【作者】 胡继立；

【导师】 年志远；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 制度经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 企业是人类文明进步的重要线索。企业控制权是理解企业性质的关键因素,也是企业“黑箱”中最神秘的部分。国外学者对企业控制权研究已经相当深刻,尤其是科斯之后的产权理论,更是将企业控制权作为其理论体系的重要内容。近年来,国内学者结合我国企业实际,开始探讨企业控制权理论,但是,研究很不深入。本文基于不完全契约理论,运用横向分析与纵向分析相结合等分析方法,重新界定了企业控制权的概念,引入了新的概念——呈现速度,拓展了企业控制权研究内容;同时,系统分析了企业控制权的来源、功能、配置、收益等内容,初步构建了企业控制权分析框架,使企业控制权理论趋于系统化和规范化。1.企业控制权基本问题研究尽管理论界研究企业控制权问题已久,但企业控制权理论始终面临理论基础不牢固、内涵外延模糊、边界不清的问题。本文对企业控制权的基础内容进行了分析,探讨了不完全契约与投资无效率问题,对“权利”与“权力”、企业契约与政治契约等概念进行了辨析,同时,梳理了已有的企业控制权研究文献。系统梳理了早期经济学家企业控制权思想、新古典经济学企业控制权思想、科斯的企业理论与企业控制权观点、契约理论与企业控制权问题。本文认为企业控制权研究主要面临三大困境:即深层次的企业控制权研究成果较少、企业控制权内涵与外延理解混乱、企业控制权理论由物质资产至上观长期主导。这些问题导致企业控制权理论轮廓不清和理论体系不完整。究其原因主要有:一是企业控制权理论缺少稳固的理论基础;二是企业控制权内涵的非正式合同性;三是企业控制权本身的复杂性。2.企业控制权概念重新界定本文将企业控制权界定为,在企业契约内对企业生产、投资、市场运营和组织租金分配的主导权利。本文分别对原始生产组织、古典企业和现代企业中的企业控制权存在形式进行了研究;对企业控制权概念三个阶段的演进进行了分析;并构建了企业控制权的结构,即企业控制权是由明晰控制权与剩余控制权构成,其中剩余控制权又由剩余基本控制权和剩余发展控制权构成。企业控制权的这种结构,既可以避免企业契约内各参与者之间不会因为机会主义而发生目标上的冲突,同时也可以通过剩余发展控制权保证组织租金的创造和分配。既实现了个体目标,也实现了组织目标。3.企业控制权拓展研究企业控制权拓展研究分四个部分。一是企业控制权来源研究。本文研究了物质资产与人力资产的内容和分类,认为物质资产并非控制权的唯一来源。为了分析企业控制权两种来源,以及物质资产和人力资产的基本特征,本文提出了“呈现速度”概念。企业控制权的来源可以分为直接来源与间接来源,直接来源是指来源于物质资产,间接来源是指来源于人力资产。能够获得控制权的是资产的专有性而非专用性。二者虽然具有不同的“呈现速度”,但均影响企业控制权的配置。二是企业控制权功能研究。本文评析了目前企业控制权功能的研究成果,并将企业控制权的功能划分为基本功能和发展功能。前者延伸出基本剩余控制权,而后者延伸出发展剩余控制权。企业控制权基本功能可以解决企业契约中各主体间的利益冲突,企业控制权发展功能可以解决企业组织的发展问题。两种功能可以保证企业组织的有效运行;三是企业控制权配置研究。本文认为,企业契约的配置不是静态的,而是依据专用性与专有性的变化而变动的。专有性是获得优势的关键,无论是物质资产所有者,还是人力资产所有者,要获得更多的组织租金,必须提高其资产专有性。在物质资产主导的企业中,物质资产先获得发展剩余控制权;在人力资产主导的企业中,人力资产在其专用性得到充分体现后,获得发展剩余控制权;四是企业控制权收益研究。本文辨析了“保留收入”、“组织租金”等概念,并重点研究了组织租金。同时,深入研究了专用性与专有性的关系。4.中国国有企业控制权实证检验中国国有企业控制权是指国有企业在实现多元化目标和分配组织租金时的主导权利。本部分运用前面的企业控制权理论分析,对中国国有企业控制权进行了实证检验。主要是对中国国有企业的控制权收益、控制权功能、控制权来源和控制权配置的现状、存在的问题及原因进行深入研究。在此基础上,提出了解决中国国有企业控制权问题的可操作性建议,即明确中国国有企业发展目标,完善中国国有资产管理制度,把中国国有企业逐步退出竞争性领域,提高中国国有企业自主创新能力,运用市场机制配置中国国有企业控制权。更多还原

【Abstract】 The firm is the vital clue of human civilization progress. The control right of the firm is not only a crucial factor for understanding the nature of firm, but also the most mysterious part of the“Black-Box”of firm. Foreign scholars have done many rather deep researches on the control right of the firm, especially the property theory after R.Coase, and even regard the control right as significant contents of its theoretical system. Recently, combined with our country’s firm practical, domestic scholars have started to discuss the control right theory whilst researches are not quite embedded. Based on imperfect contract theory, this paper utilizes some analysis methods like the combination of the latitudinal and the longitudinal, redefines the concept of the control right, introduces the new concept, the Present Speed, in order to widen the research content on the control right; meanwhile, it analyzes the source, function, configuration and margins of the control right systematically, with constructing the frame on the control right at first step, which make the control right theory tend to be systematic and standardized.I. The basic issue researches on the Control RightAlthough theorists have done some researches on the Control right for a long time, the theory of Control right is always facing the problems about unstable basic theory, vague connotation and denotation and unclear boundary. This paper analyses the fundamental content on the control right, discusses the imperfect contract and invalid investment, discriminates the right, power, firm and politics contract, meanwhile, settles the existing documents on the control right, systemizes the early economists’ideas and Neoclassical economics theory on the Control right problems. These problems lead to three main dilemmas: few achievements to some deep degree, chaos about the connotation and denotation of the control right and the long-term dominance of control right and imperfect theory system. The reasons: firstly, the control right lacks stable theoretical foundation; secondly, the informal contract of the control right connotation; thirdly, the complexity of the control right itself.II. The redefinition concept on the control rightThe control right is defined as the leading