【作者】 周笑竺；

【导师】 宋德玲；

【作者基本信息】 东北师范大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 随着现代企业制度的建立,高层管理人员的薪酬激励问题成为国内外学者研究的热点。但是目前我国高管人员的薪酬制度还不够完善,国内对上市公司高管人员薪酬激励的实证研究还不够深入,也未形成一致的研究结论。因此本文选取上市公司高管薪酬这一主题,并以高管的薪酬结构为创新点展开相关研究。本研究以委托代理理论、人力资本理论、管理激励理论和战略薪酬理论为基础,并结合国内外对高管人员的年薪及持股状况的研究成果进行了相关论题的研究综述。在此基础上,首先以2006年-2008年的1069家上市公司为样本,用描述性统计方法研究了我国上市公司高管薪酬结构的现状。然后,再用这些样本公司继续进行高管薪酬结构的实证研究。实证研究提出七个相关假设和四个线性回归模型,利用相关分析、回归分析和偏相关分析分别检验了高管年薪和持股比例与上市公司经营绩效之间的相关性,从而对我国上市公司高管人员薪酬结构的有效性进行了考察。为排除单一指标说服力不强的影响,本文把净资产收益率(ROE)和每股收益(EPS)利用主成分因子分析法提取绩效值来衡量企业的经营绩效。通过研究,本文得出的结论是:①高管年度薪酬与企业绩效存在显著的正相关关系,并且与短期绩效相关性更强;②高管持股比例越高,年薪的有效性越强;③高管持股比例大于零的上市公司,年薪的有效性比持股比例等于零的上市公司更强;④高管持股比例与企业绩效呈正相关关系但并不显著,并且与短期绩效相关性更强;⑤高管年薪对持股比例的有效性无显著影响;⑥高管持股比例的有效性存在区间效应;⑦高管持股比例与年度薪酬之间呈正相关关系。最后,本文针对以上的分析结果从三方面提出改进建议:①建立长期激励与短期激励相结合的高管薪酬结构;②建立有效的高管薪酬监督与约束机制;③完善薪酬披露制度,健全相关法律法规等其他配套措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the establishment of modern enterprise system, the issue of top managers incentive compensation has become a hot research topic at home and abroad. However, China’s current executive compensation system is still not perfect, the empirical study of top executive compensation encouragement in domestic is not enough in-depth, nor formed a coherent research findings. So, this paper selected the theme of public listed companies’executive compensation, and take related research with executive compensation structure as innovative spots.This research based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, management incentive theory and strategy compensation theory, and combined with the research results of scholars in China and abroad of annual salary and holding stocks of top executives. On this basis, we first take 2006 -2008 year’s 1069 listed companies as samples, studying the status of executive compensation structure of public listed companies in our country with the descriptive statistical method. Then, use these samples to continue to perform the empirical study of executive compensation structure. The empirical study proposed seven underlying assumptions and four linear regression model, and using correlation analysis, regression analysis and partial correlation analysis to examine the correlation between the annual salary and the proportion of shareholders of executives and the operating performance in listed companies. Thus, the effectiveness of the top managers’compensation structure in China’s listed company was studied. In order to exclude the impact of a single indicator is not strong persuasive, the paper synthesizing return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS) and using principal component factor analysis to measure the operating performance of enterprises.Through research, this paper come to these conclusions:①There was a significant positive correlation between the annual executive pay and the corporate performance, and would be stronger with short-term corporate performance;②The higher of the proportion of shareholders, the stronger of the effectiveness of the annual salary;③There will be more effective of annual salary in shareholding more than zero than those proportion equals zero;④There was a positive correlation between executives shareholding and corporate performance, but not significant, and would be stronger with the short-term corporate performance;⑤There was no significant effectiveness of executives annual salary on the proportion of shareholding;⑥The effectiveness of the proportion of executives shareholding exists interval effect;⑦T he correlation between the proportion of ?shareholding and the annual executive pay shows a positive correlation.Finally, there are three approaches and recommendations for improve basis on the above analysis results:①To establish a combining executive compensation structure with long-term incentives and short-term incentive;②To establish an effective supervision and restriction mechanism of executive compensation;③Improve compensation disclosure system and a sound-related laws in public listed companies and other regulated supporting measures.更多还原