【作者】 彭江波；

【导师】 曾康霖；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 金融学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 中国作为发展中大国,经济增长初期阶段工业化和城市化进程的推进,以及重化工业和制造业、运输业的快速发展,难免使整个社会面临能源需求大幅上升、能源消费产生的污染压力与日俱增的问题。应该说,能源有限和污染激增是阻碍中国经济转型和可持续发展的瓶颈与短板。针对此,中国自上世纪70年代就开始提出相关的环境发展政策,但在市场观念缺乏和运行机制不完善的情况下,主要以行政命令方式为主。强制性行政政策的实施尽管取得了一定的成绩和进步,但在环境管制领域并未形成有效的、完整的、能够根据环境市场供需状况和政策导向自动调整成本收益关系,进而改变微观主体行为的市场化环境工具,因此中国的节能减排进程推行缓慢,效果距离预期存在差距。充分发挥市场化环境工具在推进节能减排进程和支持节能减排项目中的作用,体现“机制内生、自动调节、目标可控、运作灵活”的优势,是今后环境规制的主流趋势,也是与国际环境政策接轨的必然选择。在市场化工具中,排放权交易自身所具有的污染控制成本低、信息需求量少、不受经济扩张和通货膨胀影响、对财政能力要求低以及能够实现总量控制等优势,决定了更适合当前中国的经济发展水平和节能减排需要。排放权交易发生于各个需要权证的主体之间,从而使交易市场的运行过程和运行结果更依赖于各微观经济主体的行为,而联系各主体行为的是定价机制所决定的权证价格和运作规则。在传统行为经济学的研究中,“理性经济人”行为的变化是通过改变自身成本-收益函数来诱发的,而价格变动作为一种市场信号,既可以单向改变成本或收益函数,也可以双向同时改变成本和收益函数,从而达到预先设定的行为目标。排放权交易改变污染控制行为达到社会最优标准的机理也是如此,通过对环境污染的外部性合理定价,并内部化为权证价格,在其出售和转让的过程中构成经济主体成本-收益函数的内生变量。由此可见排放权交易发挥作用的核心机制是其定价过程,在此过程中达到实现优资源化配置和污染治理责任的优化配置。定价过程固然重要,但离不开制度体系的相关环节设计,例如排放权交易必须在确认环境资源稀缺性和产权性的基础上才能对环境容量进行核算、分配与定价；排放权交易必须在市场上存在不同于基本需求的交易需求和投机需求下,才具有储存、结转和交易的动机；排放权交易必须在计量单位具有可比性或可交换性的前提下才能实现环境资源间的等价交换；排放权交易必须在闭合的边域内实行定价并交易,才能有效规避“用脚投票”带来的价格失灵等。基于此,论文首先就排放权交易的核心作用机制——价格发现的制度基础进行了深入分析,主要观点有：一是排放权交易具有交易性、市场性和金融性,其中交易性决定了排放权的价值所在,可以定价；市场性保证了排放权必须通过合理有效定价才能达到最优化配置；金融性使得排放权可以作为衍生产品进行交易方式的创新,期货、期权等多样化定价成为必然。同时,排放权的需求主体是具有排放要求的企业或个人,由于减排成本不同,排放权对于每个主体也具有不同的价值,由此会产生排放需求、交易需求和投机需求的差别,应不同需求而产生的交易市场必然具有不同的定价机制。二是鉴于环境资源的公共属性,无法对其按照价值和供求关系定价,只能遵循经济学中“边际成本=价格”的原则,亦言之,只有当排放权交易的市场价格与经济主体减排的边际治理成本相等时,经济主体减排的成本最低。但这是一种在市场完全竞争、交易成本为零的理想状态下的长期目标定价机制,并不符合存在地区、时间、环境等差异的现实状况的定价要求,因此,寻求一种融入差异变量的差别化定价机制是实现短期局部均衡与长期一般均衡统一的必然,就像如果想把一个不规则的半球(现实定价存在差异)修补成一个完整的球(长期目标定价的均衡),必须通过增加另一半不规则的半球(差别化的定价机制)来实现。由此可见,这里的差别化包含两层含义：一方面由于市场不存在理论上理想的环境,现实的定价必然存在差异性,否则按照“边际成本=价格”的统一定价会因缺乏买方(或卖方)导致交易失败；另一方面现实价格的差异性需要对具有相同性质和数量的差异变量采用相同的方法进行量化,否则差异量化的不可比性会加剧失衡状况。三是由于环境资源的物理属性不同,不具有通用性,因此原则上排放权不存在不同种类环境资源之间的交易需求和交换机制。但由于排放权交易的金融属性使其兼具投机性,作为投资工具在二级市场上具有相同的金融属性,可以储存、在不同种类之间进行价值转换、交易,因此不同种类环境资源之间也具有了交易的内在需求。对于同类环境资源,由于其当量的计量标准一样,可以直接在市场上折算为货币价值进行等价交换。而对于不同种类的环境资源,由于当量的计量标准不同,单纯通过货币价值体现的交换关系,无法揭示资源种类与经济增长、技术进步等的相对变化关系,因此应选择与两者均具有某种同方向单项变化关系的中间联动变量,例如GDP。四是排放权价格配置作用的有效发挥需要供求边域的闭合相配合,从而达到明确供求关系、规避“用脚投票”、减少个人理性带来的集体非理性、减少流动性带来的效率损失等目标。鉴于排放权交易所涉及的对象具有生态系统的完整性,而且我国既有的政治和行政体制改革仍需要一个较长的时期,因此,中国的排放权交易边域选择应兼顾地方行政政府在推进节能减排中的导向和均衡作用,以及基于地理分布的环境价值量化,实行基于效率的地理区划与基于公平的行政区划的共生体。纵观中国排放权交易的提出与发展,目前尚处于试点阶段,企业参与的交易基本是靠国家、地方政府或地方环境管理部门牵头来实现,其中行政干预的力度较大,没有真正体现出市场的力量和作用。在这种情况下达成的交易价格往往具有人为性和主观性,缺乏效率,不能真实体现与环境容量和供求关系相对应的权证市场价值,从而无法达到通过价格传导将外部性内部化的排放权制度设计初衷。而且中国的这种行政干预方式也不利于形成全国性的统一市场、市场交易规则和交易秩序,进而也就无法与国际市场进行有效的链接,迅速参与到国际环境资源使用权交易市场中去。他山之石,可以攻玉。通过对美国、欧盟各国排放权交易运行模式及市场建设的考察和梳理,发现中国排放权交易制度的主要缺陷在于行政权力和市场机制在排放权交易过程中的定位和作用领域模糊、边域开放制约了价格机制在有效范围内体现供求关系、缺乏统一完整的差别化定价体系增加交易主观性、排污总量控制不合理、初始分配方式不科学、排放权交易信息不对称和市场流动性不足、以及可以依据实施与处罚的法律法规缺失等。在对发达国家排放权交易发展趋势与中国发展前景进行基本判断的基础上,本论文设计了适合中国环境情势的排放权市场化定价机制,包括建立在动态福利和地区差异基础上的标价限量初始分配和定价方式,以及囊括现货价格、持有成本、预期及外部变量的二级交易和定价方式,并以环渤海经济圈污水交易为例,验证结论的科学性和可行性。论文最后从政府与市场机制的有效配合角度,就构建完善、可行的中国排放权交易制度需要创造的运作环境和配套条件提出针对性建议,包括按环境功能建立监管机构、电子清算中心以及使用调节基金,充分发挥政府在排放权交易中宏观调控、公共服务和监督管理上的协调优势；建立二级分配层级制的交易市场(所),实行差别化的交易价格,制定为总量调控目标服务的专门交易规则,发挥金融在排放权交易中的要素优势,如加快发展环境金融事业,建立环境银行,开展以环境容量及排污量为依托的权证存贷、抵押业务,尤其对排放权的期货、现货市场交易规则做出安排,从而使其与创业投资、股权基金、股票和债券市场相呼应,逐步形成一个全新的金融服务产业；加快环境立法建设,界定环境产权,深化市场经济经营机制以规范市场主体的理性行为,提供活跃交易行为的政策激励。通过上述研究,本文结论对于发挥排放权交易政策的宏观调控作用,通过价格发现机制以及政府与市场的综合作用引导微观主体节能减排行为具有重要的理论与实践意义。一方面,有助于完善环境经济学和金融创新的研究内容,具有现实的理论意义。另一方面,排放权交易的有效运作可以以较低的成本提高污染治理效率、促进产业升级与技术革新、减少社会福利损失,在当前宏观经济形势下对于实现“保增长、调结构”的政策目标具有非常重要的实践指导意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a developing country, China stays in the early stages of economic growth, industrialization and urbanization. In addition, the heavy industry, manufacturing together with transport is gaining a quite rapid development. Thus the whole society is now inevitably facing a series of problems such as substantial rise of energy demand, and pollution pressure generated by the increasing energy consumption. It should be said, limited energy and rising pollution is a bottle-neck for China’s economic transformation and sustainable development.In regard of this phenomenon, China has launched relevant environment developing