股权分置改革与资本市场动机盈余管理研究

【作者】 陈越；

【导师】 叶明；

【作者基本信息】 云南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 盈余管理一直是目前国内外经济学和会计学领域深入研究的课题。大量的研究结果表明,上市公司存在很强的盈余管理动机,使得我国证券市场中盈余管理现象较为普遍。我国资本市场存在股权分置现象,在“二元股权”结构下,大股东一般都是非流通股股东,大股东的利益与公司二级市场股价并没有直接联系,因此,大股东不会通过盈余管理影响股价,不存在资本市场动机的盈余管理行为。股权分置改革导致上市公司大股东的利益与市场挂钩,大股东的行为也随着利益约束的改变而发生变化,从而影响上市公司的盈余管理模式。国外关于盈余管理动机的研究主要有三种:资本市场动机、契约动机和政治成本动机。本文以股权分置改革为背景,研究资本市场动机推动的盈余管理。资本市场动机盈余管理是指投资者和财务分析师在股票定价过程中广泛地使用会计信息,从而导致管理者有动机操纵会计盈余影响短期股票价格。文章以股权分置改革后“大小非”减持中的盈余管理行为为研究对象,运用实证分析与规范分析相结合的研究方法,考察我国资本市场是否存在资本市场动机推动的盈余管理行为。本文首先对盈余管理的涵义进行了界定,剖析了资本市场动机盈余管理行为在我国存在的制度基础及其产生的经济后果,随后,运用案例分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,通过修正的琼斯模型对中国A股市场2003年以前上市的共1112家非金融行业类上市公司进行实证分析,研究了股权分置改革后“大小非”减持过程中上市公司盈余管理的特征,研究表明,2005年股权分置改革之后,上市公司正向盈余管理行为显著增加,上市公司在“大小非”减持之前的四个财政年度与没有进行大小非减持的上市公司相比,都存在差异显著的正向盈余管理,表明股权分置改革之后,上市公司存在资本市场动机推动的盈余管理行为,针对“大小非”减持过程中的盈余管理行为,本文提出了相应的监管对策,以保护中小股东的合法权益。更多还原

【Abstract】 Earnings management has been in-depth study in the field of economics and accounting at home and abroad . A lot of research results show that there is a strong motivation on earnings management in most listed companies . Earnings management is very prevalent in China’s capital market. In the "dual option" structure, the major shareholders are generally non-tradable shareholders. There is no direct link between major shareholders and the company’s secondary market price. So, major shareholders will not affect the stock price through earnings management and there is no capital market earnings management motivation .The reform on the split share structure led to the link between the interests of major shareholders and the stock prices. Shareholder’s behavior patterns will change with the change of the interests. Capital market motivation maybe driven on earnings management .There are three main motivation on earnings management in the overseas research: capital market motivation、contract motivation and political cost motivation. In this paper , we main research capital market motivation on earnings management in the background of the split-share reform. Capital market motivation on earnings management is that capital investors and financial analysts use accounting information during the decision of stock price , so, managers have an incentive on manipulation of accounting earnings to influence short-term stock price. In this paper, we study the“size not”reduction in earnings management after the split-share reform. We use empirical analysis and normative analysis as our research methods. Investigate whether there is capital market motivation on earnings management in our capital marketIn this paper, we first of all define the meaning of the earnings management and analyze the system foundation and economics consequences on the capital market earnings management motivation in our country. The ,we use case research and empirical research as our methods .We analysis a total of 1112 non-financial sector listing by 2003 in china A-share market through Jones model Our target is to study the“size not”reduction listed company’s character of earnings management. The result shows that ,after the split-share reform, positive earnings management of listed companies increased significantly. Compared with no reduction companies ,“size not”reduction companies showed positive earnings management in before four financial years. All results show that, after the split-share reform, there is capital market motivation on earnings management in our capital market. Based on the studies, we propose appropriate regulatory measures to protect the legitimate interests of minority shareholders更多还原