中国国有企业权利委托代理关系研究

【作者】 于池；

【导师】 刘永佶；

【作者基本信息】 中央民族大学 ， 中国少数民族经济， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 与共和国一起新生、成长起来的国有企业,在中国的发展历史上是一个创造,是古老中国从农业文明向工业文明转化的关键环节与标志。中国的国有企业凝聚着几代劳动者的辛勤付出和劳动成果。20世纪90年代苏联的国有企业因“私有化”而消解时,中国的国有企业也进入了发展的矛盾凸显期,改革是肯定的。但是往哪个方向改,怎么改?如何才能保证劳动者创造的这份财产还在自己手里,如何保证它的社会主义方向以及逐步使其走向高级形式?回顾国有企业的发展,国有企业的诸多弊端中,核心的问题是各级国有企业到底为谁所有?由准掌控?收益由谁所享?这涉及到国有企业的整个所有权权利体系,包括从所有权到占有权、使用权和收益权的一整套委托代理关系。在国有企业的曲折发展中,经历了放权让利、承包责任制和现代企业制度等一系列的改革。但是,国有企业真正的所有者全体劳动者并未实现对国有企业的掌控。所有者主体的虚置、国家占有机构同董事会、经营层的权限边界不清、内部人控制和国有资产流失、国有企业效益不佳和亏损严重等等,这些问题并未随着国有企业委托代理链条的多层化和复杂化得到根本解决。问题的根源就在于,所有者并未真正地掌控所有权。从历史上看,中国国有企业的所有者权利是反向形成的,以中国共产党为代表的革命者建立了新中国,国家政权机构直接掌控了国有资产。劳动者之所以是所有者,是因为他们被国家政权赋予了这样的权利。在国有企业的发展中,国有企业的委托代理关系主要集中在政府和企业之间的关系上,国有企业的改革也围绕它们而展开,在很大程度上所有者被搁置一边,他们的劳动力个人所有权和生产资料所有权尚未充分得到实现。与之相伴随的,是国有企业在权利上一步步从“民有”蜕化为“官有”,全民的所有权在国企发展中逐步赢弱化。为实现广大劳动者的根本利益,国有企业必须积极改革。国有企业的改革仍然要坚持社会主义的方向,改革的关键就是要充分实现劳动者的劳动力和生产资料的个人所有权,通过民主法制来完善所有权主体对于公共占有机构的掌控,以及公共占有机构对于企业经营者的掌控,理顺国有企业的权利委托代理关系,让国有企业体现所有者的意志,保护所有者的权利。如此,在理顺国有企业委托代理关系的过程中,国有企业的弊端才可能逐步得到克服,国有企业才能真正地健康发展壮大,公有制经济的优越性才能真正体现出来。本论文坚持以劳动社会主义为主要指导思想,同时吸收其他各派研究者的有益成果。劳动社会主义是中国和全世界劳动者利益和意识的理论概括,是对现实社会矛盾的规定和论证,是对社会主义政治经济学运动和制度变革的经验总结。劳动社会主义并非只是一个称谓,它是有内容的。这个内容来自一百年以中国劳动者为主体的革命运动,特别是六十多年来初级公有制和民主制的实践经验和教训,在这个实践过程中所体现的劳动者利益和意识。本文的研究方法：一是主要采用关系研究的方法,从中国经济矛盾体系角度对中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾问题进行关系研究,对中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾问题进行关系研究,界定出其主要矛盾,并提出相应的解决问题的方法。二是突出研究方法的主体性。社会科学的研究方法具有主体性,即不同的主体会有不同的研究角度和方法,其根据均是主体自身的利益。所有社会问题的解决,都要以人为主体和出发点,在矛盾体系层次框架中加以分析考察。三是注重辩证统一的社会总体性。中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾问题,是一个较为明显的集合了政治、文化、社会、外交等多种因素的经济问题。本文从经济角度研究这一问题,但在经济矛盾的分析中已将政治、文化、法律等因素都作为经济问题的内在要素加以考虑。四是理论演绎分析与实证分析相结合。对改革过程中的中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾问题进行研究。力求研究过程和结论科学、准确、可靠。本文阐述的主要观点：一是,从中国政治经济学劳动社会主义的角度界定国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系,是一个涉及劳动者社会主体地位能否坚持,涉及社会主义公有制经济能否健康发展,涉及中国改革开放、经济发展、社会和谐等一系列重大现实问题。必须从坚持社会主义制度、促进社会主义公有制经济、完善社会主义市场经济体制,以及全面建设和谐社会和全面参与国际竞争与合作的高度认识国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾问题。二是,中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系存在的主要矛盾是国有企业的所有权与占有权的矛盾。也就是说,本应行使占有权的国有企业监管机构,越位行使了所有权,由此导致劳动者的所有权被虚置。中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾的主要矛盾形成于统制经济体制时期,延续并集中暴露于向市场经济体制的转轨时期。所以,在完善社会主义市场经济体制的过程中加以解决十分必要。三是,解决中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系矛盾的主要矛盾,首要的是确立国有企业的所有权主体。在坚持劳动者的劳动力所有权的基础上,明确劳动者对国有企业的个人所有权,进而制约占有权、经营权等,建立起以劳动者所有权为基础的,而不是以占有权为基础的新的权利体系。四是,改革中国国有企业所有权、占有权、经营权委托代理关系,必须坚持民主监管与依法监管。民主监管是劳动者行使劳动力所有权和国有企业所有权的法权形式。民主权集合为立法权,要坚持立法权对执法权、司法权和行政权的监督与控制。依法监管国有企业,就是以法制保证劳动者的所有权和民主权,它是对以所有权为核心的国有企业权利体系的规定与实现。更多还原

