【作者】 杨晓艳；

【导师】 罗福凯；

【作者基本信息】 中国海洋大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【副题名】基于关联交易视角

【摘要】 在全球经济一体化进程日益加快的今天,资本市场的发展对一国经济增长发挥着越来越重要的作用。大量研究表明：对投资者,特别是中小投资者权益的保护是资本市场长期健康发展的基石。因为它不但影响金融市场的稳定和发展,而且会通过影响金融市场最终对实体经济产生重要影响(Beck et.al,2000)。2008年爆发的美国金融海啸对全球资本市场和各国实体经济的巨大冲击,充分印证了上述观点。在新兴市场乃至世界上大部分国家中,资本市场中的投资者保护问题主要体现为上市公司大股东及其利益代言人与中小股东之间的利益冲突与协调问题,即第二代公司治理问题,“掏空(Tunneling)"和“支持(Propping)"等概念则是对第二代公司治理问题的经典描述。而我国作为新兴市场经济国家,上市公司大股东行为与公司治理问题成为我国学者亟待解释和解决的新问题。“掏空”和“支持”等概念的提出,带动了国内外大量的理论和实证研究,为理解公司治理和投资者保护提供了丰富的视角和证据。在这些研究中,有两个相互联系的问题显得尤其重要。一是如何衡量或发现大股东的“掏空”或“支持”行为,从而合理把握投资者利益的保护程度；二是什么因素激励或制约着大股东的“掏空”或“支持”行为,从而导致不同程度的投资者利益保护。到目前为止,虽然已有大量文献对公司治理和投资者保护问题进行了深入研究,但遗憾的是,仍然鲜有文献同时结合这两个问题进行深入、系统地研究。有鉴于此,本文尝试运用我国上市公司2002-2008年的大样本数据,以上市公司普遍存在的关联交易为突破口,通过考察关联交易与上市公司业绩、利润转移、交易成本和盈余质量等不同方面经济后果的经验关系,完整地刻画关联交易背后大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机。在此基础上,结合我国上市公司特殊的宏观制度环境和微观治理特征,对大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机和后果进行系统地解释和分析。本文的主要结论是：第一,大股东及上市公司联营企业是我国上市公司关联交易的主要对象,并且主导了关联交易的经济后果；第二,股权集中度、股权制衡度和地区市场化进程等内外治理因素是影响关联交易形成的重要因素；第三,关联交易对上市公司同时具有“掏空”和“支持”效应,从而表现出复杂的经济后果。体现在,关联交易一方面有助于降低各种交易成本,显著促进公司会计业绩,另一方面却成为大股东等关联方从上市公司转移利润的重要途径,并且,关联交易在提升会计业绩的同时也无法带来相应的市场评价；第四,政府控制、股权集中和制衡、独立董事、审计委员会和地区市场化进程等内外部治理因素及其相互作用,在不同程度上显著影响了关联交易的“掏空”或支持效应；第五,总的来说,在影响关联交易的形成及其经济后果的发挥问题上,内部治理结构与外部治理环境之间存在相互替代关系。本文研究的贡献在于：第一,与以往分析侧重于从内部治理结构研究大股东动机不同,本文同时从内部治理结构和外部治理环境的双重视角出发研究大股东的“掏空”和支持动机,并且考察了内外治理因素在影响大股东动机方面的相互作用机制,从而进一步丰富了有关公司治理和投资者保护的国内外研究成果；第二,本文以关联交易为研究对象,分别从公司业绩、转移定价、交易成本和盈余质量四个不同的方面和层次去描述关联交易的经济后果,从而更直接有效地考察大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机,弥补以往文献对大股东“掏空”和“支持”的刻画过于简单或者片面以及过于间接的缺陷；第三,本文的研究为新兴市场国家企业集团和公司治理的研究提供了有意义的国际比较参考；第四,本文的理论和实证研究结论,将为我国有关部门就完善企业集团内部运作、规范上市公司关联交易行为、保护中小投资者利益等问题提供有意义的参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Today, with the process of global economic integration increasingly accelerating, the development of capital market is playing an increasingly important role on a country’s economic growth.A large number of studies have shown that the protect of investors, especially medium and small investors, is the basic of healthy development of the capital market. Because it affects not only the stability and development of financial markets, but also by influencing the financial markets and ultimately have a major impact on the real economy (Beck et.al,2000).The huge impact on the global capital markets and the real economy of U.S.financial tsunami outbroke in 2008 fully confirms this view.In emerging markets, even the most countries of the world, the protection of investors in capital markets mainly reflected the conflicts of interest and coordination issues between major shareholders,or their spokesmen, and small shareholders of listed companies, which is named the second generation of corporate governance issues.The concepts of "Tunneling" and "Propping" is the classic description of problem of corporate governance.The proposed concepts of "Tunneling" and "Propping" led to a large number of theoretical and empirical research in the home and abroad, and provided a wealth of perspectives and evidence to understand corporate governance and investor protection. In these studies,there are two interrelated issues are particularly important. The first is how to measure or discover "Tunneling" or "Propping" of large shareholders; Second, what factors motivate or constrain the major shareholders’"Tunneling" and "Propping", resulting in varying degrees of protection of the interests of investors.So far, there is extensive literature conducted on corporate governance and investor protection issues in-depth, but unfortunately, there is still little literature combined with these two issues in deep and systematic study. For this reason, this paper attempts to use a large sample of listed