【作者】 李伶俐；

【导师】 张孝友；

【作者基本信息】 西南大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2011， 博士

【副题名】来自中国上市公司2006-2009年的经验证据

【摘要】 效率不仅是宏观经济层面所关注的一个重要命题,而且是微观企业主体需要关注的一个永恒命题。在众多效率中,反映企业生产前沿面的生产效率(即企业效率)是本文研究的重点,公司治理会通过作用于企业要素资源的配置与使用,从而直接或间接地对企业效率产生影响。因此,本文试图就公司治理对企业效率的影响进行研究。研究的基本思路和内容是：借鉴经典公司治理相关理论,对公司治理与企业效率间的关系进行理论分析,以此为依据,运用数据包络分析法(DEA)对2006—2009年中国上市公司的企业效率进行了实际测度；在此基础上,实证检验了公司治理因素,诸如公司内部治理结构、终极控制权结构、终极控制人类型、外部治理环境对企业效率产生的具体影响；最后,从公司治理视角,提出了企业效率改进的途径和政策建议。1.论文的基本结论(1)公司治理的基本目标是通过公司治理的制度安排与治理行为,做出企业资源的合理配置决策,实现企业效率最优和可持续。公司股东和利益相关者的利益保护需要一定的经济基础,这需要企业通过有效的公司治理,实现资源的优化配置,促进企业效率可持续优化。而反过来,只有公司利益相关者的利益得到了有效保护,也才能为公司治理决策——企业资源的优化配置与使用创造良好的环境条件和信任体系,从而有助于实现企业效率目标。因此,公司治理与企业效率有着十分紧密的理论联系。公司治理作用于企业资源要素的合理配置,作用于投入产出过程。追求企业效率的最优是公司治理的基本目标。而只有依赖于内部机制与外部机制的协调配合运行的公司治理,才能够实现企业效率优化目标。(2)实际测度结果显示,我国上市公司的企业效率整体表现较差。分地区来看,经济较发达的地区,上市公司整体素质和生产效率较高,但经济越是落后的地区,上市公司整体生产效率也越低。上市公司的生产效率表现出的弱DEA有效,表明企业没有实现资源的充分合理配置,对资源存在严重浪费和掠夺,企业粗放式经营严重,导致国家整体经济的低质量增长。此外,外部经济环境对上市公司整体生产效率也产生巨大影响。例如,各地区经济发展不平衡对上市公司的生产效率构成了重要冲击。(3)公司内部治理因素中,股权集中度、管理层持股和两职分离的领导结构与企业效率存在显著的正相关关系；董事会独立性、董事会和监事会的勤勉度、董事会规模与企业效率存在微弱的负相关关系；股权制衡度和审计委员会的设立无助于企业效率的提高。研究表明,在目前我国公司治理实践中,股权集中度有助于提升公司生产效率,但股权制衡机制不能有效约束大股东的行为：为了实现企业效率目标,提高董事会战略决策能力,强化独立董事的独立性,比提升董事会规模和勤勉度更为重要；对于监事会和审计委员会,赋予其独立的监督权力,有助于改进企业效率。2006—2009年,样本公司管理层平均持股比例为1.44%,管理层持股比例还远没达到最优持股水平,通过推进适度的管理层股权激励计划将有助于企业效率的显著提高。(4)终极控制人的现金流权与控制权对上市公司的企业效率均存在正面影响,两权分离度,以及两大终极控制人之间的股权制衡对企业效率均表现为负向的治理效应。研究还证实,分离型金字塔控制结构能抵减终极控制人现金流权和控制权对企业效率的正向影响,而非分离型金字塔结构能增强终极控制人现金流权和控制权对企业效率的正向影响。分离型金字塔控制结构下,由于权益杠杆效应的激励,以及有限责任原则的保障,第一大终极控制人能够通过超额控制权获得控制权私有收益。因此,终极控制人会产生掠夺上市公司利益的行为,降低企业效率,第二大终极控制人对其也难以有效约束,或者通过建立“利益联盟”,进一步增强对企业效率的负向效应。而在非分离型金字塔控制结构下,两大终极控制人的股权制衡结构对企业效率的负面作用被削弱。(5)终极控制人为政府控制的上市公司,其企业效率低于非政府控制的公司；政府层级越低,其控制的公司生产效率也就越低。研究发现,县级政府控制的公司除外,市级政府和省级政府控制的公司,其企业效率要低于中央政府控制的公司。而且,平均来看,政府控制的公司,其企业效率要低于非政府控制的公司,这主要是由市级政府和省级政府控制的公司的企业效率更低所引起的。虽然县级政府控制上市公司与企业效率存在正向关系,但并不显著。事实上,不同层级的政府对所属上市公司的治理目标和治理行为存在显著差异,因而对其效率的影响也不一致,但总体上仍然低于非政府控制上市公司的效率,因此,国有产权退出竞争性领域,以及引入多元化的股权代表等将有助于企业效率的提高。(6)市场化指数越高,政府干预程度越小,法治水平越高,所属地区上市公司的企业效率越高。实证还发现,减少政府干预程度对企业效率的积极效应较之市场化进程和法治水平提升对企业效率的影响更为明显。因此,减少和避免政府的不良干预对提升上市公司生产效率具有更加积极的意义。公司治理的外部环境的改善,对政府控制或非政府控制上市公司的企业效率,都具有明显的促进作用。所以,改善公司治理的外部环境对提升企业效率至关重要。2.论文的主要创新(1)论文初步构建了公司治理影响企业效率的理论框架。论文从现代股份制公司的治理属性和功能出发,基于企业可持续发展要求,建立了公司治理的目标体系,并将反映企业资源要素运用效果是否接近生产前沿面的“企业效率”定位为公司治理的短期目标,“企业价值最大化”定位为公司治理的长期目标。然后,运用逻辑推演等分析方法,从产权结构、公司内部治理机制、外部治理环境等角度,探讨了公司治理对企业效率的影响机制。(2)论文运用2006—2009年中国上市公司的大样本数据,采用数据包络分析法(DEA)测度了中国上市公司的企业效率,在此基础上,比较全面地实证检验了中国上市公司的公司治理机制对企业效率的实际影响。本文为这一领域的研究提供了补充证据。3.论文的政策框架(1)改善公司内部治理机制的对策思路。主要包括：一是强化董事会的职能作用。首先,将董事会的职责范围限定在战略决策和监督控制两个方面。其次,建立董事会领导团队的民主与科学决策机制,提升董事会的战略决策能力。第三,充分发挥好董事会下属专门委员会包括战略委员会、风险管理委员会、审计委员会、薪酬委员会等的作用。第四,审慎推动董事遴选、薪酬和退出等方面的市场化改革。二是重构经理层的激励约束机制。主要包括培育充分竞争的经理人市场、推行适度的股权激励；发展资本市场,充分利用“用脚投票”的机制约束经理人的败德行为。三是充分发挥监事会的监督作用。保证监事会的独立性,完善监事会成员的选任机制,严格监事会成员的任职资格,改进监事的监督方式,推行监事的经济责任制。(2)改善公司治理外部环境的政策建议。主要包括：一是深化国有企业产权改革。国有股权要进一步退出竞争性领域,明确所有权代表,减少政府的不良干预。二是培育和发展控制权市场。有效利用资本市场平台,推进产权交易,改善上市公司整体结构,提高上市公司质量。三是提高中介机构职业素质,加强对中介机构的监管和处罚力度,明确中介机构虚假行为的法律责任。四是完善相关配套法律制度。出台更加具有操作性的公司治理法律规范,完善股东诉讼制度和累积投票制度,落实关联交易的监管制度等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Effiencicy is not only an important concern in macroeconomic field, but also an everlasting issue in microenterprises. Among most kinds of effiencicies, production efficiency (enterprise efficiency) is the key factor in this paper. Corporate governance will influence enterprise efficiency directly or indirectly through resources allocation and use. Therefore, the paper will try to research the effect of corporate governance to enterprise efficiency. Of the basic ideas and content that is: referring to the classic theory of corporate governance, the paper theoretical analysis the the relationship between corporate governance and enterprise efficiency. Using the data envelopment analysis (DEA), we measure the enterprise efficiency based the data of the Chinese listed firms from2006 to 2009; subsequently, investigate empirical the complicated factors, such as internal governance structure, control right of large shareholder and the type, external governance environment, impact enterprise efficiency. Finally, from the perspective of corporate governance, we propose the