【作者】 高文亮；

【导师】 罗宏；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 2007年,由美国次贷危机引起的金融危机席卷全球,世界上许多著名的大型金融机构相继陷入财务困境。在这种背景下,世界经济陷入前所未有的恐慌,工人失业率水平直线上升,而美国华尔街金融机构的高管们仍然享受着天价的薪资。据不完全统计,在2008年纽约州金融机构高级主管们领取的红利高达184亿美元,国内经济已经陷入如此困境,但这些银行家还拿政府的钱“自肥”,使得这种行为受到全社会的猛烈抨击。全世界范围内,公众要求政府对经理人实施薪酬干预的呼声越来越强烈。美国、英国和澳大利亚等国家纷纷出台政策对薪酬进行管制。例如,2009年美国《复苏与再投资法案》(ARRA)要求对参与资产救助计划(TARP)的机构高管薪酬增加额外的限制,其中一条就是限制奖金不超过年度薪酬总额的三分之一。再如,美国财政部2009年所公布的准则规定领取“普通”资本基金的美国机构以及那些需要“特殊援助”的机构高管薪酬总额上限为50万美元。就我国国有企业的经理人而言,薪酬管制并非新鲜事。出于种种原因,从最初的计划经济体制到市场经济体制,国有企业经理人的薪酬一直受到比较严格的管制。近年来,在推行国有企业体制改革的过程中,为调动国有企业经理人的积极性,国有企业的薪酬管制有逐渐放松的趋势。在这种背景下,部分国有企业的过高薪酬(尤其是金融行业)引起了社会公众的质疑与强烈的不满。我国政府为维护社会稳定,从2008年开始出手加强对国有企业经理人薪酬的干预。一方面,政府通过设置最高薪酬限额,以法定形式约束过高的薪酬。如2009年,财政部一份征求意见稿中拟规定金融国企高管年薪的上限为280万元。另一方面,政府重拾传统薪酬管制手段,将高管薪酬与职工的平均工资联系在一起。如2009年,人力资源和社会保障部会同中央组织部、监察部、财政部、审计署、国资委等单位联合下发了《关于进一步规范中央企业负责人薪酬管理的指导意见》,意见规定企业主要负责人的基本年薪与上年度中央企业在岗职工平均工资相联系。虽然限制高管薪酬在一定程度上缩小了社会贫富差距,但在面对社会与新闻媒体一片叫好之时,部分学者也表现出对政策执行效果的担忧。关于管制经济后果的研究结果虽有不同,但众多结果都支持利益集团假设而非公众利益假设,即便管制者出于良好意愿实施了管制,其实施效果也往往有悖于管制者初衷。在薪酬管制领域,已有的经验证据也显示如此。本文基于多个角度拓展了薪酬管制经济后果的研究。其一,基于成本与收益的视角,本文发现薪酬管制提高了国有企业的代理成本,降低了公司的业绩。本文发现较弱的证据证明当薪酬管制的程度加深时,垄断属性会加重薪酬管制的负面作用。其二,基于业绩敏感性和薪酬激励的角度,本文发现薪酬管制会降低国有企业的业绩敏感性、削弱薪酬激励的效应。薪酬管制程度重的国有企业大概比薪酬管制程度低的业绩敏感性低25%左右,薪酬激励的效果被削弱约30%。除此以外,本文还发现国有企业的薪酬契约具有一定的有效性,业绩成为薪酬的决定因素。垄断企业的收益可以分解为垄断收益和竞争性收益,实证结果证实垄断收益是决定垄断企业高管薪酬的重要因素,而竞争性收益并不影响其薪酬。国有企业的总经理薪酬对未来期的业绩能够产生显著正向作用,这说明国有企业的总经理薪酬具有一定的激励作用,可以激励总经理努力工作,提高公司未来期的业绩。但是,垄断企业的总经理薪酬仅对垄断收益产生显著正向作用,对未来期的竞争性收益不产生显著影响。这说明垄断企业现有薪酬机制可能会对垄断企业高管产生寻求更高垄断收益的激励。结合实证结果,对经理人过高薪酬的监管应当采取标本兼治的措施,为应对社会反响过于强烈而实施短期干预政策时,必须有相应的配套措施予以辅助,综合治理,打出政策的“组合拳”,但从长期治理政策来看,更需要从制度层面完善现有薪酬机制的缺陷。基于相关理论的研究结果和本文实证结果,我们认为应该从以下几个方面完善国有企业薪酬机制。必须在薪酬考核中突出业绩的地位。对国有企业的业绩考核应在保值增值的基础上,把市值指标与EVA、现金流回报率等结合起来,促进公司价值稳定增长,更好地实现国有资产保值增值。同时,对他们实行分类考核机制,区别对待垄断与竞争性行业高管、政府行政官员高管与市场化高管等。应该剥离垄断企业的垄断收益,使竞争性收益成为垄断企业高管薪酬的决定因素。必须在薪酬契约制定中凸显股东的作用。首先,要提高股东的话语权。中国证监会规定3%以上股份的股东才可以提出议案,相比美国的1%显得较高。应该降低这一门槛,股东有权对不是最优的薪酬契约发表自己的意见。其次,为投资者表达自身的“愤怒”提供方便。应该合理引导投资者,使其能够在合适的时机表达自身的“愤怒”,同时需要相关媒体机构的配合,给予投资者表达“愤怒”的场所。最后,加强信息披露,让投资者有“愤怒”的来源。相比“难以找到重大缺陷的美国上市公司信息披露制度”,我国上市公司关于高管薪酬的信息披露制度还是相当薄弱的。目前中国证券监管部门已经要求披露个人薪酬,但还没有要求披露高管薪酬的具体构成、高管薪酬方案的相关内容、当年离职高管薪酬以及离职后相关福利计划等。因此,应进一步完善信息披露制度,方便投资者获取高管薪酬的相关信息,利于投资者作出相应决策。必须引入更有效率的管制方法。政府既可以通过限制边际收入进行薪酬管制,也可以通过限制最高收入额进行薪酬管制。当高管退出成本过高时,经理人总是在现有约束条件下追求利益的最大化,管制经理人薪酬的边际收益将激励经理人付出更多的努力来获取总收益的最大化。由于垄断企业和非垄断企业存在着显著差异,应适时在垄断企业引入薪酬限额制度。全文的具体安排如下：第一章引言：引言部分总括介绍了本文选题的研究背景、研究意义以及创新点；阐述了本文研究的基本思路,勾勒了研究的总体框架；同时对本文中所涉及的重要概念进行了界定。第二章高管薪酬理论相关文献综述：首先,回顾了薪酬研究中的两个重要理论基础——最优契约论和管理层权力论。在介绍两个基础理论的相关研究进展之后,简要评价了两个理论的适用性。其次,对薪酬管制起因及其经济后果进行了论述。最后,简要介绍了目前世界薪酬管制的主题和相应的薪酬管制技术。第三章制度背景与国有企业薪酬管制理论分析：制度背景与国有企业薪酬管制理论分析：首先,介绍了我国薪酬管制存在的特殊性和其制度背景。其次,指出薪酬机制不完善是我国国有企业实施薪酬管制的根本原因。最后,简要说明了目前国有企业高管薪酬的现状。第四章薪酬管制的衡量与影响因素分析：研究了政府控制、管理层权力与薪酬管制之间的关系,以检验相对薪酬作为薪酬管制变量的合理性。第五章薪酬管制对代理成本的影响：从成本与收益的视角,检验了薪酬管制对国有企业的代理成本和公司业绩的影响。第六章薪酬管制对薪酬激励效果的影响：从业绩敏感性和薪酬激励的视角,检验了薪酬管制对国有企业的业绩敏感性和薪酬激励效果的影响。第七章研究结论：对全文的研究结论和研究启示进行了总结概括,并指出了研究的不足之处及未来的研究方向。本文的创新点：(1)本文将垄断企业从国有企业中分离出来,把垄断收益按其成因分解为垄断收益和竞争性收益,研究了垄断收益对垄断企业高管薪酬的作用。同时,检验了垄断企业薪酬激励对垄断收益的影响。(2)多角度检验薪酬管制的经济后果。首先,从成本收益对比角度来检验薪酬管制的效率,致力于衡量薪酬管制引起的成本与收益的关系,为提升薪酬管制的效率寻求对策。其次,检验了薪酬管制对业绩敏感性的影响。最后,检验了薪酬管制对薪酬激励效果的影响。(3)将国有企业薪酬制度与政府治理、公司治理(管理层代理问题)纳入同一框架进行研究。分析管理层代理问题对薪酬管制效率及隐形激励的影响,为规范国有企业薪酬机制提供治理途径。本文的研究局限性主要在于首先,本文将垄断企业限定为国有行政性垄断企业,对于垄断企业的分类,存在一定的局限性；其次,由于我国高管薪酬的信息披露机制的局限,考虑难以准确衡量管理层的其他控制权收益,如在职消费、股权激励以及其他控制权收益,因此,没有将这些控制权收益纳入研究范围,这也是本文的局限之一;最后,没有进一步考察管理层权力对薪酬管制经济后果的影响。