【作者】 杨芬；

【导师】 李远行； 陈俊峰；

【作者基本信息】 安徽大学 ， 社会学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 “三农”问题一直是中国学界的关注点。十七届三中全会以后,国家着实进行农村改革,决定破除“城乡二元结构”,全面实施以工补农、以城带乡,向乡村注入大量资源。但事实表明,大量资源的注入并没有让农村真正发展起来。因为这些资源主要输给单个农户,数量巨大的资源化整为零,农村公共事业依然因缺少资源而发展停滞。如果乡村拥有一个整体平台承接这些资源,根据乡村实际需要将之运用,可以解决资源对接的矛盾。农民合作是存在于农村的一种实践形式,其在农民日常生活中发挥很大的作用,可通过农民合作建构乡村资源承接及应用的平台,但有的农民合作达成目标而有的合作却相当困难,这其中的原因值得探究。本文选取位于江汉平原西北部的Z湾为研究对象,在国家与社会关系框架中,分析Z湾村民在上世纪八十年代和本世纪初的两次较典型的合作行为——修家谱和征地分款,从国家与农民、市场与农民以及村庄与农民关系入手,结合农民的行动逻辑,比较两次合作成效差异,探究其中存在的结构性、制度性原因,同时也展示乡村结构的变迁。本文在详述Z湾村民修家谱和征地分款两次合作的基础上,比较分析两次合作行为发生的条件、运作机制、合作效果的差异,以显示在受国家、市场影响下的乡村,其自主合作在何种情况下成为可能。通过比较分析得出：在修家谱过程中,国家鼓励、帮助农民合作,且让农民自主进行,国家的适度干预创造良好的合作环境；在自由市场中,农民利用市场条件及市场机制为合作提供的便利,以促成合作；在村落中,村民因属同族团体,村落中存在合作的基础,即完整的宗族组织、精英的积极主持发动和族内惩罚机制,这些共同降低了合作成本,减少合作的贴现率,提高不合作的代价,以保证合作的顺利进行。但在征地分款中,实际代表国家政权的村级及以上组织在征地中选择性地过度干预与缺位,征地过程中主持征地与抽取征地款,但遇到问题时又推卸责任,提高农民组织合作的成本；农民与资本市场中其他利益主体相比,力量弱小,而且其他利益主体之间存在利益结盟,造成力量对比悬殊,处于弱势的农民受到资本的侵蚀,削弱合作能力；在村庄内部,市场化使得村庄成员利益分化,原有组织结构受到破坏,村民们共同举行的会议无法负担合作的组织功能,而村落共同体对不同村民的影响力发生分化,政治精英因为其不再与普通村民属于同一利益共同体,侵占村民利益自肥具有相当吸引力,同时缺乏监督者,他们的不合作行为成本很低,相反收益很高,本来充当保护型精英的传统精英考虑到主持合作存在潜在的高昂成本而选择退让,使得掠夺型精英可以从中自肥,再次提高合作成本。普通村民考虑到地缘关系中的伦理,采取成本较小的策略,或让妇女出面或只是小范围地议论,而在公共场合考虑到“人情”“面子”,在村庄层面不能形成有效的舆论监督力量,提高合作的贴现率,降低合作收益,于是合作成效低下。本文的创新性在于：1、在同一个村庄选取不同时期的合作进行比较,避免了地方文化上的差异而造成分析结果的差异,由此可以显示村庄在结构上的变迁。2、分析思路超越合作“政府化”与“市场化”争议,用农民的行动逻辑来解释合作成效,指出合作成效的高低是农民在权衡经济利益、制度和结构约束后的结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 "Three Rural Issues" has been China’s academic focus. After the 17 Third Plenary Session,the state really for rural reform, decided to get rid of "Urban-rural dual structure", implemented industry nurturing agriculture and cities helping rural with massive resources.But the fact is that the injection of substantial resources to rural areas did not let the rural really developed. Because these resources are mainly lost to the individual peasantry, large amounts of resources decentralized, public utilities are still due to lack of resource the development of stagnation. If there is a whole platform to undertake the resources under the rural practical need for the use, it can solve the contradiction between resources docking. Peasants cooperative is a practical form in the countryside. It play a very big role in daily life,so we can make a whole platform by peasants cooperating to undertake resources. Some of peasants cooperative achieve goals, but another does not. The reasons should be explored.This selection is located in the northwest of the Z village as a case in the framework of the state and social relations, of Z village, eighties were in the last century and the beginning of this century, two typical of cooperative behavior Revised Family Tree and land sub-shall, from relationship between the state and peasants, markets and peasants, and the village and peasants combining with the peasants action logic, compare the two effective cooperation, explore where existing structural and institutional reasons, but also shows the structure of the village changing.In this paper, based on detailed revising family trees and land sub-paragraph, comparative analysis of the conditions of the two cooperative behavior, functioning mechanisms, cooperation between effect to show in the affected countries, under the influence of the rural market, its how to conduct self-cooperation possible.Through comparative analysis: Genealogy in the repair process, the State encourages cooperative behavior to help peasants and the peasants autonomous, the state’s appropriate intervention to create a favorable environment for cooperation; in a free market, peasants take advantage of market conditions and market mechanisms to facilitate cooperation, to facilitate cooperation success; in the village, the villagers belong to the same ethnic group, the basis for cooperation exists in the village, that is a complete clan organizations, initiated and hosted the elite of positive punishment mechanism within the family, which together reduce the cost of cooperation to reduce the cooperation of the discount rate, to improve the cost of non-cooperation to ensure the smooth progress of cooperation. But in the land sub-paragraph, the actual state power on behalf of the village-level organizations in the land and the absence of undue interference selectively, the cost of increasing peasants organizations; peasants and the capital market compared to other stakeholders, power weak, and other interests of the main alliance of interests, resulting in the balance of power and the poor, disadvantaged peasants by the erosion of capital, weakening cooperation capacity; in the village itself, the market makes the interests of the village members of the division, the destruction of the original structure, the villagers can not afford a common meeting cooperation of organizational functions, but the village community on different force borne villagers influence differentiation, political elite and ordinary villagers because of its no longer belong to the same community of interests, the interests of himself occupied village of benefit to be attractive, while lacking supervisors, and their uncooperative behavior low cost, high yield contrary, the elite have been as protective of traditional elites into account co-chaired the high cost of concessions to choose, making predatory elites can learn from the fat, once again raising the cost of cooperation. Ordinary villagers into account in relation to the ethical edge, low cost strategy to take, or let the women come out or just small-scale discussions, and in public places taking into account "RenQing" "MianZi",in the village of public opinion can not form efficacious strength and enhance cooperation in the discount rate, lower co-benefits, so cooperative effect is lower.Innovation of this paper lies in: 1, In the same village selected to compare different periods of cooperation, to avoid differences in local cultural differences in the results caused, thus it can show changes in the structural of the village.2, Thinking beyond the cooperation of the "government" and "market" controversy, with peasants logic of action to explain the cooperative effect, pointed out that the level of cooperation results in balancing the economic interests of peasants, institutional and structural constraints the result.更多还原