policy ways to improve enterprise efficiency.1. Basic conclusion in the thesis(1)The basic goal of corporate governance is that corporate governance through institutional arrangements and management behavior, make the enterprise resources reasonably allocating, so to realize enterprise efficiency optimal and sustainable. Concerning the shareholders and other stakeholders interests protection needs certain economic basis, this needs the enterprise, through the effective corporate governance, optimize the allocation of resources, promote enterprise efficiency optimization and sustain. In turn, only the interests of its stakeholders have been effectively protected, but also create a good environment and credit conditions to the decision-making of corporate governance, that is the optimal allocation of corporate resources, which helps achieve enterprise efficiency targets. Therefore, corporate governance and corporate efficiency theory is closely. Corporate governance affects the rational allocation of enterprise resources. The basic goal of corporate governance is the enterprise efficiency optimization. But only rely on between the coordination of internal mechanism and external mechanism the firms realize the optimization goal of enterprise efficiency.(2)The dissertation finds that efficiency of Chinese listed firms is very poor. From regional perspective, the more economically developed areas, are the production efficiency of listed firms higher, but the more backward areas, the production efficiency lower. The weak DEA efficient shows that the fims do not fully allocat resources, there is a serious waste of resources and plunder extensive, leading to the national economic growth in low quality. In addition, economic environment have a huge impact. For example, unbalanced regional economic development significantly impacts the production efficiency.(3)Concerning the internal management factors, such as ownership concentration, managerial ownership, the separate leadership have obvious positive effects on enterprise efficiency; board independence, board, supervisors diligent, board size and enterprise efficiency are weak negative relationship; ownership balance and the Audit Committee does not help to improve enterprise efficiency. The results show that, in the current practice of corporate governance, ownership concentration helps to improve company efficiency, but ownership balance does not effectivlly constraint the large shareholders’ behavior. In order to achieve the goal, improving strategic decision-making of board, strengthening board independent are more important than size and diligence For the Supervisory and Audit Committee, given its independent oversight authority help to improve efficiency. Over the period of 2006-2009, managerial ownership was average 1.44%, not far from the optimal levels, so promoting the moderate managerial ownership will significantly improve the efficiency.(4) Control rights and and cash flow right positivly impact on enterprise efficiency, he divergence of two rights and owernship balances showed negative effects. Research proves, separated pyramid structure can offset the positive effect of owernship and control right of large shareholder, rather than unseparated pyramid structure can enhance the positive effect of large shareholder’s. Under separated type, due to leverage equity incentives, as well as the principle of limited liability, large shareholder who can control seizes the private benefits of control. Therefore, large shareholder will rob the firms’ interests, reduce efficiency. Under unseparated pyramid structure have improved enterprise efficiency.