【作者】 房林；

【导师】 王述英；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 产业经济学， 2010， 博士

【副题名】以电信业为例

【摘要】 网络产业互联互通的接入定价研究一直是电信业乃至网络产业的一个焦点领域,更是理论界和实务界广泛探讨的重要议题之一。20世纪80年代以来,发达国家在网络产业,特别是电信业相继放松价格规制、打破垄断、引入竞争,实施规制改革。由于各国历史、文化、法律制度等背景不同,规制改革的出发点也有所不同,但30年来世界各国电信业规制改革的基本目标却是一致：通过打破垄断、引人竞争,促进电信行业的有效竞争。自从电信业引入竞争以来,电信网间互联互通成为电信监管的重中之重,而制定一个合理的网间接入定价是解决互联互通问题的关键。但是,由于电信网络结构的复杂性、业务种类的多样性,因此,很难确定一种各方都认同并且科学合理的定价方案。随着世界各国电信改革的不断深入,建立一种能同时最大化电信网络营运的社会效益、企业效益和消费者效用的互联互通接入定价模式,是实现电信市场有效竞争的关键。基于上述原因,本文试图利用数理分析法研究互联互通中的接入定价对市场结构的影响,同时分析在特定的假设条件下,单向接入、双向接入中的在位运营商和进入运营商在其各个业务领域的产品定价、接入定价的影响因素,从而为制定价格规制政策提供理论和实践建议。全文主要包括六方面内容：1、第二章在对网络经济的相关文献研究的基础上,分析总结网络的概念及其分类以及网络经济、网络效用的概念,进而归纳网络产业的基本特征。2、第三章从网络产业的基本特征之一——网络外部性角度,把互联互通的接入定价引入到市场结构的研究范围内,建立数理模型,分析接入定价的变化对社会福利水平及市场结构的影响,得出：接入定价的变化对社会福利水平及市场垄断势力的改变取决于改变接入定价运营商的规模的大小。3、第四章主要研究在政府规制条件下,当存在规制激励时,单向接入中的在位运营商、进入运营商在各自业务领域的产品定价以及接入定价的影响因素,进而引申出政府在制定对运营商的转移支付时,既要考虑运营商的成本,又需考虑运营商的垄断势力,同时提出了提高产业的网络外部性,是利用市场手段降低产品定价的途径之一4、第五章研究双向接入条件下,针对中国电信业固定电话、移动通讯业务领域的特殊格局,分别运用区域性双寡头垄断模型和双寡头价格博弈模型,分析接入定价的高低对生产者利润、社会福利及生产者合谋的影响,同时给出市场失灵的条件。5、第六章结合中国电信业规制的特殊经济背景,分析单向接入条件下激励机制、规制收买对受规制运营商和进入运营商的产品定价以及接入定价的影响。当存在有规制收买的可能性时,规制机构说真话的概率越大,受规制运营商的产品定价越高,同时,给出了规制收买是否可以发生的临界概率值；进入运营商产品的定价结构及接入定价结构不会受规制收买的直接影响,但会通过产品价格、需求量对其产生间接影响。6、第七章在前述分析中国电信业相关内容的基础上,进一步分析电信业发展的趋势——三网融合。从三网融合概念、原因及途径对三网融合进行理论分析,同时对国外某些国家和我国的三网融合现状作一简单的比较分析,并提出相应的政策建议。本文研究的主要特点和具有创新性的地方在于：1、在分析电信业的市场结构、有效竞争时,尝试从网络外部性特点把互联互通接入定价引入到数理模型中,研究接入定价的变化对运营商的利润、社会福利以及市场结构的影响。2、在前人研究的基础上,本文提出接入价格并非外生变量,而是接入数量的函数,从是否存在政府规制的角度建立理论模型。同时,在分析政府边际转移支付对受规制运营商在垄断领域的产品定价影响时,首次从成本效应、垄断势力效用两方面进行解释,并分析了技术进步、网络外部性对受规制运营商在竞争领域的产品定价的影响。3、在互联互通的双向接入定价方面,针对中国目前固定电话的“北网通南电信”的经营模式,区别对待固——固、移——移的双向接入问题,建立区域性双寡头垄断模型和双寡头价格博弈模型分析了接入定价的确定对运营商的利润及社会福利水平的影响。4、结合中国电信业现有的行政体制及社会因素,在接入定价的建模分析时考虑规制收买这一特殊因素及变量特征并提出相应的变量特征假定,同时设计一个激励机制,研究受规制运营商和进入运营商的产品定价以及接入定价问题,力图为中国电信业互联互通接入定价的规制提出有意义的建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Access pricing of network interconnection in telecommunications industries and networks industrise is one of the most important issues facing our industrial economics. Since the 80s of the 20th century, in the telecommunications industries, developed countries have successively relaxed price regulation, introduced competition to break the monopoly, and promoted regulatory reform.Although every country has their unparalleled economic environment, such as its respective history, culture and legal system, all countries have the common objective in the telecommunications regulatory reform:promoting competition in the telecommunications industries, and breaking the monopoly. In fact, developing a reasonable access pricing has been the key to design incentive regulation for the telecommunications industries.However, because of the complexity of the telecommunications network infrastructure, the uncertainty of business process path and the diversity of product cost, it is hard to find a universal pricing scheme.In this paper, I research the influence of access prices in interconnection industries on the market structure. At the same time, under several different assumptions, one-way access pricing, two-way access pricing and corresponding product pricing are studied which are involved to both the incumbent enterprises and access enterprises. The last part of the dissertation is relevant measures.The paper consists of four aspects. First, taking into account the externalities of network industries, in the view of interconnection, I establish some models by introducing the access pricing to the market structure, to analyze the influence of access prices on