【作者】 郑谷晨；

【导师】 赵旭东；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 公司控制权的制度构造是公司治理的核心问题。本文结合世界范围内公司法改革的软化趋势,以公司控制权的契约构造理念为指引,对公司控制权的生成基础、行使路径以及失范救济等问题进行了较为全面和深入的契约化分析,并以此为基础将公司控制权的制度构造全面还原为公司参与各方之间的契约安排。除导论和结论外,本文共设四章,各部分的主要内容如下:本文的导论部分首先介绍了世界范围内一些国家公司法改革的基本情况,通过对公司法发展趋势的概括和揭示,提出了公司控制权的契约构造这一命题并阐明了该选题研究的理论和现实意义。此外,导论部分还简要说明了本文研究的路径选择以及具体的研究方法,并介绍了本文的主要内容及结构安排。第一章,公司控制权基本概述。本章首先介绍了人们对公司权力的传统认识并给予了适当评论,其后通过对公司权力内在逻辑的追问重新厘定了公司权力的概念定义,并从权力来源的角度论证了公司权力的生成机理;在此之后,围绕着公司控制权导源于公司权力这一核心论点,重点论述了公司控制权的概念限定及类型划分,并渐次梳理了公司控制模式的演进脉络。此外,本章还基于扬弃的立场对公司契约理论进行了较为全面的检视和评介,其中重点分析了公司章程的契约属性,并解释了之所以存在公司法的主要原由。从逻辑体系上看,本章是其后各章节的基础铺垫。第二章,公司控制权生成的契约基础。本章重点论证了股东控制权、董事控制权以及债权人等利益相关者控制权得以生成的契约基础,并描述了不同控制权形态之间的转换过程。股东之所以拥有公司的(最终)控制权,一方面是因为他们向公司让渡了传统意义上的财产所有权;另一方面,他们承担了公司经营的绝大多数边际风险,因此具有行使控制权的最佳激励。此外,由于股东是公司的最终控制者,所以,董事的控制权主要来自于股东的整体授权,为了保障股东利益的实现,在此过程中董事往往被要求承担信义义务。还有,债权人等利益相关者在特定的场合也可以通过签约获得控制权,因此,这种控制权的生成则完全是契约性的。第三章,公司控制权行使的契约路径。本章集中分析了股东控制权、董事控制权以及债权人等利益相关者控制权在实际运作中的各种行使方式及其契约属性。就股东控制权的行使路径而言,股东投票权、投票权代理、累积投票条款的设定、投票权信托、股东表决权拘束协议等行使方式都是典型的契约安排。在董事控制权的行使方面,董事会的议事规则、商业判断原则、投票代理权征集等行使方式也可以在契约的框架内获得解释。较之于股东和董事控制权的行使路径,债权人等利益相关者控制权的行使方式则纯粹是通过合同的约定予以明确的。第四章,公司控制权失范的契约救济。本章主要分析了(控制)股东、董事以及债权人等利益相关者滥用控制权的各种可能情形,并从契约的角度提出了规制控制权失范现象的各种策略。为了防范控制股东滥用控制权,股东之间可以通过合同约定决策权;债权人则可以在订约的起点上要求股东放弃有限责任规则的庇护,也可就有限责任基础之上的交易后果及其相关事项与任何偿债能力有疑问的公司约定各种行之有效的自助措施。针对可能发生的董事滥用控制权的情形,股东可以通过公司章程和董事服务契约为董事的行为设定各种具有针对性的契约义务并辅之以严格的违约责任。此外,债权人等利益相关者在实际控制公司以后,也可能实施对抗公司管理的潜在机会主义行为,此时对公司而言,契约的救济也不失为一种有效的自助措施。本文的结论部分总结了各章节的主要观点和研究结论,并再次重申了公司控制权的契约构造理念,最后,在前述基础上揭示出了公司控制权的适应性品格及其重要意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The system construction of corporate control is the core issue of corporate governance. Combined with the softening trend in corporate law reform around the world, guided by the idea of contract construction of corporate control, this paper has provided a comprehensive and in-depth contract analysis over several issues concerning corporate control, such as its formation basis, ways of exercise and anomie remedies. Based on the above analysis, this paper turns the system construction of corporate control back to the contract design between corporate participant parts. Besides the introduction and conclusion parts, this paper consists of four chapters. The main contents of this thesis are as follows:Firstly, the introduction part introduces the basic situation of corporate law reform in some countries around the world. Then it summarizes and reveals the trend of corporate law reform, and on this basis, it puts forward the concept of contract construction of corporate control and clarifies the theoretical and practical significance of this subject. Furthermore, the introduction part shows briefly the path selection and specific research methods in this paper, as well as the main contents and structure design.The first chapter, Basic Overview of Corporate Control. In this chapter, it firstly introduces how people consider the power of corporate in traditional sense and then gives appropriate comments. Subsequently, it redefines corporate power through reconsidering its inherent logic; from the perspective of the origin of power, it illustrates the mechanism of corporate power. Thereafter, centering about the point that corporate control originates from corporate power, it emphasizes the definition and classification of corporate control. Moreover, the evolution of corporate control model is gradually combed. In addition, it gives comprehensive examination and review on the corporate contract theory based on the position of sublation. It emphasizes the contract characteristics of articles of incorporation, and explains the existence of corporate law. Logically, this chapter is the basis of the following chapters.The second chapter, the Contract Basis of the Formation of Corporate Control. This chapter demonstrates the contract basis of the control powers held by shareholders, directors and stakeholders, such as creditors, and then describes the switching process between different forms of controls. The shareholders enjoy the ultimate control over the corporate. