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美国政府对跨国公司的监管研究

Research of U.S. Government’s Supervision on Multinational Corporations

【作者】 张庆伟

【导师】 杨鲁慧; 张宇燕;

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 , 国际政治, 2011, 博士

【摘要】 权力与财富的关系是国际政治经济学的基本命题之一。当今世界政治经济的一个显著事实是:作为超级大国的美国既是最大的跨国公司母国,也是最大的跨国公司东道国。历史地看,美国的崛起与跨国公司的发展扩张具有很强的共时性。众所周知,在美国霸权构成中,跨国公司具有重要分量,美国也建构了支持跨国公司扩展的完善政策体系,但同样需要关注的是全球资本对美国趋之若鹜,外国跨国公司对于美国的发展同样发挥了不可替代的作用。美国是开放的经济体,面对主权国家和跨国公司天然的利益冲突,美国政府监管如何实现了国家利益最大化的目标。这是本文试图回答的问题。美国对于跨国公司的监管是在国际体系无政府状态下,国家采取现实主义态度,以获取相对收益为目标的典型体现。本文在理论范式上采用国际政治经济学的主要创始人罗伯特·吉尔平的“以国家为中心的现实主义”,主要假设包括:首先,虽然国际经济日益融合,国际机制逐渐增多,但国际体系的无政府本质没有改变,国家为了各自利益也不会放弃监管跨国公司。其次,国家始终是国际国内事务的首要行为者,具备监管跨国公司的能力。在很多自由主义者的眼里,全球化为跨国公司提供了一个没有国界的广阔舞台,面对席卷全球的市场力量,主权国家调控监管的空间和能力受到大大制约,陷入了弗农式的“主权困境”,正在发生苏珊·斯特兰奇所说的国家“退却”。但以国家为中心的现实主义认为,虽然跨国公司、国际机构和非政府组织等非国家行为体在决定国际事务中发挥日益明显的作用,但是国家对国际组织的主权让渡、对跨国公司的放松管制,都是主动的政策选择。各国的政治目的、竞争和合作相互影响,创造出经济力量在其中运作的政治关系框架。国家制定每个企业家和跨国公司必须遵守的规章。第三,国家安全永远是国家最关心的问题,在各种监管目标中排在首位。国家权力和权力之间的关系在国际事务中起决定作用,权力可以以军事、经济、甚至心理的形式表现出来,精神道义和价值观念在决定行为中同样可以发挥作用。国家必须不断地防止对他们政治和经济独立的现实或潜在威胁,不断地关注权力关系的变动,以及在国际均势中国家利益变化的后果。第四,大国更能把握驾驭跨国公司等市场力量,左右着跨国公司的监管规则。世界经济的性质受到主要大国安全、政治利益和相互关系的强烈影响。这些大国绝不会让全球经济产品的分配对其国家利益的影响完全由市场左右。在将跨国公司监管的现实主义理论范式应用到美国时,需要充分考量美国的霸权地位及其对霸权的追求。正如美国学者所自我认知的:美国不是一个传统的殖民大国,其帝国主义式的行动不是体现在军事上,而是一般体现在对美国银行和公司的影响和控制方面。围绕获取、加强和维持霸权,美国政府在监管跨国公司的三个维度——安全、经济和文化方面,都赋予特别的政策目标,分别是维护被广泛定义的国家安全利益、防止经济技术领先地位丧失、输出民主政治和市场经济意识形态。美国在世界体系和国际资本市场中的特殊地位,使其成为跨国公司政策的探索者和先行者,也成为国际规范的制定和引领者。本文从跨国公司监管所涉及的纷繁的政策中,按照既定的理论框架进行了梳理,并验证理论假设的解释力。美国政府监管跨国公司的政策工具主要有对外国跨国公司投资的监管、对跨国公司的出口监管、对跨国公司转移定价等避税措施的监管、对于跨国公司输出文化的监管等。