【作者】 孙春晓；

【导师】 徐金发；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 公司为应对资源有限及商业环境快速变革的压力,需要不断进行业务重构以提升其效率。上世纪80年代开始,公司业务重构开始在欧美盛行,而剥离和并购一样,被认为是公司业务重构的主要方式之一。近年来,无论在国外还是在国内,资产剥离的数量和规模都呈持续增长的态势。尤其是2007年以来,市场环境发生了巨大变化,次贷危机、股市动荡、行业衰退使企业作为市场主体处于十分不利地位。然而与并购相比,剥离长期以来一直都没有得到理论界和实务界应有的重视,通常多数公司都是时刻准备着收购资产,而非剥离资产。学术界对并购的理论与实证研究已浩如烟海,针对剥离的研究却并不多见,国内少数研究剥离的文献或主要是介绍国有企业如何剥离非经营性资产,这与国外研究的剥离内涵并不一致,或集中于研究剥离的原因和结果。现有研究的一个前提是：虽然很多公司都有重构需要,尤其是针对长期处于低绩效的业务单元,但即使剥离更有利于公司的长期发展,实践中大部分公司管理者不愿意通过剥离减少或调整其业务部门,而且即使剥离发生,对企业业绩改善的作用也并不明显。剥离作为体现公司战略方向调整的重要战略行为是否发生,是否真正有利于公司发展,都极大地受组织情境及管理者行为的影响。而公司治理作为保障管理者对公司资源贡献者负责的制度安排,决定着公司战略决策制定及实施结果,它对公司剥离决策的影响及其在解释剥离后绩效提升方面的研究仍有待深入。基于此考虑,本研究试图通过在国内证券市场收集大量公司治理和剥离交易的数据和资料,利用国内外较为成熟的研究成果作为本文理论模型和统计分析方法的参考依据,为我国上市公司治理与剥离关系的深入分析提供大量的经验证据,并就发现问题提供一些建议。为实现上述目标,本研究主要分析了以下主要问题：①公司治理如何影响剥离的发生?②剥离发生是否带来积极的剥离绩效?③剥离绩效是否受公司治理的影响?针对以上问题,本研究共分为三个部分,以在国内沪深证券交易所上市的公司为研究对象,分析上市公司治理对其剥离决策和剥离绩效的影响。在现有公司治理和剥离相关研究的基础上,通过理论分析框架和假设提出,构建了股权集中度、控股股东属性、管理者持股、管理者变更、董事会规模、外部董事规模、长期负债等公司治理构成要素对上市公司剥离决策影响的二维Logistic回归模型、上市公司综合剥离绩效的评价模型和股权集中度、管理者持股、外部董事规模、公司长期负债对上市公司长期和短期综合剥离绩效影响的多元线性回归模型。以258个发生剥离和293个未发生剥离的上市公司的公司治理、剥离交易和相关财务数据资料为基础,采用Logistic回归分析、因子分析、多元线性回归分析等方法对数据进行处理,并对模型所包含的假设进行实证检验。通过以上研究,得出如下三个基本结论：在研究内容一中,公司治理对剥离决策有直接的影响。第一大股东持股比例、Z指数(第一大股东持股与第二大股东持股比例)、管理者变更情况均对剥离决策有正向直接的影响。第一大股东持股比例越高、股权越集中的上市公司,更积极从事剥离活动；而剥离发生之前两年,往往伴随着剥离公司管理者变更,尤其是公司总经理或CEO发生变更。董事会规模与剥离决策显著负相关,说明董事会规模越大,越不利于剥离的发生；而剥离频率与剥离决策显著正相关,说明上市公司过去两年剥离发生次数越多,经验越丰富,其持续进行业务剥离的可能性就越大。而外部董事的规模、控股股东的股权属性、管理者持股比例对剥离决策的作用并不明显。在研究内容二中,剥离不一定带来积极的剥离绩效。虽然2004-2008年间,上市公司剥离发生当年的绩效较剥离前一年的有明显上升,但是上市公司剥离后第一年和第二年的绩效不但没有上升,反而出现不同程度的下降。剥离后第三年其业绩才出现了显著上升,第四年虽然也有所上升,但是并不显著。这说明上市公司短期剥离绩效变化并不明显,而长期剥离绩效较短期绩效变化显著。在研究内容三中,公司治理对剥离绩效产生重要影响。从短期来看,剥离绩效与Z指数(第一大股东持股与第二大股东持股比例)之间显著负相关,但是长期来看二者之间无显著相关,说明股权越集中,不利于剥离后短期绩效的改善。剥离后长期内,管理者持股比例的激励和监督有助于剥离绩效的提高,但是短期来看,二者之间的关系不明显；外部董事的监督和服务有助于剥离绩效的提升,但是它对剥离短期绩效作用并不显著。公司债务的监督对剥离绩效的提升也没有显著的作用；且剥离规模和公司规模对短期绩效提升有一定的影响,但与剥离长期绩效之间相关关系不显著,而剥离经验却有助于剥离长期和短期绩效的提升。综合本研究的主要结论,与前人的相关研究比较,本研究的主要创新点在于：从战略管理和组织行为的视角,提出了“公司治理—剥离发生—剥离绩效”的研究框架；研究了公司治理对剥离发生这一决策的影响,得出其股权集中度、管理层变更、董事会规模、公司长期负债、剥离频率对剥离决策具有直接影响,而控股股东属性、外部董事规模、管理者持股比例与剥离发生不存在显著关系。然后,对剥离绩效进行了评价,发现剥离短期绩效变化并不明显,而长期绩效改善较显著；基于此,进一步分析了公司治理对剥离绩效的影响,发现管理者持股比例、Z指数、外部董事规模、公司长期负债及剥离规模和频率、公司规模对剥离公司长期和短期的剥离绩效都产生重要影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 In response to limited resources and the pressure for rapid change of business environment, the corporates need to restructure constantly to improve the efficiency of their business. In 1980s, business restructuring began prevailing in Europe and America, also divestment and M&&A(mergers and acquisitions) were considered as one of the main modes of business restructure. In recent years, whether abroad or at home, the number and size of divestment continued to keep sustainable growth. Especially since 2007, the market environment has changed dramatically with the subprime mortgage crisis, stock market volatility, industry recession, enterprises as the market entities have been in a very disadvantageous position. However, compared with the acquisition, divestment has not been paid the attention it deserves for a long time whether in theoretical research and practical industry. Usually most corporates are ready to buy assets, rather than divest assets. Theoretical and empirical studies on M&A are very rich, while studies on divest are few. The extant domestic studies in divestment are mainly to introduce the State-owned enterprises to divest non-operating assets, which is not inconsistent with the concept of foreign scholars’ study, or focuses on the causes and outcomes of divestiture. A premise of existing research is although many corporates need to restructure, especially for a long-term low performance of business units, but even more conducive to divest for the long-term development, the practice of most of executives do not want to reduce or adjust their business by divesting. And even if divestment occurs, the corporate performance does not be improved significantly. Therefore, as the important strategic action to adjust its strategic direction whether the divestment occurred and really conducive to development of the corporate, are greatly affected by organizational context and the impact of management behavior. Extant researches on divestiture from organizations context and the impact of managerial behavior are rare, and combined with the relevant theory and practice to make empirical research on the decision to divest and long-term performance is more rare. Corporate governance as the institutional arrangements to secure manager be responsible for resources contributors, determines the strategic decisions and the results of implement. Therefore, research on corporate governance and divestment, in particular, whether there are relationships between governance and the decision to divest and on the relationship between governance and improvements of divestment performance needs to be further.Based on this consideration, this study attempts to collect a large number of data and information from domestic securities markets in corporate governance and asset divestment, and to use more sophisticated domestic and international academic research as the basis of the theoretical model and statistical analysis to provide a lot of empirical evidence for analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and divestment of Chinese listed corporates and to provide some relevant proposals. To achieve these objectives, the study examined the following main issues:①Will corporate governance affect the initiation of divestment?