【作者】 郑志斌；

【导师】 赵新华；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 法学理论， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 重整制度作为与破产清算、和解并列的三大破产制度或破产程序之一,是一种积极拯救债务人并促使其复兴的破产预防制度。它的出现,使破产法的价值观念由个人本位向社会本位转变。我国《企业破产法》颁布以后,有众多学者对重整制度展开了研究。遗憾的是,由于我国对重整制度引入较晚,实践上缺乏经验,导致现阶段对公司重整制度的研究还一般较为宽泛,缺乏针对性。在英、美、日、德、法等其他国家,对重整制度的研究较为充分,有关破产重整的立法颁布较早,其间一般历经多次修改,相对来说比较科学完善。值得注意的是,针对具体重整制度中股东所处的法律地位及股东权的变化问题,国内或国外的系统地理论研究都很少,《企业破产法》关于股东的权利也是散落在各处,很难整理出重整制度中特有规则。重整制度究竟给股东地位带来了什么样的冲击?股东在《公司法》上的权利是否受到限制?股东在《企业破产法》的重整制度中又有哪些权利?股东与债权人在重整制度的各个环节是否存在利益冲突?这些冲突该如何平衡?司法实践中成为上市公司摆脱困境最佳选择的上市公司重整制度中股东权问题又有哪些特殊性?正是带着这些疑问,笔者将《公司重整制度下的股东权变异研究》作为自己的博士学位论文选题。本文的核心观点是:重整制度对股东的地位和权利产生了深层次影响,但是,重整制度与破产清算不同,重整制度使股东仍然能够作为参与主体参加重整程序,维护自身权益。重整制度中,债权人利益优先于股东利益,因此,重整制度对公司法上的股东权利进行必要限制。然而,重整制度的基石是利益平衡。要实现重整目标,重整制度又必须通过制度设计对债权人、股东的利益进行平衡,从而切实保障债权人、股东的利益。本论文共分四章,约18余万字。第一章探究重整制度下股东权变异的诱因。从比较法和法史学的角度论述了重整法律制度的起源和发展,重整制度是社会经济发展的必然产物,是破产立法价值多元化的制度需求。重整制度的产生,突破了原有破产法构筑的只保护债权人利益和债务人利益的狭小空间,将所有可能受债务人破产消极影响的利益主体都考虑在内,从而为破产法对社会利益的维护提供了制度上的归依。笔者介绍了重整制度的定义和特征,对重整制度价值取向进行研究,认识到“正义”、“效率”、“公平”这三个法律价值元素贯彻在整个重整制度的价值追求之中,并实现于受法律制度调整的社会生活之中。本章重点阐述重整制度利益平衡这一基本原则,分析重整中利益平衡的必要性和可行性,设计重整制度具体规则达到利益平衡的作用,法院和管理人是利益平衡的裁量者,而重整计划是利益冲突的集中体现与利益平衡的最终实现。笔者从重整制度中股东地位与重整前正常经营情况下及破产清算制度中股东地位进行对比的视角,分析重整制度下股东地位的特殊性,探究引起这些变化的深层次原因,主要包括三个方面:公司丧失清偿能力动摇了股东控制权的根基;利益结构的变化要求权力重新配置,司法权介入干预股东自治。第二章探讨公司重整制度下股东控制权的变异。与破产清算不同,重整并不终结公司作为一个法律实体的存在,而是通过各种措施维持公司继续营业,最终使公司摆脱困境恢复正常的经营状态。这使得公司的内部权力结构以及这种权力结构的分权制衡机制对于重整公司至关重要,笔者从股东控制权变化的角度揭示了公司内部分权制衡机制即公司治理结构的变化过程。要想真正清楚在进入重整程序后权力分配制衡机制,必须充分了解正常状态下公司治理结构的特点及股东控制权的配置,才能对比出重整程序对公司治理结构及股东控制权产生的冲击。因此,笔者首先对正常状态下的股东控制权问题进行了探讨。第二节笔者对重整程序中的控制权配置进行了全面分析,归纳出重整中控制权配置的基本特点,明确新产生的法院、管理人、债权人会议与公司原有的股东大会、董事会及监事会之间的权力分配及制衡机制,分析了股东控制权的变化。第三节论述重整程序中经营控制权的归属问题。第四节对比分析管理人管理模式与债务人管理模式下公司控制权的具体变化。由于管理人管理模式和债务人管理模式由不同主体掌握公司的经营控制权,而管理人、债务人与股东之间的关系有着较大差别,所以,通过对比两种管理模式下控制权配置的差异能够看出股东在不同管理模式中地位的不同和权力的变化。第五节则探讨重整计划执行期间公司控制权的特殊问题。第三章剖析重整制度下股东权与债权博弈之变异。在公司重整的过程中,存在多方利益主体,相互之间存在复杂的利益冲突,其中股东与债权人之间的利益冲突最为激烈。股东与债权人作为公司重整中重要的利益主体,对公司重整的成败有着至关重要的作用。笔者认为有必要系统地分析股东与债权人之间的利益冲突和利益平衡问题。第一节笔者提出公司重整就是股东与债权人的一场利益博弈。在公司重整前,股东与债权人已经是一种博弈关系,他们在公司的运行过程中不断产生利益的冲突与平衡。在公司重整的过程中,股东与债权人也不是孤立存在,而是有着密切关系的,同样表现为一种冲突与平衡,这种冲突与平衡其实就是利益的博弈。当公司濒临破产时,资源已经不多,各利害关系人无法全部受偿,利益冲突更加激烈。股东与债权人之间的利益冲突有多方面原因,但是整体利益的一致性及重整制度的独特设计使二者之间的冲突有调和的可能性。本章第二节、第三节和第四节分别为“重整程序启动中的利益之争”、“重整计划制定中的利益之争”、“重整计划表决权之争”,笔者选择重整程序中的几个最重要环节分析股东、债权人之间的利益冲突,对各国立法规定进行对比,希望能在制度设计层面提出兼具公平与效率的合理建议,达到平衡股东与债权人利益的目标。第四章分析上市公司重整制度中股东权的特殊变异。上市公司涉及面广,一旦破产清算,将产生一系列连锁反应,对社会影响很大,因此,如何有效拯救上市公司成为亟待解决的问题。实践证明,重整制度是上市公司拯救危机的有效手段。上市公司股东众多,股权结构复杂,使上市公司重整制度具有一定的独特之处。本章以股东权作为研究视角,结合我国上市公司重整案例的实践经验,对我国上市公司重整制度中存在的特殊问题进行实证分析。第一节对上市公司重组和重整中股东的地位进行对比,研究重整中股东地位发生的变化。第二节从切实保障股东在上市公司重整中的知情权的角度,分析建立完善上市公司重整信息披露制度的必要性和重大意义,介绍信息披露制度的主要内容,不同模式下信息披露义务人的确定,重整不同阶段信息披露的基本内容和要求等,重点建议上市公司在股东行使表决之前应该提供哪些重要信息。上市公司股东权益调整是重整制度中股东最为关注的问题,与其自身利益有最直接的关系,因此,本章第三节探讨了股东权益调整的几种主要方式,如存量股份让渡、减资(缩股)、资本公积金转增、发行新股、债转股等。笔者对这几种方式在司法实践中的具体运用进行了介绍,对产生的法律问题和争议进行了分析。第四节是上市公司重整中股东行使表决权的特殊问题,网络投票对重整计划表决有什么影响?资不抵债情况下股东是否还应有表决权?股东表决权的增强是否对债权人利益优先原则造成动摇?笔者对目前实践中仅有的三例网络投票案例进行了实证分析。该节还讨论了出资人会议的表决范围问题,以及出资人表决没有通过情况下的法院强制裁定批准重整计划问题。第五节关注的是股东在上市公司重整中的诉讼权问题。重整制度允许股东提出新的诉讼,而正在审理的诉讼则需要根据法律规定中止一段时间。结合国外相关立法和实践经验,对股东赔偿请求权的定性问题进行分析,究竟应该作为劣后债权还是一般债权处理。通过实际案例分析股东诉讼对上市公司重整及重组带来的影响,探讨重整程序中应如何应对股东诉讼及赔偿请求权,既不影响重整目标实现,又能够充分保障股东利益。更多还原

【Abstract】 The bankruptcy reorganization, as a bankruptcy prevention system to save the predicament debtor and promote its revival, has been one of three broad forms of the modern bankruptcy legal system together with bankruptcy liquidation and conciliation system. Due to this emerging system, the value of bankruptcy law shifted from individual-based to community-based standard. After the enactment of "Bankruptcy Law of PRC", many scholars have already carried out studies on the reorganization system. Unfortunately, due to the late introduction of the reorganization system and the lack of practical experience in China, the study on reorganization at this stage is still