今后有待于进一步开展的研究：薪酬管制经济后果的拓展研究；管理层权力对薪酬管制经济后果的影响；薪酬顾问制度对薪酬机制的补充作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 In 2007, because the financial crisis caused by U.S. subprime crisis sweeps the globe, the economy has a depression state. The world’s large commercial banks have been leading the verge of bankruptcy, and the survivors are also attributed to the unprecedented national emergency measures. In this case, the world economy was into a state of crisis and the level of unemployment skyrocketed. However, Wall Street senior executives of financial institutions still held astronomical salaries. According to incomplete statistics of New York, the domestic economy has been plunged into such a predicament, but the executives of financial institutions in the state received the dividend totaling 18.4 billion dollars in 2008, which are criticized by the whole society.The public voices around the world, who ask the Government to implement intervention on managers’compensation, are becoming stronger. There has nonetheless been an outpouring of regulatory responses to executive pay in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia.The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), commonly referred to as the "stimulus bill", was signed into law on 17 February 2009. And the US stimulus bill limited bonus payments to no more than one third of the value of total annual compensation for companies receiving TARP funding. This restriction prevents the managers who rewarded greed without any regard to the integrity of corporate risk. Under guidelines released by the US Treasury in February 2009, US institutions receiving funds under "generally available" capital programs, and those requiring "exceptional assistance", are subject to a total annual compensation pay cap of US S500,000 for senior executives.In China, regulatory of executive compensation in SOE (state-owned enterprise) is not a new phenomenon. Because of various reasons, executive compensation in SOE has been always strictly regulated from the initial planned economy to the construction of market economy. Executive compensation in some SOE (especially in the financial sector) have so abnormally high payment that cause strong questioning and unsatisfactory from society in recent years. To achieve stability and appease public sentiment, government began to strengthen executives’compensation regulation since 2008. On the one hand, government set up the maximum compensation limit through legal ways; for example, in 2009, the ministry of finance documented executives’highest compensation in financial department of SOE should less than 2.8 million every year. On September 16, 2009, the Department of Human Resources and Social Security together with the Central Organization Department, Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Finance, the Audit Commission, the SASAC and other units jointly issued the "Further Standard the Guidance of Compensation Management for Central Enterprise Responsible Persons", and it provides basic annual salary of central enterprise responsible persons which links to average wage of workers in the previous year.Limiting executive compensation, to some degree, narrowed the compensation gap between the rich and the poor. Contrast to cheering from society and media, some scholars worry about this policy effect. Western scholars have little research on the regulatory of executive compensation, however, there are different views on the economic consequences caused by the regulatory. Many results support the assumption of interest groups instead of the assumption of the public interests. Even if the regulator is out of good will, the regulatory effects often contrary to the intention of regulators.Based