【作者】 姜海光；

【导师】 罗福凯；

【作者基本信息】 中国海洋大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 边界是博弈的结果。其体现是,在权力博弈所确立的界限内,建立了一种稳定的“内部秩序”。不同于既有所有权研究文献将出资人与企业两分的思路,本文从现实世界中国有控股企业权力的分布实际出发,利用“政治秩序”约束,将处于政治核心的政府官员和企业的关键代理人,重新拟合为一个所有权分析的“政治利益集团”,重点研究这个政治利益集团的“内部秩序”建立与维持问题。沿着“权力博弈”以及“内部秩序”的线索,本文首先对国有控股企业运转的社会政治环境约束、以及国有控股企业运转的逻辑、特征等进行了分析。然后根据国有控股企业真实的权力分布状况,提出了适合这种运转“秩序”的权力配置取’向。最后,研究了国有出资人为了维护这种运转秩序的稳定,在资本配置方面应当采取的措施。本文的理论基础是企业的契约理论和基于资源的公司战略观。交易成本理论使用“资产专用性”解释交易成本的节约,资源的基础观使用“专用性资源”解释组织租金的来源,对企业价值来源的解释,两者的本质基本一致。价值来源问题决定了剩余分配和资本投资取向,是所有权与财务战略研究的重要内容。在研究方法上,本文采用事实研究法,把国有控股企业所有权和资本变更案例,以及笔者现场访谈获知的国有控股企业权利配置实例,放在我国现实的社会政治背景下,开展所有权与财务战略基础理论研究。本文的主要创新：一是以“政治利益集团”为研究视角,剖析了现实中国有控股企业领导人与政府官员关系的“行政黑箱”；二是从出资人角度,提出了财务战略研究的“控制权资本”中心取向。本文的基本结论：第一,国有控股企业的强资产专用性特征,决定了其所有权边界可以延伸到拥有关键代理人的人力资本产权。拥有企业控制权的国有控股企业关键代理人,是“政治利益集团内部秩序”的组成部分。其职位源于国家与企业的长期培养,在政治秩序约束下不应享有企业所有权,应与政府官员一样享受“终身雇佣”与“国家租金激励”。国有控股企业资产较高的专用性特征,以及关键代理人的长期专用性投资,形成了显著的锁住效应。为维持准租金不被分割,长期关系契约在稳定“政治利益集团内部秩序”中发挥重要作用。第二,国有出资人视角的财务战略取向,是为了维护国有控股企业“政治利益集团内部秩序”的稳定。国有出资人应以“控制权资本”为中心,根据国有控股资本特征、企业的资产特征、以及生产组织特征,选择与之适应的财务治理、资本筹集与战略资产投资取向,以长期稳定地获得国家租金和组织租金,降低对人力资本等其他要素的依赖。第三,国有控股企业所有权特征与现行政治规则的适应性效率,将在国有控股企业长期绩效增长中发挥作用。国有出资人要客观对待新自由主义全盘私有观点,在尊重国有控股企业控制权现实情况下,着力建立适应我国国有控股企业权力配置模式。更多还原

【Abstract】 Boundary is the result of game. Its expression is, within the limits established by the game of powers, to set up a stable "internal order". As unlike the existing literatures in which dividing ownership and corporate into two opposite parts, this paper, however, puts the political officials and agents into "political interests group" under the constraints of "political order" according to the real distribution of power in the state-controlled enterprises. The research focuses on the issue that how the "political interests group" sets up and maintains the "internal order".Firstly, this paper analyzes the social and political environment constraints and how the state-controlled enterprises operation. And then, it proposes an approach to allocate the power in State-controlled Enterprises. Finally, in order to maintain the stability of this "operating order", the issue of capital allocation should be addressed by State-owned Investors.The purpose of this paper is to provide a newly-view for addressing the question of the ownership boundaries of State-controlled Enterprises and the choice of State-owned capital, with the Enterprise Contract Theory and Resource-based Theory of Corporate Strategy. Transaction Cost Theory use "asset specificity" to explain transaction cost savings and Resource-based view use the "specific resources" to explain the source of organizational rents. When explaining the source of enterprise’s value, the natures of the two theories are consistent to each other. The source of value determines the orientation of the capital investment strategy and the ownership distribution, which is important in studying ownership boundaries and financial strategy orientations. In this paper, State-controlled Enterprises are put into a realities context in which the enterprise and its key agents are all restricted by the socio-political surroundings. This study uses the factual analysis approach deducing the new theory from real cases of state-controlled enterprises, which are well-known facts or on-site interviews conducted by the author.Main contributions and innovations of this article are, first, from the perspective of the "political interests group", this paper analyzes the relationship between the leaders of the State-controlled Enterprises and the officials, which is called "Bureaucratic black box" in this article. Second, this paper proposes "controlled capital center view" from the view of state-controlled investors on the ground of the conventional framework of financial strategy.The conclusions are as follows:firstly, the stronger Asset-specific characteristic of the assets of State-controlled Enterprises determine the human capital property rights of the key agents. The reasons are, the leaders of the State-controlled Enterprises are component of the "political interests group" and they are "special officers" in bureaucratic system, and also possess effective control rights of the enterprises. Further more, as their positions come from the State’s long-term investment and training, they should not be ownership, but can enjoy the "lifetime employment" and "national rent incentives". Hence, long-term relational contracts play an important role on maintaining "the order within political interest group" in order to prevent from quasi-rent dividing.Second, from the perspective of State-owned investors, financial strategic orientations of the State-controlled Enterprises are to safeguard the stability of "the order within political interest group". "Controlled capital center view" should be the suitable view of State-owned investors. They are expected to analyze the characteristics of state-controlled capital, the characteristics of its assets, and characteristics of productive organization, and then, to be selected with suitable financial management, capital raising and strategic asset investment orientations. The objectives are to maintain stability of long-term organizations rents, state rents and to lower the dependence on human capital and other factor elements.Finally, the adaptive efficiency, between the Ownership feature of State-controlled Enterprises and the existing political rules, will play an important role in the State-controlled Enterprises long-term performance increasing. Dealing with the overall private view of Neo-liberalism objectively, the State-owned investors should respect for the reality of corporate control rights, and establish the appropriate power-sharing form to adapt to our business model.更多还原