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, they transfer the ownership of property in traditional sense to corporate. On the another, they take the company’s most marginal risk during its running, and this gives them the optimum stimulation to exercise the control powers. Moreover, because shareholder is the ultimate controller in the company, the control powers of the board mainly comes from the shareholders’ total authorizing. In order to guarantee the realization of shareholders’ benefits, the directors are always required to assume fiduciary duties. And also, the stakeholders, such as creditors, can acquire control powers by signing in particular situations. Consequently, the generation of the control powers are completely contractual.The third chapter, the Contract Path of the Exercise of Corporate Control. This chapter focuses on the analysis of various exercise styles and its contractual nature of the control powers held by shareholders, directors and stakeholders, such as creditors, in the actual operation. As for the exercise path of shareholders controlling, the typical contract arrangement includes the following exercise styles: shareholder voting rights, proxy voting, settings of cumulative voting terms, voting trust, and the voting agreements. In the respect of the exercise of director’s control powers, these exercise styles can be explained within the framework of contract: rules of procedural of the board, business judgement rule and proxy solicitation. However, the creditors exercise the control powers in different ways from that of the shareholders controlling and directors controlling. Their exercise styles are purely determined by the contract.The fourth chapter, the Contract Remedies for the Anomie of Corporate Control. This chapter mainly analyses various kinds of possibilities of abuse of control by shareholders, directors and stakeholders, such as creditors. It also provides a variety of strategies to regulate the anomie of corporate control from the perspective of contract. In order to guard against the controlling shareholders abuse their control powers, decision-making power can be agreed upon in a contract between shareholders; at the starting point in the contracting, the creditors can require the shareholders to abandon the shelter of limited liability rule and can also reach agreements with those companies that are lack of solvency. The transaction results and its relevant issues that based on limited liability can be written into the agreements. In this way, creditors can arrange some terms, such as a variety of effective self-help measures, into the contract. With regard to the probable situation that the directors may abuse their control powers, shareholders can set all kinds of customized contract duties with the strict liabilities for breach of contract as the supplementary. The above duties and liabilities can be formulated in the articles of corporation as well as director service contract. In addition to this, other stakeholders, like creditors, are probably to implement some potential opportunistic behaviours that will be against the corporate management after their actual control over the corporation. In this situation, the contract remedies will definitely be an effective self-help measures.The conclusion part summarizes the main ideas and research results of the above chapters, and reaffirms the concept of contract construction of corporate control. In the end, on the basis of the above, it reveals the adaptive characters of corporate control, as well as its significance.更多还原