system, making the relationship among grain market players become orderly and stable; thirdly, the "TIXI"(体系)promotes the balance between supply and demand. The reason is, under the condition of a little tight grain supply and a relatively complete system, reluctant departments do stimulate production by increasing investment, and can roughly predict investment yield. Relying on grain self-sufficiency policy, food reserve system, the national wholesale market, and other state-owned grain enterprises, system architecture has powerful ability to control the flow. Over the past decade, China’s grain price has successfully avoided the ups and downs, and stayed stable growth, which is related to the formation of the system.The appearance of "TIXI"(体系)brought stable grain price, but the "TIXI"(体系)itself is unstable. If "TIXI"(体系)continues to strengthen itself along the existing logic, it may threaten the sustainability of the system itself. The question needs further consideration is:If we want to consciously improve the "TIXI"(体系),then, what is the orientation for this kind of conscious improvement?更多还原