(5)The listed firms controlled by government, their efficiency are lower than non-government controlled firms; and the lower levels of government, the lower production efficiencthe. Research found that government-controlled firms, except county, city and province government-controlled ones, its efficiency is lower than the central government-controlled ones. Moreover, averagelly, efficiency of government-controlled firms are lower than the non-government ones, which is mainly caused by less efficient from the city and province government-controlled firms. Although county government-controlled firms positivlly affect on enterprise efficiency, but not dramatically. (6)The higher the marketization index, the smaller government intervention level, and the higher the law level, the listed firms’ efficiency, belong to the district, are higher. Empirical test also found that reducing government intervention, compared with marketization and law, is more obvious influence to enterprise efficiency. Therefore, to reduce and avoid the bad government intervention is more positive. The external environment of corporation governance improvement, for the government control or non-governmental control firms, has a significant role in promoting efficiency. So, improve the external environment of corporation governance is vital to promote enterprise efficiency.2. Main innovation in the thesis(1)1 Preliminary constructed theoretical framework about the effect of corporate governance to enterprise efficiency. From the view of attributes and functions of modern joint-stock firm, based on the sustainable development of firms, I try to establishthe objectives of corporate governance, and "production efficiency" defined as corporate governance Short-term goal, is close to the production frontier, "maximize corporate value" is defined as a long-term objective of corporate governance. Then, using methods such as logical deduction, I research on the efect of corporate governance to enterprise efficiency from the related factors, such as ownership structure, internal governance, and external governance environmental.(2) Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), I exam the efficiency of listed firms, dataed from firm-lever of China’s A-share stock over the period of 2006-2009; consequently, empirical test the effect of corporate governance on enterprise efficiency of listed firms. This research in this area provided additional evidence.3; Policy proposals in the thesis(1) Improving the internal management mechanism. Mainly includes:One is to strengthen the functions of the board. First, the responsibility of the board of directors was limited in strategic decision and supervision and control two aspects. Secondly, establish the board leadership team of democracy and science decision-making mechanism improve the board’s strategic decision-making ability. Third, give full play to good board subordinate specialized committee includes strategy committee, risk management committee, the audit committee and the role of remuneration committee, etc. Fourth is clear limit to selection, compensation, and exit of the board members. Two is to reconstruct the burgeoning incentive-restricted mechanism. Mainly includes fostering fully competitive market, the implementation of the managers moderate salary incentive and equity incentives, reduce principal-agent problem; Develop capital market, make full use of "voting with their feet" losing the mechanism of constraint managers DE behavior. Three is fully exert the supervision function of supervisors board. To ensure that supervisors independence, perfect the selection mechanism of the member, strict qualifications, and further improve the supervision ways, implementation supervisors in the economic responsibility system supervisors.(2) Improving corporate governance external environment policies. Mainly includes:One is the deepening the reform of state-owned enterprise property rights. State-owned shares should further quit from the competitive field, clear ownership representative, reduce government bad intervention. Two is to cultivate and develop control market. Effective use of capital market platform, promote property transactions, improve the listed company overall structure, raise the quality of listed companies. Three is to improve the intermediary agencies, to strengthen professional quality supervision and of intermediary institutions of punishment, and clear intermediaries false behavior of the legal responsibility. Four is to perfect the related legal system. More could be operated on corporate governance laws, perfecting shareholder litigation system, implement the cumulative voting system related transaction of regulatory system, etc.更多还原