美国政府对跨国公司的域外管辖、以及在跨国公司国际管制问题上的自利倾向一并得到了阐述。如果不能打开国家这个“黑箱”,国家主义范式的分析将难以摆脱扁平化问题。本文通过路径融合,用国内结构路径和制度路径,弥补了罗伯特·吉尔平把国家作为单一行为体的局限,拓展了研究的深度。在国内层次,重点考察了政府与企业关系、国家与社会关系、国家管制机构之间关系等制度结构,提出美国国内制度结构不仅决定了政府监管的范围和力度,而且通过制度的力量,使对跨国公司监管既反映不同政治力量及利益集团的诉求,又最大限度避免过度政治化对国家利益的损害。另一方面,美国监管跨国公司也需要对国际层次的变量进行有效回应。本文在国际政治变革的大框架下,探讨体系因素作为一种外部环境如何影响了跨国公司监管政策及其实施,重点选择美国对外资并购的国家安全审查这个与中国密切相关的命题,进行具有一定时间跨度的考察。分析认为,围绕维护国家安全和霸权地位的战略目标,美国对跨国公司的监管,因为面对的国家不同、议题不同,而调整演变,以实现国家利益最大化。跨国公司监管属于政府公共政策范畴,本文定位在理论检验型和历史评估型论文的结合,所以含有较多的关于美国管制政策和管制案例的描述成分,用以检验“以国家为中心的现实主义”范式的解释力,并对具体政策效果进行评估。具体研究方法上,采用文献研究法,涉及大量美国政府、国际组织的官方文件、政策及国内学术专著、论文;采用案例分析法,由于美国的法律体系属于判例法,管制政策体现在具体的案例分析中,所以研究政策离不开案例;采用比较研究法,以中国视角研究美国问题,本身即有比较,文中还特别关注了发达国家与发展中国家,东道国与母国,大国与小国,主权国家与国际组织等在跨国公司监管中的差异,多维度地展现跨国公司监管的不同侧面。本文的核心结论可以概括为,美国采用“以国家为中心的现实主义”原则,对本国和他国的跨国公司实施了有效监管,使跨国公司成为其霸权地位的重要支撑。美国对于跨国公司的监管受各种利益集团的影响,但其国内政治结构和监管制度能够使监管以符合国家利益最大化的目标展开。美国对于跨国公司的监管受外在环境变化和国际压力的影响,但根据国家关系和议题性质做出不同回应。美国在跨国公司的国际监管制度建设中存在明显的自利主义倾向。论文具有一定的理论意义和较强的现实意义。美国对跨国公司的监管需要一种全景式理论阐释。选择以罗伯特·吉尔平“以国家为中心的现实主义”理论为基本架构,站在国家的立场,选择政府监管的维度,吸收对外经济政策领域的相关研究成果,更有利于完成对美国跨国公司政策与实践的全面解读。从实践看,中国与美国日益扩大的经贸交往赋予了本课题强烈的现实意义。美国对跨国公司的监管与中国利益密切相关。如在过去几年间,包括中海油、海尔、华为在内的中国企业连续数次并购,都受阻于美国的国家安全审查机制。只有深刻理解了美国对跨国公司监管的理论、立场、尺度和影响因素,才能有的放矢地制定方案,达到现实可行的目标。同样重要的是,中国已经连续19年成为吸收外商投资规模最大的发展中国家,全球500强跨国公司中的九成已落户中国,同时中国迅速成为资本输出最多的发展中国家之一,大批企业走出国门,成长为有影响的跨国公司,《财富》杂志2010年公布的世界500强企业名单中,中国企业已达54家。毫无疑问,中国崛起需要充分发挥跨国公司的力量,而建构中国的跨国公司监管体系,需要积极借鉴美国的经验。本文对于主权国家和跨国公司这两个国际政治经济学的核心行为体,尝试采用监管的视角,从总体上把握国家与跨国公司的关系,对于分布在美国对外经济各领域的政策工具进行了梳理:在理论框架上,以国家为中心的现实主义为主,借助国家主义回归时倡导的路径融合,从国内结构和体系层次进行拓展,搭建起较有解释力的分析模型。

