【作者】 陶玲；

【导师】 兰艳泽；

【作者基本信息】 广东商学院 ， 会计学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 近年来,在美国次贷危机演变成为席卷全球的金融危机下,全球范围内的银行兼并重组、政府接管甚至破产等现象频频出现。银行的风险承担问题再次被提到议事日程,成为国内外理论界、实务界与政府部门等社会各界关注的焦点。在银行风险承担的实证研究方面,国内外已有文献大多数是从宏观层面进行考察,而从微观层面,特别是银行自身的公司治理层面的研究较少。本文拟在公司治理的视角下,借鉴相关的经典和前沿理论研究银行风险承担问题。在对风险承担的衡量问题上,为避免单一风险指标的局限性,本文采用综合风险指标衡量银行风险,最后以我国2002-2008年上市商业银行为研究样本进行实证分析,实证检验发现:(1)在股东的“道德风险”、经理人的堑壕效应、集体决策效应以及股权制衡效应的共同作用下,股权集中度与银行的风险承担存在状态依存的关系。具体而言,两者呈非线性的U型关系,即是:股权过度分散或过度集中都有可能导致银行更高的风险承担,而相对集中的股权集中度可能导致银行较低的风险承担;(2)在集体决策效应和代理问题的综合影响下,董事会规模与银行风险承担、绩效波动与银行破产风险成负相关关系;(3)独立董事比例与津贴均与银行风险承担呈正相关关系,其主要原因在于代理问题与激励效应;(4)CEO权力对银行风险承担的影响不显著,但是CEO权力与破产风险存在负相关关系。本研究可为广大的利益相关者提供一些有价值的决策依据;为进一步深化我国“商业银行改革”以及应对“后金融危机”提供一些有益的政策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Recent years, under the financial crisis sweeping the global from America subprimemortgage, there frequently appeared, such as merger and acquisition of banks、governmenttaking-over、even bankruptcy. Therefore, the problem of bank risk-taking became concernof all walks of life again. For a long time, there are many literatures study the bank risktakingfrom the perspective of macro-level, while the number of the relative study from theperspective of micro-level is few, especially from the corporate governance of banksthemselves. This paper will study the problem of bank risk-taking, under the perspective ofcorporate governance, referring the relative classic and cutting-edge theories. For avoidingthe limitation of single risk index, about the measurement of risk-taking, this paper usesynthesize indicators to measure the bank risk-taking. Finally, this paper carries on theempirical analysis, based on the sample of the listed commercial banks of our country from2002 to 2008,the result of which finds out: (1)With the common influence of theshareholders of "moral hazard"、the entrenchment of manager、the group decision-makingeffect and the equity balance, there are relationship with situation between the ownershipconcentration and bank risk-taking. In detail, they are nonlinear U-relations——overdispersionor over-concentration of equity are likely to lead to a higher risk-taking, whilethe relative concentration of ownership could lead to a lower risk banks; (2)With thecomposite influence of the group decision-making effect and the problem of agency, thesize of board have negative relation with the bank risk-taking、the fluctuations ofperformance and bank risk-taking; (3)The proportion of independent directors andallowance have positive relation with the bank risk-taking, resulting from the problem ofagency and incentive effect; (4)CEO power is not significant to bank risk-taking, but it hasthe negative relation with bankruptcy risk. This study can provide some valuable evidenceof decision-taking for the majority of interest relatives; and some useful policy reference forfurther reform of commercial banks as well as“post- crisis of financial”.更多还原