policies since 1970’s. But due to lack of market concepts and in complete mechanisms, the environmental policies were mainly executed as administrative orders. It’s true that the mandatory implementation of administrative policies have made some achievements and progress, however, in the field of environmental regulation, an effective, comprehensive market-based environmental tools did not get produced as expected. Therefore, the process of implementation of energy-saving and emission-reduction in China is slow, and the actual effect is far from what is expected. We should give full play to market-based environmental tools in promoting the process of energy saving while highlighting the vantages of "endogenous mechanism, automatic adjustment, target controllable, flexible operating" since these are main trend of future environment planning. Among all the market-based environmental tools, emission trading itself is well equipped with low pollution control cost, less information requirements, low financial requirements, possible to realize total controlling and it won’t be affected by economic expansion and inflation. All the above mentioned advantages decided that the emission trading can meet the developing requirements of China in current economic status.Emission trading takes place between the various subjects in need of warrants, this makes the market running processes and results depend more on the behaviors of every micro economic subject. And what link every different subject’s behaviors are warrants prices and running principles determined by pricing mechanism. In the traditional study of behavioral economics, behavior variations of "rational economic man" are always caused by changing of the cost and benefit function, and price variation, as a kind of market signal, can change cost or benefit function separately as well as change cost and benefit function in the mean while. It is the same case for the mechanism of emission trading to change pollution-controlling behavior to make it meet with the most excellent social standard. A reasonable external pricing of environmental pollution, which will be internalized to warrant price, will become an endogenous variable for cost-benefit function of an economic subject. And this point tells us that the core mechanism of emission trading is its pricing process, which can lead us to arrive at an optimal allocation of resource allocation as well as responsibility for pollution control.It is true that pricing process is important, but it cannot be separated from application condition, for example, only when the scarcity and property rights of environmental resource is confirmed, we can do calculation, allocation and pricing of environment capacity. Only when there are basic trading demands and speculative demand existed in the market, the emission trading has motivations for storage, transfer and trading. And an equal exchange between environmental resources can only happens with a precondition of comparable and exchangeable units of measurement. Emission trading can effectively price and trade only in close region which can avoid price failure from "voting by foot". This thesis gives a further study on the core mechanism of emission trading by listing the following points:Firstly, emission trading has natures of trading, marketing and financial, and among which the nature of trading decides the value of emission right which make it price, marketing ensures that pricing must reasonable and effective in order to realize the optimized allocation, financial makes diversified pricing such as futures pricing and optional pricing an inevitable case. Meanwhile, due to the different abatement costs, emissions for each subject has also a different value, this will produce differences among emissions requirements, trading requirements and speculative demand. Correspondingly, the emission markets generated from three kinds of demands have different pricing mechanism. Secondly, it is true that the public character of environmental resources can not price via value and demand-supply relationship, the only way it works is to obey the economical principle