【作者】 刘向杰；

【导师】 廖楚晖；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 公共工程组织与管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 公私合作融资模式的出现,解决了政府在基础设施建设方面的资金短缺、经营管理效率低下的问题,通过政府的宏观管理,在财政资金少投入的情况下可以实现基础设施的有效供给；通过对政府行为的研究,可以制订出科学合理的补贴模式,实现在基础设施供给方面形成有效的激励约束,减少公众的财政负担。公私合作模式下,政府不再直接参与准公共基础设施项目的运作,从而可以成为投资与建设的“裁判员”和游戏规则的制定者,通过规范项目投资者的行为,能够提高企业的管理和效率,建立以市场为核心的多向决策机制、多维的相互制约和平衡机制,及早实现基础设施的正外部性与公益性目标。公私合作的理论依据来源于福利经济学的定价理论,从研究强自然垄断产品的平均成本、边际成本、及无管制状态下公共产品的定价理论入手,研究了公私合作提供公共产品补贴的可行性,引入了效率参数,结果表明,只要满足条件(4-26)、(4-29)两个条件,对准经营性公共项目的财政补贴就能够带来社会福利的增加。事实上无论以何种形式对合作的项目进行补贴,总会出现政府的效率失真,我们只能通过完善我们的制度来实现效率的最小失真,增加政府补贴的效率。利用经济学的效用论与博弈的观点分析了政府对项目进行补贴的效用；对财政补贴的政治成本与交易成本进行了对比,提出了政府在补贴的过程中应注意的事项。利用多目标决策理论对公私合作的补贴比例与特许年限进行了研究并运用算例对该决策机制进行了模拟。运用无限期重复博弈与声誉博弈理论对财政补贴过程中私营投资者的违规行为进行了研究,结果表明政府的处罚力度越大、投机被发现的概率越大,投资者违规的动机就越小。投资者的声誉越好,越有动力维持声誉；没有声誉的投资违规的频率最大。政府一方面要加大对违规的惩罚力度,另一方面要加强制度的建设来加强对投资风险的控制。信息的不对称与投资的复杂性是投机风险存在的原因,公私双方利益诉求是合作的动力,私营投资者追求利益的最大化是投机行为存在的前提,为有效降低投机的存在,实现双方的共赢与公众的多赢,公私双方在合作过程中要建立长期以信任为目的的信任机制、合理的联盟贡献与补偿机制、及契约的完善机制,事前、事中、事后的项目风险控制与项目建设监管机制,对比目前政府项目投资的监管框架,改进了由政府大项目办为监督主体的政府投资监管的理论框架体系,有效减少私营投资者的投机行为。借鉴相关研究理论,建立了政府行为影响项目绩效的结构方程,依据调研的数据与结构方程模型,得出了政府行为对项目绩效的影响效应,政府行为不仅可直接影响项目的绩效,而且可以间接通过影响投资环境与信任程度影响合作项目的绩效,提出了改进政府行为的政策性建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The emergence of public-private partnership financing model may solve the shortage of funds and management inefficiencies for the government in infrastructure building; through the government’s macro-management and operation, we can achieve effective supply of infrastructure with less financial resources. Through the study of government behavior, we can develop a scientific and reasonable subsidy model, achieving an effective incentive and restraint in the infrastructure supply, reducing the public’s financial burden. In public-private partnership model, the government is no longer directly involved in the operation of quasi-public infrastructure projects, and just acts as the "referee" in investment and construction and the maker of the game rules; and by regulating the behaviors of project investors we can improve enterprise management and efficiency, establish a market-centered multi-directional decision-making mechanism, a multi-dimensional mutual restraint and balance system, so that the goal of positive externalities and public welfare of infrastructure can be realized as soon as possible.The theoretical basis for public-private partnership is the pricing theory of welfare economics. Starting from study of the pricing theory, namely strong natural monopoly products pricing, the average cost pricing, marginal cost pricing, and public goods pricing theory without control of a state, we research the feasibility that government provide public goods subsidies for the public-private partnership project and introduce the efficiency parameters. Through analysis of the conditions of government subsidies, we find that so long as subsidies meet the conditions that is (4-26) and (4-29), the financial subsidies can lead to social welfare increasing for the Quasi-public project.In fact whatever form do we supply subsidy with for co-operation projects, the efficiency distortion of government always appear. By improving our system we can only achieve the efficiency minimum distortion, so we realize the goal that increases efficiency of the government subsidies.The economics effectiveness and game theory are adopted to analyze the effectiveness that government provides subsidies. By contrasting the policy cost with transaction cost, we put forward the advice that government should pay attention to issues in the process of government subsidies. We use multi-objective decision theory to study the relation between the subsidy scale for public-private partnership and the franchise year and simulate the example for the decision-making mechanism.We study the irregularities of private investors in course of financial subsidies and applicate the indefinite game theory, repeated games to research risk of financial subsidies, we find that violation motivation of the investor become less if the greater the punishment of the government for violator and the greater the probability of speculative be found is. The better the reputation for the investors is, the more motivated do the investors have to maintain the reputation; however the violation frequency of investor without reputation is the greatest among investors. The Government has to increase the penalties for speculative investors, on the other hand government should strengthen the building of the system to strengthen the investment risk control.Speculative risk is due to the existence of information asymmetry and investment complexity, each of public and private has interest and aspiration oneself, the pursuit of the most interests of private investors is the premise of the existence of speculative behavior, in order to effectively reduce the speculative existence and to achieve win-win-win with the public, private and public parties in the process of cooperation we should establish a long-term trust mechanism and rational alliance contributions and compensation mechanisms and the improving mechanism of contracts and project risk control and construction monitoring mechanism in the pre-post, so we will effectively reduce the private investor speculation.Drawing on relevant research theory, we establish the structure equation governmental action affecting the structure of project performance, based on research data and structural equation model we educe impact effects that governmental action affect the performance of the project, namely governmental action can not only directly affect the performance of the project but also can indirectly affect the performance of cooperative projects by influencing the investment climate and the degree of trust. At last the policy recommendations are proposed to improve government action.更多还原