on the perspective of cost-benefit, this paper tests the economic consequences of ECR in SOE. By our study, we have discovered that, ECR indeed improves the agency costs, reduces the efficiency of enterprise agency, and reduces enterprise’s performance. These reflected in the empirical results as follows:the higher relatively salaries, the lower agency costs; the higher agency efficiency, the more company’s performance. We found weak evidence that the monopoly property control of will increase negative effects of ECR with high degree of regulatory. From the perspective of performance sensitivity and compensation incentive, this paper examines the economic consequence of ECR in SOE. Empirical results find that regulatory of compensation reduces the performance sensitivity and weakens the effects of compensation incentive. Empirical results also show that the performance sensitivity of SOE with high degree of ECR is lower 25% than the SOE with low degree of ECR, and the effects of compensation incentive reduce about 30%.According to research results of optimal contract theory, the status of performance must be outstanding in the compensation evaluation system. Based on increasing the value of the performance evaluation in state-owned listed companies, marker indicators combined EVA, cash flow return rates, etc. These promote the steady growth of corporate value and achieve the increasing value of the state-owned assets. We classify assessment mechanism to distinguish high-ranking managers between monopoly industry and competitive industry.According to research results of the management power, the role of shareholders must be highlighted in formulating the compensation contracts. Firstly, we must improve the speaking right of shareholder. China Securities Regulatory Commission provides that shareholders with more than 3% shares can propose bill, which seems high compared to 1% in the United States. Therefore, we should lower the threshold, and shareholders have the right to express their views for not optimal compensation contracts. Secondly, firms should provide convenient conditions for investor expressing their "outrage". Companies should reasonably guide investors to express their "outrage" at the right time. Meanwhile, we need to combine the relevant media organizations to give investors the place expressing their "outrage". Finally, firms should strengthen information disclosure to provide investors with the source of "outrage". Compared to "hard to find major defects of information disclosure system of listed companies in the United States", information disclosure system of China’s listed companies is still quite weak. Currently, the China Securities regulatory authorities have required to disclose personal emoluments, but not required to disclose the concrete composition of executive compensation, relevant content of executive compensation programs, executive compensation and related benefits programs of high-ranking managers leaving in the year.According to the research results related to regulatory of executive compensation, we should introduce more efficient methods. For example, limits marginal income, limits the total amount of income. When executives exit costs too high, managers are always pursue the maximization of benefits under the existing constraints. Regulating the marginal benefit of executive compensation will encourage managers to pay more efforts to obtain the total revenue maximization. Therefore, we timely introduce quota system of compensation in the monopoly enterprises.The arrangements of