清代台湾的地方治理

【作者】 严新宇；

【导师】 姚荣涛；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 法律史， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 大量文献资料显示,在清代基层社会治理中,任用半官方的乡约、保长等人进行地方社会的日常管理成为全国各地的普遍实践。但这一机制具体如何运行、其在地方社会起到何种作用,等等,通常史料里罕有记载。庆幸的是,近年来愈来愈多新发现的地方档案中保存了大量关于乡保人员的记录,这为我们探究这一机制提供了可能。本文通过对清代台湾淡水厅、新竹县地方档案(1776-1895)的集中考察,对乡保制在清代台湾地方治理中的角色及实践进行细致描绘与分析。在此基础上,本文进而对这一机制如何形塑基层社会权力结构、如何与正式权力互动、以及何种因素促使其通行全国等问题展开探讨。全文共分为以下几部分：开篇导论首先简述过去数十年相关领域的研究状况,并对其中具有代表性的著述略予评论,随后陈列本文主旨及主要资料文献来源。第一节介绍清代官方设计的基层管理体制—里甲和保甲制,并指出二者在实践中逐渐为乡保制所取代。第二节主要介绍台湾的历史沿革,及清室领有台湾后对其乡庄地区所设置的行政区划及管理方式。第三节着重分析在台湾乡庄治理中发挥关键作用的基层自治首领—总理、董事—之设置,并通过结合档案记录和地方志等文献记载介绍总理、董事的选任及基本职能。第四节重点探讨总理在地方行政中的功能和作用。这一考察主要通过对总理与地方官、乡民和士绅的交涉来进行。第五节通过对几名长期任职总理的个案分析,对台湾地区的乡保制特征进行归纳。最后的结语中指出尽管各地的乡保实践呈现出极大的地域性差异,但在任用乡保这一半官方的行政机制管理基层社会上,清代全国各地基本普遍皆然。本文认为这种地方治理方式很大程度上是由其帝国高度中央集权的君主制政体和有限的财政收入状况所共同决定。这种治理方式一方面为统治者节约了大量行政成本,但另一方面其所造成的基层控制松弛、乡庄首领贪墨需索等问题也极大削弱了帝国的统治基础。尽管统治者可能充分认识到这一点,但在清代财政体制之下,其根本无力对局势做出实质性改变。更多还原

【Abstract】 As shown in a great many documents, using quasi officials such as xiangyue and baozhang to perform the everyday administration in rural areas has demonstrated the common practice all over China in the Qing dynasty. Yet in respect of details about how this system had run or how it had worked in local society, an absence of records was often seen both in official codes and in local gazetteers. Fortunately, the consecutive releasing of local archives in the Qing dynasty in recent decades makes it possible to have an up-close look at the xiangbao system as a great deal of records of xiangbao are found in archive files.Focusing on archival records from Danshui Subprefecture and Xinzhu County in northern Taiwan from 1776 to 1895, this thesis offers a detailed account and analysis of the role and operation of xiangbao system in the local governance of Taiwan in the Qing dynasty. In the exploration, special effort is made to discuss how this institution had shaped up the power pattern in local society and how it had interacted with formal authorities as well as what factors had contributed to its prevalence all over the country.The dissertation is divided into seven parts as follows. In the opening introduction, an overview of past scholarship on the subject of rural administration is presented with some necessary remarks. Following this, a brief description of the aim of this study and the sources of documents utilized is successively made.Chapter I describes the operation of baojia and lijia, two systems designed by the empire to function as its rural controlling tools. By scrutinizing the efficacy of these two systems, I point out that they had in practice been gradually replaced by the xiangbao institution owing to several fatal drawbacks revealed in applications.ChapterⅡgives a brief introduction of the history of Taiwan and the administration of its rural areas performed by the Qing Empire since the latter incorporated Taiwan into its domain.Chapter III centers on the election procedure and duty of zongli and zhuangzheng, two kinds of semiofficial leaders who had played a vitally important role in rural governance in Taiwan. The delineation comes from records in both archive files and local gazetteers.ChapterⅣexamines the function and role of zongli in local administration. The exploration is made from the interplay between the magistrate, community residents, local gentry and zongli.Chapter V provides several cases of zongli who had for years held their positions. By analyzing the behavior of these people in their tenure, I attempt to generalize several characteristics of xiangbao practice in Taiwan.Finally, I present the practices of local governance in both North China Plain and Ba County, Sichuan Province, evidencing that the xiangbao system, showing regional variations though, had been widely used all over the country in Qing China. Regarding this mode of local governance, I suggest that it was in a large part determined by the empire’s highly-centralized monarchy as well as its slim revenue. On one hand, such a way of governance had saved the empire handsome amount of administration costs; on the other hand, it had also considerably impaired the foundation of the empire because of the problems it had caused such as the loosing of rural control, the corruption of the xiangbao staffs, and so on. Even though the governors may be full aware of these side effects of the xiangbao system, little could they do to make a change under the existing fiscal system.更多还原