②Divestment bring any positive performance?③Divestment performance can be affected by corporate governance?To solve the above problems, this study is divided into three parts. Choosing he domestic listed corporates in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as research objects, this dissertation analyzes the relationships of corporate governance, decision to divest and divestment performance. Based on the existing studies, the Binary Logistic regression model is constructed to analyze the effects of ownership concentration, the controlling shareholder, managerial ownership, managers turnover, board size, independent directors on its decision to divest, and performance evaluation model and the multiple linear regression model are constructed to evaluate the relationships between ownership concentration, managerial ownership, independent directors scale, long-term debt ratio and divestment performance of listed corporations. Based on the information of corporate governance, divestment business and related financial data of listed corporations,258 divesting samples and 293 non-divesting samples are chosen, and with the use of Logistic regression analysis, factor analysis, multiple linear regression analysis, data are processed and model assumptions are tested in the empirical tests. Through the above research, this dissertation draws the following three basic conclusions:In the research topic one:corporate governance has a direct impact on decision to divest. The proportion of the largest shareholder, Z index, general manager turnover have a direct positive impact on the decision to divest, indicating that the higher the proportion of the largest shareholder, listed corporates are more focused on and more actively engaged in divestiture activities; The decision occurred often accompanied by manager turnover in two years before divestment, in particular a turnover of general manager or CEO. Divestment decision has a significant negative correlation with board size, indicating that the larger the board size, the more ’detrimental to the occurs of divestment. And divestment frequency and divestment decision have a significant positive correlation, indicating that more times listed corporates in the past were divested, more experience, and more likely its ongoing divestment business. The relationships of the size of the independent directors, controlling shareholders equity, managers ownerships and decision to divest are not obvious.In the research topic two:divestment may not lead to positive performance. Although the performance of listed corporates over the divestment year marked increase in the previous year, but there are different degrees of decline in the first year and the second year after divestment. There wasn’t a significant increase in performance until the third year is coming, although in the fourth year also the performance has increased, but not significant. This shows that the short-term performance of listed corporates changes are not obvious after divestment, and the long-term performance changes more significantly than the short-term.In the research topic three:corporate governance has an important impact on the divestment performance. In short term, divestment and Z index have a significant negative correlation, but in the long run no significant correlation between them is found, indicating that the concentrated shareholder equity ratio is not conducive to improvement of short-term performance after divestment. In the long term the incentives and monitoring of managerial ownership will help improve the post-divestment performance, but in the short term, the relationship between them is not obvious. The supervision and guidance of independent directors are helpful to improve the divestment performance, but in short-term performance it is not significant. Supervision of corporate debts does not play a significant role to improve the performance. The correlation of divestment size, firm size aild long-term performance is not significant, but the divestment experience helps to make divestment performance improvement.This dissertation integrating these main conclusions and compared with previous studies, the main innovation of this research are as follows:Based on the perspective of strategic management and organizational behavior, we proposed the research framework of corporate governance-initiation of divestment-divestment performance to study the impact of corporate governance on divestiture decisions and concluded the ownership concentration, manager turn-over, board size, long-term debt, divestment frequency had a direct impact on the decision to divest. And the divestment performance was evaluated and we found that changes in short-term performance are not obvious, and performance improvement in long-term was more significant. Also we analyzed the impacts of corporate governance on divestment performance and found that managerial ownership, Z index, the scale of independent directors, the long-term liabilities, the divestment size-, frequency and firm size all had a huge impact on long-term and short-term performance of the divesting corporates.更多还原