generally a more broad study of principles. To contrast, in Britain, the United States, Japan, Germany, France and other developed countries, the study on the reorganization system is more in-depth and comprehensive. Furthermore, the relevant bankruptcy law in those countries is enacted earlier and became relatively scientifically sound after several revisions. It is also noteworthy that there is very little systematic theoretical study on the specific reorganization system regarding the legal status of the shareholders and the change of shareholders’rights. What’s worse, the rights of shareholders on enacted "Bankruptcy Law" are also scattered throughout. Hence, it is difficult to sort out specific rules for the reorganization system.What kind of impact the reorganization system would bring to shareholders? Whether the rights of shareholders in the“Company Law”would be restricted? What kind of rights the shareholders would enjoy in the reorganization system under“Bankruptcy Law”? Whether there is conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors in the all aspects of reorganization proceedings? How to balance these conflicts? What specialty the rights of shareholders demonstrate in the reorganization system which becomes the best choice for listed companies to bail out in judicial practice? To deal with these questions, the author chooses“Variation of Shareholders’ Rights in the Reorganization of Corporation" as his doctoral thesis topic. The key point of this article is: The reorganization system had a profound impact on the status and rights of the shareholders. However, unlike bankruptcy liquidation, shareholders can still participate in the reorganization proceedings to safeguard their own interests. In addition, the interests of creditors have priority over the interests of shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary for the reorganization system to restrict the rights of shareholders. However, balance of interests is the cornerstone of the reorganization. To achieve this goal, we need to re-design a system to balance the interests of shareholders and creditors, thereby effectively protecting the interests of the shareholders. This paper is divided into four chapters, about 180 thousand words.The first chapter explores the reason of variation of the shareholders’right in the reorganization system. From the perspective of comparative law and legal history, the author discusses the origin and development of the reorganization system. The reorganization system is the inevitable product of social and economic development, reflecting the need for the diverse value of bankruptcy legislation. It extends the narrow space of the original structure under the bankruptcy law to protect all stakeholders who may be affected by the negative impact of debtors’bankruptcy, not only the interests of creditors and debtors, so as to maintain the interests of society in the framework of the bankruptcy system. The author describes the definition, characteristics and value of the reorganization system, and recognizes that "justice", "efficiency" and "fair", all these three elements are existed in pursuit of the whole value of the reorganization system and achieved by the adjustment of the legislation in the social life. This chapter also focuses on the balance of interests, the basic principles of the reorganization system. The author analyzes the necessity and feasibility of the balance of interests, and designs specific rules to balance the interests. The balance of interests is in the discretion of Court and bankruptcy administrator. Reorganization plan is concentrated reflection of conflict of interests and final realization of balance of interest. By Comparison of the status of shareholders in the reorganization, before the reorganization and in the bankruptcy liquidation, the author analyzes the specialty of the status of shareholders to explore the underlying reasons