social welfare and market structure. It is shown that access price’s impact on social welfare and market monopoly power depends on the size of enterprise who changes access prices.Secondly, the influence of government regulation is analyzed. When there is incentive regulation, I study one-way access pricing and corresponding product pricing of incumbent enterprises and access enterprises in the two conditions of monopoly and competition. I find that it is necessary to consider the costs of enterprises, but also to consider the enterprises’monopoly power, when the government makes transfer payments to enterprises. And it is pointed that improving network externalities is effective method to lower price by market mechanism.Thirdly, based on China’s telecommunications industry regulatory system, on the condition of one-way access, I analyze the influences of incentive mechanism and regulation captures on one-way access pricing and corresponding product pricing of incumbent enterprises and access enterprises. I find that when there may be regulation captures, the greater the probability of the regulatory agencies’telling the truth is, the higher the product prices of regulated enterprise will be. And the critical probability value is given to whether regulation captures will happen. It is also shown that pricing structure and access pricing structure are not affected directly by regulation captures, but affected indirectly by regulation captures through product prices and demand.Fourthly, based on the special structure of China’s fixed-line telecommunications and mobile communications services, on the condition of two-way access, using regional duopoly two-step game model and duopoly game model of price fixing, I study the level of access prices’influence on the producer profits, social welfare and collusion of producers, and give the conditions of market failure.In this paper, the main features and innovative part include four points. In the first place, analyzing the telecommunications industries’market structure and effective competition, I introduce access pricing of interconnections to pricing model, and research access price’s influence on profits, social welfare and market structure.In the second place, on the basis of previous research, because the access price is not an exogenous variable, but is decided by the access number, I establish a theoretical model from the perspective of government regulation. At the same time, analyzing the effect of marginal government transfer payments on product pricing of regulated enterprises in the monopoly fields, for the first time, I study from the two aspects of both cost-effectiveness and monopoly power. And then I analyze the impact of the advances in technology, network externalities on product pricing of regulated enterprises in the competitive fields. Thirdly, based on China’s current fixed-line’s "North Netcom South Telecom" business model, in the views of two fields of both fixed phones and mobile, using regional duopoly two-step game model and duopoly game model of price fixing, I study the level of access prices’influence on the producer profits and social welfare.At the last, combined with the existing system of China’s telecommunications industry, I study the features and impacts of regulation captures, and design an incentive mechanism to solve the question of regulation captures, and analyze the question of both access pricing and product pricing, strive for the Chinese telecom industry interconnection access pricing regulation to make meaningful suggestions..更多还原