【作者】 尹琳琳；

【导师】 尹贻林；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 工程管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 政府投资项目是政府提供公共服务,提高国民生活质量的重要保障和手段。尽管政府作为公共项目的提供主体存在着“公认”的效率低下问题,但政府作为弥补“市场失灵”的手段始终是无法替代的。问题的关键在于,如何实现对这类项目投资的有效控制,完美的平衡公共物品提供中公平性和效率性的矛盾,它既是一个长久性的课题,也是一个世界性课题。过去对政府投资项目投资控制的研究主要集中在对政府投资项目的造价控制的技术范式上。目前的研究表明,对政府投资项目投资控制研究开始向政府投资项目的管理制度和机制的更深层次发展。据此,本文基于经济学分析范式,利用公共项目治理理论和横向分析法、因果分析法等就政府投资项目的投资控制问题进行研究,主要工作与成果如下:1.以政府投资项目特殊的契约关系为切入点,将政府投资项目的投资控制体系划分为行政监管层、项目代理层和项目治理层三个层面,并结合其公共产权特性指出分别面临不同的委托代理问题和投资控制难题。2.政府投资项目第一委托代理层中投资控制的关键问题是由于公有产权下的初始委托人监督缺失产生的政府失灵问题。基于国会控制论等监督政府理论的观点,并借鉴国外成功经验的基础上,构建了我国投资项目的行政监管体系,包括以政府职能部门间的分权制衡机制和责任追究机制为核心的内部监督体系,以及人大监督与社会监督相结合的外部监督体系两部分。3.政府投资项目第二层契约关系中投资控制的关键问题是由于公有产权下剩余索取权的不可转让性导致的项目法人缺位问题。本文采用公共项目治理的分析范式,通过在利益相关者间合理的权、责、利的配置实现各方的制衡与协调。基于治理结构的分析解决了当前我国代建制三种模式的选择问题。并在此基础上,构建了基于风险分担的投资控制机制,及对应的基于风险分担的代建项目投资目标的确定与调整模型,实现了政府委托方与代建人的激励相容。4.在第二层委托代理关系所确定的制度安排下,政府投资项目第三层契约关系中的投资控制问题,转化为项目业主(代建单位)在有限风险承担下的成本管理与投资控制问题,需要解决建设市场中承发包交易中的风险管理和控制问题。鉴于此,本文在主动控制的视角下,构建了代建单位以合同管理为手段基于风险分担和控制的全过程投资控制。更多还原

【Abstract】 Government projects are an important national security and measures for the government, which can provide public services and improve the quality of life. Although the Government as the main provider of public projects is considered inefficient, the Government as to make up for "market failure" means has always played a role which can not be replaced. The key point is that how to control the costs of these projects effectively and to balance the contradiction perfectly between the equity and the efficiency while providing public goods. It is a global issue which also requires the long-term concern.In the past, the research of Government investment and control of investment focused on a technological paradigm of cost control. The current study demonstrates that the research of government projects and investment control are changing to management systems and mechanisms of government projects at deeper levels. Based on economic analysis paradigm, using of public project management theory and transversal analysis, causal analysis and so on, the problem of investment control in government projects are studied. The main work and achievements are as follows:1. Starting from the special contract relationship, the investment controlling system of government project is divided into three levels: administrative supervision level, project agent level and project contractor level, which are facing different problems of principal agent and investment control.2. The critical problem of the investment control in the first principal agent level of government project is the government failure caused by lacking of supervises from the initial principal in the public property rights. Based on the viewpoint of the government supervised theories like the congress control theory, etc. and the successful experience for reference, we construct the administrative supervision system of the investment project in our country, including the interior and exterior supervision systems. The core of the interior supervision system is the checks and balance mechanism and liability investigation mechanism between the government functional departments. While the exterior supervision system is combined with the people congress supervision and social supervision.3. The critical problem of the investment control in the second level contract relationship of the government project is the vacancy of project juristic person caused by the residual claim without transferability in the public property rights. The public project governance theory is applied in which the balance and coordination of each stakeholder is realized through the allocation of their authority, responsibility and profits. By analyzing the governance structure modes of the three modes of the agent construction system in our country, we figure out that the ownership allocation in the enterprise substitute construction mode is more advantageous to the investment control of projects. Further more, the investment control mechanism based on the risk sharing and the model of determining and adjusting the goal of the deputy construction project are constructed in this paper which realize the incentive compatibility of the government consignor and construction agents.4. Under the arrangement of the principal agent relationship system in the second level, the investment control problem of the contract relationship in the third level is transformed into the cost management and investment control problem with the limited risk sharing of project proprietor(construction agency). And the risk management and control problems of the contractor and owner contract in construction market are required to be solved. In view of this, under the initiative control perspective, the risk sharing and controlling based whole process investment control of the substitute construction enterprise considering the contract management as method is constructed in this paper.更多还原