of "Marginal cost=Price". However, this is a long-term pricing mechanism basing on a completed-competition and zero cost. It won’t go along with the actually pricing status and conditions, so we are required to search for a new pricing mechanism which can reflect the influence of different variables such as region, time, environment etc.Thirdly, since environment resource has different physical characrer, there is no exchange requirement and mechanism existed among different types of environmental resources. But the finance character of emission trading makes the storage and value exchanging become possible, so original demands of trading between different types of environment resources get generated. As for same category of environment resources, due to its equivalent measurement standards, can be directly exchanged in the market. For different types of environmental resources, if we simply carry out trading by monetary value, relative changes between of resources types and economic and technological progress cannot be revealed as expected, so we should select and design a media variable which has unidirectional relationship with two different resources, i.e. GDP.Fourthly, the efficient pricing of emission trading needs a close region which can definite demand-supply relationship region, avoid "voting by foot" and reduce efficiency loss. Considering the objects of emission trading is featured with completion of bio-systems, in the meanwhile, the reform of existed policy and administrative systems still need a comparatively long period, then the close region should select the association of geography and administration.To take an overview of the history and develop trail of China’s emission trading, it still has an obvious feature of a pilot phase as the trading is mainly directed or guided by central government. Thus prices formed under this kind of circumstance always take features like subjectivity and human-made, inefficient prices like this are hard to embody the real market value. Moreover, China’s such administrative intervention is not conducive to the formation of a unified national market, thus can not effectively link the international market. After referring and researching into emission trading operating mode and market establish of USA as well as European Union, we discover that the main flaw of China’s emission trading system lies on the administrative government power and the improper market mechanism which always give out an incorrect orientation and unclear direction etc.On the judgments of emissions trading trends and prospects for China, the thesis designed and launched an emission trading market pricing mechanism for China’s specifications. And this mechanism includes following:an original pricing and allocating mechanism based on dynamic welfare and regional discrepancies; a secondary pricing and allocating mechanism including spot price, holding cost, expectations and external variables. And all the illustrations are supported by vivid example of water trading in Bohai economic circle. Finally, on the point of coordination of government and market mechanism, the thesis gives suggestions on operation environment and additional measures of emission trading in China, including setting up regulatory institution, elect-clearing center and adjusting funds, constructing two-lay exchange board, implementing different pricing mechanism, developing green finance (such as setting up environmental bank, developing deposit-loan and mortgage business based on warrants etc), promoting environmental legislation and providing policy incentives etc.In a conclusion, this thesis will be of great theoretical and practical significance in playing the macro-control of emission trading policies. On the one hand, it will help to improve and complete research content for the environmental economics and financial innovation. On the other hand, the effective operation of the emissions trading can lower the costs of pollution control with a higher efficiency and promote industry upgrade which is important to realize the policy goal of "ensuring increase and adjusting structure".更多还原