the thesis are as follows:Chapter one: Introduction. It summarizes the background, significance and innovation of this research. It also expounds the basic ideas and the overall framework of this thesis. Meanwhile, it defines the important variables involved in this paper.Chapter two: In the first instance, this chapter reviews the two major theories of compensation:optimal contract theory and the theory of management power. Subsequently it introduces related research of the two basic theories and briefly evaluates the applicability of the two theories. Finally, it discusses the causes and economic consequences of ECR, and it briefly introduces a few themes of ECR around the world and important technology of ECR.Chapter three: Firstly, this chapter introduces the specificity of China’s ECR and its institutional background. Secondly, it points out that imperfect compensation mechanism is the root cause of ECR in China’s SOE. Finally, this chapter briefly describes the current status of ECR in SOE.Chapter four:This chapter researches the relationship between government control, the management power and regulatory of executive compensation. This can test the rationality of relative compensation as a ECR variable.Chapter five:Based on the perspective of cost-benefit, this chapter tests the impact of ECR on the effect of CEO performance sensitivity and compensation incentive in SOE.Chapter six:From the perspective of performance sensitivity and compensation incentive, this chapter examines the impact of ECR on the effect of CEO compensation incentive in SOE.Chapter seven:The chapter summarizes the conclusions and some research suggestions. Finally, author points out the shortcoming of this thesis and future research direction.The innovations of the thesis:(1) This thesis makes monopoly separate from the state-owned enterprises, and makes monopolistic gain divided into monopolistic profits and competitive benefits by its cause, and then test the impact of monopolistic gains which is caused by remuneration incentive.(2) Multi-angle tests the economic consequences of ECR. Firstly, from the perspective of cost-benefit, this thesis measuring the relation between the cost and return which is caused by ECR, is committed to search the ways to enhance the efficiency of ECR. Secondly, from the perspective of the sensitivity, this thesis tests the economic consequences of ECR. Finally, this thesis tests the impact of ECR on the effect of remuneration incentive.(3) This thesis puts remuneration system of SOE, Governance and corporate governance into the same framework. This thesis tests the impact of management agency problem on the effect of ECR efficiency and invisible incentives. Finally, this thesis provides new methods to improve remuneration system of SOE.The main limitations of this thesis:Firstly, the monopoly is limited to administrative monopoly of SOE. Secondly, because information disclosure mechanisms of executive compensation in our country, it is difficult to accurately measure the other control benefits of the management, such as expensive in-office, equity incentives. Therefore, this thesis does not include these control benefits. Finally, this thesis does not further investigate the impact of the management power on the effects of economic consequences of ECR.Further research:(1) Development research of the economic consequences of ECR;(2) The impact of the management power on the effects of the economic consequences of ECR;(3) The system of compensation consultant may be a complementary of compensation mechanism.更多还原