【Abstract】 The relationship between power and wealth is a basic topic of International Political Economics. A significant fact of current global politics and economy is that the United States of America, as a superpower, is both the largest home country of transnational companies (TNC) and the largest host country of TNCs. From a history perspective, the rising of U.S. and the development and expansion of TNCs is highly synchronic. It is commonly known that TNCs play important roles in the U.S. hegemony and the U.S. has formulated a complete policy system supporting the expansion of TNCs. It is also noteworthy that foreign TNCs have played irreplaceable roles in the development of the U.S. and capital has been rushing to the U.S.. This paper is an attempt to find an answer on how the goal of maximization of national interests is realized through government supervision in the U.S., an open economy, when facing the natural conflicts of interest between a sovereign state and TNCs.The U.S. supervision on TNCs typically manifests the realism attitudes employed by a nation with comparative benefits as goals in the international anarchy system. The theoretical paradigm of this paper is the state-centered realism by Robert Gilpin, a major founder of international political economics. Key hypotheses include:Firstly, the anarchy of the international system has never changed and the supervision on TNCs will not be abandoned by a nation for its own interests despite of the ever-increased integration of international economy and increased international mechanisms. Secondly, a state is always the primary actor of international and domestic affairs, and has the strength to regulate TNCs. From many liberalists’ perspective, globalization has facilitated TNCs a vast arena without borders, and the supervision spectrum and capabilities of a sovereign state have been greatly restricted facing the market power around the world. According to liberalists, a state is falling in the Vernon style "sovereignty at bay" and is undertaking "retreat" as described by Susan Strange. However, according to the state-centered realism, sovereignty transfer from a state to an international organization and the deregulation of TNCs is a proactive policy choice by a state, though non-state actors like TNCs, international organizations and NGOs have been playing important roles. With the interaction of political objectives, competition and cooperation, the political framework is forged within which economic power is operating. The state makes regulations that every entrepreneur and TNC shall be complied with. Thirdly, national security is always the issue a state shows most concerns and places on the top priority among various supervision objectives. The relationship among powers is the decisive factor in international affairs. Power may show up in the form of military, economy and even psychology. Moreover, ethics and values contribute to decision-making. A state has to contentiously guard against any real or potential threats to its political and economic independence, and pay close attention to the changes of power relationship and the consequences of national interests changes in international equilibrium. Fourthly, large countries have more capabilities to regulate market powers like TNCs, and master the supervision on TNCs. The nature of global economy is substantially influenced by security, political interests and interrelation of the large countries, who will definitely deny the full control of markets in terms of distribution of global products and the influences of national interests by economic powers.The U.S. hegemony position and its pursuit for hegemony should be taken into consideration when the realism paradigm of TNC supervision is applied to the United States. As American scholars perceive by themselves, the U.S. imperialist-style actions are commonly shown from its influences and supervision on American banks and corporations rather than from military, since the U.S. is traditionally not a large colonial country. In order to acquire, improve and preserve its hegemony, the U.S. government has made specific policy goals in the tri-dimension of security, economy and culture for its supervision on TNCs, i.e., to maintain the broadly-defined national security interests, to guard against its leadership in economy and technologies, and to export democracy and ideology of market economy.The U.S. has been the explorer and forthgoer in TNC policies, and the maker and leader in international standards due to its particular position in the world and international capital markets. According to the established theoretical framework, this paper has reviewed various policies related to supervision on TNCs and verified the explanation strengths of the theoretical hypotheses. The U.S. policies related to TNC supervision include investment supervision from foreign TNCs, export supervision on TNCs, supervision on tax mitigation methods like multinational transfer pricing, and culture exportation supervision on TNCs. Extraterritorial jurisdiction and its self-serving tendencies in terms of international supervision on TNCs are also elaborated.The flattening problem in the state paradigm study could not