for these changes, including three areas: corporate insolvency which shakes the foundation of shareholders’control; changes in the structure of interests which require redistribution of the power; Judicial intervention to the autonomy of shareholdersChapter two deals with the variation of the shareholders’control in the reorganization system. Unlike bankruptcy liquidation, reorganization is not the end of the corporation’s existence as a legal entity, but maintains the corporation to continue business through various measures, thereby bailing out the corporation to resume normal operation. Thus, corporation’s internal power structure and the mechanism for the separation of such power are essential for the reorganizing corporation. The author reveals the process of change in the corporate internal mechanism of checks and balances, namely, the corporate governance structure from the perspective of change of shareholders control. In order to analyze the checks and balances of power after the reorganization process, one should fully understand the characteristics of normal state corporate governance and distribution of the shareholders control, and then conclude the resulting impact on corporation by comparison. In the first place, the author discusses the shareholder control under normal state. In section II, the author conducts a comprehensive analysis of the distribution of control in the reorganization process, summarizes the basic characteristics of the distribution of control in the reorganization process, and clarifies the distribution and separation of power between newly created meeting of court, administrator and creditors, and corporate existing general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and board of supervisors. Section III deals with who has the operational control in reorganization proceedings. Section IV compares the specific changes of shareholder control between administrator management and debtor management. As to the different subject of operational control in different management styles and the difference of the relationship among administrator, creditor and shareholders, the distribution of control under these two kinds of management can also reflect the different position and changes of power in different management styles. In section V, the author discusses special problems about control of company in the implementation period under reorganization plan.Under Chapter Three, the author analyzes the variation of the game between the right of shareholders and the right of creditors. In the corporation reorganization process, there is conflict of interests among multi-stakeholders, especially intense between shareholders and creditors. Shareholders and creditors are the most important subject of interests and also play vital roles in the reorganization. The author believes that it is necessary to conduct a systematic analysis regarding with the conflict and balance of interests between shareholders and creditors. In section I, the author proposes that corporation reorganization is a game of interests between shareholders and creditors. Even before the reorganization, shareholders and creditors have already been in a game relationship, continuously generating conflict of interests and balancing the conflicts during the corporation’s operation. Meanwhile, shareholders and creditors in the process of corporation reorganization are not isolated, but closely related, as a relationship of conflict and balance, namely, the game of interests. When a corporation is near bankruptcy, its resource is so limited that not all of the stakeholders would get repayment; the conflicts of interest would become more intense. Conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors have many causes, but the consistency of overall interest and the unique design of the reorganization system make it possible to reconcile the conflicts. The following sections in this chapter