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供应链中断风险下带有产品替代的多源供应策略和采购拍卖研究

Dual Sourcing Policy with Product Substitution and Procurement Auction Under Supply Chain Disruption Risk

【作者】 吕梦石

【导师】 黄四民;

【作者基本信息】 清华大学 , 管理科学与工程, 2009, 硕士

【摘要】 供应链中断风险是近十多年来制造企业运作、盈利和生存所面临的主要威胁之一。随着经济全球化不断深入和国际局势的变化,供应链中断的危害还在进一步的加大,其中中国的情况尤为严重。研究供应链中断风险及其应对措施对我国企业提高自身抗风险能力和国际竞争力具有重要的意义。本文研究了供应链中断风险下的两个重要问题:带有产品替代的多源供应策略,和供应商不可靠的采购拍卖问题。企业界的成功案例表明,产品替代是应对供应链中断的有效措施。但是,为了保证产品替代能够有效地实施,企业必须采取多源供应作为支持机制。本文考虑了一个含有两种单向可替代的产品,和两个可靠性和订货成本不同的供应商的供应链模型,并在确定性需求和随机性需求两种情况下对这一问题进行了研究。结果表明,在最优多源供应策略中,高端产品应该受到更多的重视。同时本文给出了最优策略中只有高端产品采用多源供应即部分柔性策略优于完全柔性策略的充分条件。通过与产品不可替代的情况进行比较,本文揭示了产品替代对不同产品多源供应期望边际回报的影响。最后,本文应用数值方法对需求不确定性对产品替代效果的影响进行了讨论。采购拍卖是近十年来供应链管理中发展最为迅速、应用前景巨大的供应商选择和价格决定方式。但是传统采购拍卖只关注价格的特点可能使得供应链的可靠性受到损害。本文研究了带有供应商中断风险的采购拍卖问题,为这一问题建立了贝叶斯博弈模型,并对供应商生产成本相同和生产成本随可靠性递增两种情况下的贝叶斯-纳什均衡进行了讨论。对于一般的可靠性概率分布,本文给出了采购拍卖中保证供应链可靠性的条件;对于可靠性服从均匀分布的情况,本文证明,供应商成本相同时可以保证中标供应商的可靠性,但在供应商成本随可靠性递增时,采购者必须对供应中断收缴足够多的罚金,才能使最可靠供应商赢得采购合同。通过引入供应中断罚金与可靠性的近似关系,本文还对权衡了采购成本与可靠性的最优机制进行了讨论。

【Abstract】 Over the past decade, supply chain disruption risk has been the primary threatto the operations, serviceability, and sustainability of manufacturing companies. Sup-ply chain disruptions have become increasingly jeopardizing under the background ofglobalization and current international situation. Study on supply chain disruption andits mitigating strategies is of great significance for Chinese companies to enhance theircapability of withstanding risks and international competitiveness.In this thesis, two important issues related to supply chain disruption are studied:dual sourcing policies with product substitution, and procurement auction with supplierdefault risk.Product substitution is an effective tactic in mitigating supply chain disruptions.However, in order to guarantee its effect under complete supply failures, multiplesourcing is required. We consider a supply chain with two downward substitutableproducts which can be sourced from an unreliable supplier and a reliable but more ex-pensive supplier. It is found that the higher-grade product should be preferred over thelower-grade one in the optimal sourcing policy. A su?cient condition is given, underwhich only the higher-grade product is dual sourced in the optimal policy. The e?ectof substitution is shown by comparison with the non-substitution case. We also use nu-merical results to show how the optimal sourcing policy and corresponding substitutionquantity are affected by demand variability.Procurement auction is the supplier selection and price determining mode in sup-ply chain management that has undergone the most rapid development and still has agreat potential in the future. However, people may argue that as traditional procure-ment auction only focuses on price, it may result in endangered supply chain reliability.We study procurement auction with supplier default risk, and formulate this problem asa Bayesian Game. For the cases of identical ordering cost and proportionate (in relia-bility) ordering cost we study the Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of the game. For general reliability distribution, conditions are given to guarantee the most reliable supplier winthe supply contract. For the case where reliability follows uniform distribution, weprove that reliability is guaranteed under identical ordering costs, while the procurermust impose su?cient penalty to supplier default so that the most reliable supplierwill be chosen. Given an approximation between supply failure penalty and supplierreliability, we discuss the mechanism that leads to the optimal trade-o? between pro-curement cost and reliability.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 清华大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2011年 S2期
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