companies in China 2002-2008,by looking at related party transactions with the performance of listed companies, profit transfers, transaction costs and earnings quality, these different aspects of the economic consequences of the empirical relationship, to completely characterize the major shareholders’ motive of On this basis, combined with the special micro-macro-institutional environment and governance characteristics of China’s listed companies, this paper will interpret and analyze the motives and consequences of the major shareholders’"Tunneling" and "Propping" systematically.The main conclusions of this paper are:first, the largest shareholder and its affiliated companies are the main target of related-party transactions of listed companies in China, and those connected transactions dominated the economic consequences;second, equity concentration, degree of equity and regional balance of market-oriented and other internal and external governance are major factors in the formation of related-party transactions;third, related party transactions of listed companies also have "Tunneling" or "Propping" effects,demonstrate the complexity of the economic consequences, which embodied in that a variety of related-party transactions on the one hand helped to reduce transaction costs and significantly promote the company’s accounting performance, on the other hand had become an important way for major shareholders to transfer profits from listed companies.At the same time,related-party transactions can’t bring a corresponding market evaluation even if improve the performance of accounting; Fourth, the government-controlled, equity concentration and checks and balances, independent directors, the Audit Committee and regional mercerization process of internal and external governance factors and their interactions, show a significant impact on the effects of "Tunneling" or "Propping" of the related-party transactions in varying degrees;fifth, generally speaking, the internal governance structure and the external governance environment appears to be an alternative relationship in the process that affect the performance of formation and economic consequences of related-party transactions.This paper maybe provides the following potential contributions:first, differently from that the previous analysis focused on the motives of major shareholders from the internal governance structure, this article study on the motivation of "Tunneling" or "Propping" of major shareholders from both the internal governance structure and the external governance environment, and look at the internal and external governance factors in affecting the mechanism of interaction between shareholders of motivation, which further enriched the corporate governance and investor protection of the domestic and foreign research results; second, this paper focuses on the research of the related-party transactions, describes the economic consequences of related-party transactions, examines "Tunneling" or "Propping" of major shareholders in four different aspects and levels directly and effectively, the performance of the company, transfer pricing, transaction costs, and earnings quality, which can make up for defects the literature of substantial shareholders is too simple or one-sided portrayal, too indirect; third, this paper provides a meaningful international comparison reference for studies of state-owned enterprises in emerging markets and corporate governance research group;Fourth, theoretical and empirical research findings of this paper will provide a meaningful reference to improve the enterprise group of China’s relevant departments on internal operations, standardize the listed companies related transactions, and protect the interests of small and medium investors.更多还原