be avoided if the "black box" of a state is not opened. Through path integration of domestic structure and regime, this paper offsets the limitation of Robert Gilpin’s sole path of the state as the sole actor and thus expands the depth of the research. At domestic structure level, attentions have been paid to observe regime structure such as the relationship between state and market, between sate and society, and interrelation among state administration organizations. It is pointed out that the U.S. domestic regime structure not only determines the scope and intensity of government supervision, but also reflects the appeals from different political powers and interest groups through its supervision regimes of TNCs and thus prevents any harm to national interests by politics at an utmost level.On the other hand, the U.S. supervision on TNCs should effectively response to international variables. Under the framework of international politics transformation, this paper makes discussions on how the system factor as an outside environment impacts TNC supervision policies. One issue closely related to China has been reviewed in a certain time span:American’s national safety examination on foreign M&As. It is found that the U.S. supervision on TNCs have been adjusted and evolved in its pursuit for national security and hegemony goals due to different countries and issues.Supervision on TNCs is carried out by government public policies. As an integration of theory testing and history evaluation, this paper contains substantial descriptions of the U.S. supervision policies and real cases in order to verify the explanation of the state-centered realism and to review the results of specific policies. This paper employs literature research to cover official documents and policies of U.S. government and international organizations and papers, books and theses from China. Case study is also used because supervision policies are reflected in case analysis in the U.S., a case-law country. Comparative study is also used in this paper. Comparison can be easily found from this paper since it is a research of U.S. from a Chinese perspective. Differences in TNC supervision have been particularly reviewed by comparing developed countries and developing countries, host countries and home countries, large countries and small ones, sovereign states and international organizations, showing various aspects and similarities and/or dissimilarities in multi-dimensions.The core conclusion of this paper is that the United States, with the state-centered realism, has implemented effective supervision on TNCs both from the U.S. and abroad, and facilitated TNCs as important supports for its hegemony position. Though its TNC supervision is influenced by various interest groups, the U.S. domestic political structure and supervision system is able to expand its supervision towards the goal of national interest maximization. Though its TNC supervision is also influenced by outside environment and international pressures, the U.S. has different responses to different relationship and issues, showing apparent self-serving tendencies.This paper significantly contributes to both theory and practice. A full-spectrum theory explanation is needed for U.S. supervision on TNCs. Within the framework of Robert Gilpin’s state-centered realism, a complete interpretation of U.S. supervision on TNCs could be more easily achieved, learning from related researches in foreign economic policies from a state’s perspective and in the dimension of government supervision. In practice, this paper may contribute to the ever-expanding economic exchanges between China and the U.S., since the Chinese interests are closely connected with the U.S. supervision on TNCs. For example, several M&As by CNOOC, Haier, Huawei and other Chinese companies were rejected by the U.S. national security review system in the past years. Realistic objectives can be achieved with well-targeted programs only through deep understanding of the theory, stance, scale and influential factors of U.S. supervision on TNCs. It is equally important that China has been the largest host for FDI among developing countries,90% Fortune 500 companies have business presence in China, and that a large number of Chinese companies are growing to TNCs with 54 Chinese companies listed in Fortune 500 (version 2010). In the process of China’s rising, TNCs should be brought into full play, and American experiences should also be introduced when forging China’s TNC supervision system.For the two core subjects of international political economics, sovereign state and TNC, this paper attempts to employ a new perspective to review the relationship between state and TNC by analyzing the U.S. policy instruments in various foreign economic areas. In terms of theoretical framework, the state-centered realism is majorly employed to formulate an analytic model with the path integration advocated by nationalism and expansion at both domestic structure and regime levels.

【关键词】 美国政府跨国公司管制现实主义
【Key words】 U.S. governmentTransnational CompanySupervisionRealism
  • 【网络出版投稿人】 山东大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 06期
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