are“the dispute of interests to initiate reorgainzation“,“the dispute of interests in the proposed reorganization plan”and“the dispute of voting rights for the reorganization plan”. The author analyzes the conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors in the most important parts of the reorganization process, hoping to make some reasonable, fair and efficient proposals to balance the interests between shareholders and creditors.Chapter Four studies the special variation regarding the right of shareholders in listed companies under reorganization system. As to the characteristics of listed companies, bankruptcy liquidation of listed companies will produce a series of chain actions and exert a profound influence on society. Therefore, how to effectively save the listed company becomes a serious problem. It has been proven that reorganization system is an effective means to save the crisis of listed companies. Due to the large number of shareholders and complex ownership structure, the reorganization system for listed companies is certain unique. The author in this chapter conduct an empirical analysis of special problems in the reorganization system for listed companies in China, combined with the practical experience of China’s listed companies’reorganization. Firstly, the author compares the status of shareholders in listed companies’restructuring and reorganization, and studies the change of shareholders’status in reorganization. In order to effectively protect the shareholder right to know in the reorganization, section II discusses the necessity and significance of information disclosure about reorganization, describes the main contents of the information disclosure system, the determination of the obligor of information disclosure in different modes, the basic content and requirements of the information disclosure at different stages, and suggests listed companies to focus on information which should be provided before the vote by shareholders. The adjustment of shareholders’equity in listed companies, as most concern of shareholders, is directly related to their own interest. Section III discusses several major methods of shareholders’ equity adjustment, such as transfer of treasury stock, capital reduction (shrink), capital accumulation fund, issuance of new shares, debt and etc. The author introduces the concrete application of aforementioned methods in judicial practice and analyzes relevant legal issues and disputes. Section IV deals with the special problems of exercising voting rights in the listed companies’reorganization. Does the internet voting have any effect on the reorganization plan? Whether shareholders should have the right to vote? Whether the enhancement of shareholders voting right would shake the principle of the priority interest of creditors? The author conducts an empirical analysis of the only three internet voting cases in current practice. This section also discusses the scope of voting in the investor conference and the situation where the investors did not approve a reorganization plan, the court ruled to force the approval of a reorganization plan. Section V is concerned about the litigation right of shareholders in listed companies’reorganization. The reorganization system allows shareholders to propose new actions, but when it comes to pending lawsuits, the suspension is required in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. With relevant foreign legislation and practical experience, whether the right to request compensation should be treated as bad debt or general debt is still in dispute. Finally, the author analyzes the impact of shareholder litigation on listed companies’reorganization and restructuring through practical cases and also discusses effective ways to deal with shareholder litigation and compensation claim, not affecting the goal of reorganization, but also fully protecting the interest of shareholder.更多还原