【Abstract】 China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which were newly born and have been growing up together with the Republic can be regarded as a creation in China’s development history, and they play a crucial role during the ancient China’s transformation from agricultural to industrial civilization.China’s State-Owned Enterprises cohere the industriousness and achievements of laborers of several generations.When the Soviet Union’s ones stepped into ruins owing to privatization in the 1990s, China’s SOEs also developed into the period of highlighting the social contradictions. Reform has to be done, but in which direction and in which way should it be? How to assure the laborers’ possession of properties created by themselves, how to ensure the reform’s socialism orientation and let them moving towards the high-level forms?Reviewing the development of China’s SOEs, the core of their problems is whom they own to, they are in the charge of and their benefits are shared by. This relates the entire SOEs’ ownership rights system, involving a full set of principal-agent relationships from ownship to rights of possession, use and benefits.The SOEs’tortuous development experienced a series of reforms, from the decentralization of power and transfer of profits, the contracted responsibility system to the modern enterprise system. However, all the laborers, that is, the real owners of SOEs, still have not realized their control over the enterprises. Problems such as vacancy of ownership bodies, vagueness of permission boundaries between state institutions, boards of directors and the management, the insider control, erosion of the state assets, SOEs’ underperformation and their heavy losses haven’t been fundamentally resolved in despite of the multiple stratification and complication of SOEs’principal-agent chain.The root of the problem lies in that the owners have not really take the ownership. Historically the state power bodies took the control of the state assets as revolutionists represented by the Communist Party of China established the New China. The laborers became the owners of SOEs only for that they were endowed with such rights of the state, based on which we can safely say that China’s SOEs ownership was formed reversely.In the development of SOEs, their principal-agent relationships were mainly focused on the ones between the government and enterprises, which their reforms were also implemented around. Meanwhile the great extent owners were disregarded aside and their rights to ownership of individual labor and production materials never truly realized. Accompanied with this, SOEs’ ownship degenerately transferred from laborers to government and all the laborers’ rights to ownership became weakened step by step.In order to realize the laborers’ fundenmantal intrests, SOEs’ reforms have to be taken actively, which should still uphold the socialism orientation and whose key points lie in the realization of the laborers’ rights to ownership of individual labor as well as production materials, the perfection of the laborers’ control over public institutions which fully in charge of SOEs’management through democracy and legal systems and the straightening out of SOEs’ principal-agent relationship, so as to refelect the laborers’ wills and to protect theirs rights. Only during the process of strengthening their principal-agent relationships, can China’s SOEs develop and expand healthily, overcoming the system disadvantages, and can the advantages of public ownership truly come out.The main method that the thesis had taken is studying the relationship between all objects, first analyzing the concept of ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise by using relationship method from the Angle of economic contradiction. Analyze on the relationship between ownership, management right, right of possession and principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise, defined the principal contradiction, and the methods of solution are provided. Second, emphasize the Entity principle. The method of social science has entity, that is to say, different researcher studies according the benefit from different angles by different method. All the social problems should be dealt with appropriately concerned People-oriented, solved in the contradiction System-level Analysis. Ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise is an economy issue which had gathered all political, culture, social, diplomatic factors.etl. This article from the perspective of economy on the issue, besides, political, culture, law factors have been considered in the analyzing. Four, this paper combines the deductive method with the empirical studies researching the contradiction of ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise. The method strives for scientific, accurate and reliable.The Opinions Explains in this text as follows:first, the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise is an issue including whether the worker as the entity of society consisted, whether socialist public economy developed soundly, reform and opening-up policy, Economic development, Society Harmonious from the angle of Chinese political economy-labor socialistMust Taking the Views of uphold the socialist system, safeguarding the socialist public ownership, the construction of rich and harmonious society and overall Participation international competition and cooperation to learn the contradiction of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise. The principal contradiction of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise is the contradiction between ownership and possession right. Regulators of state-owned enterprise only has the right to possess the property, now is offside to exercise of rights of ownership. Therefore, the labor whom has the ownership has been imperfection of the real right. second, the contradiction of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise was formed at the stage of Economic reform, and developed transformation to a market, so its very necessary to explain the proceed. To solve the problems of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise, Above all is to establish the entity of state-owned enterprise. On the basis of labor power belonged to the labors, definite the ownership of state-owned enterprise by citizen. Then condition the behavior of exercise the power of management right, right of possession, establish new right system. Four, the key to reform the relationship of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China’s state-owned enterprise is to interfere with the supervision democracy and according to law. Democratic supervision is the right that the labors to supervise the state-owned enterprise, democratic rights form legislative powers, Should adhere legislative to the restrain of judicial power and right of perform. Supervision of the state-owned enterprise lawfully is the behavior that to protect the ownership and democracy of the labor. This is the rule and the implementation of the enterprise right system with state-owned enterprise as the leading role.更多还原