right of distribution on firm production, investment, marketing management and rents organization in the Contract Theory. In addition, the paper carries on research on original production organization, classical firms and existing forms of the control right in modern forms individually; analyzes the three evolution stages of the control right; constructs the structure of the control right, which is consisted of clear and residual control right, and residual control right is made up of residual basis control right and residual development control right. This structure of the control right, not only can avoid conflicts about goals in firms, but also it can ensure the creation and distribution by residual development. It achieves the individual and organizational goals.III. The expansion research on the control rightThe expansion research on the control right is divided into four parts. Firstly, the control right results from the research. The paper studies the content and classification of substance resource and human resource, considering that material property is not the unique source of the control right. To analyze the sources on control right and fundamental features about material property and human property, the paper comes up with the concept“present speed”. The source can be divided into the direct and the indirect source. The direct one result from material property whiles the other from the human property. What we can gain is the specificity and the unspecific of property. The two things possess different“present speed”, but they can affect the allocation of the control right. Secondly, the functional research on the control right. The paper assesses current research results on the function of control right and classifies the basis and development function on the control right. The former extends the fundamental residual control right; the latter extends developmental residual control. The basic functions can solve the profit conflict of all subjects in the firm contract, and the development function can solve some issues which are related to the firm organization. Two functions can ensure the valid operation of firm organization; thirdly, the control right allocates researches. The paper thinks that the allocation of firm contract is not static, but it is mobile according to the specificity and unspecific. The specificity is crucial to gain advantages and both the owners of material property and human property and improve the proprietary property for gaining more organizational funds. In the firm on main material, material property firstly gains the residual development control right; in the firm on main human material, it gains the residual development control right after the specificity fully achieves; finally, the research on the returns of the control right. The paper analyses“Reserved Revenue”,“Rents Organization”and other concepts and emphasizes the rents organization. Meanwhile, studies deep in relation between the specificity and the proprietary.IV. The empirical study on the control right of Chinese state-owned enterprisesControl right of Chinese state-owned enterprises refers to the dominant right of the estate-owned enterprises when it achieves diversity goals and allocates organizational rents. This section uses the former analysis of the control right theory for companies to conduct an empirical study for Chinese state-owned enterprises. It mainly makes an in-depth study including the benefit function and resource of control right, the current status, reason, problem of allocation control right for Chinese state-owned enterprises. On this basis, the article proposed the operability of recommendations to solve the problem of the control right for Chinese state-owned enterprises. For instance, it clarifies the development goal of Chinese state-owned business, also improves Chinese state-owned assets management system. What is more, it makes Chinese state-owned enterprises gradually quit from the competition, improves the independent innovation capability of Chinese state-owned enterprises, uses of market mechanism to allocate the control right of Chinese state-owned enterprises.更多还原