【作者】 钟帅；

【导师】 史本山；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 产业经济学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 今天的市场竞争变得前所未有的激烈,企业为了生存与发展,必须综合运用价格和非价格竞争手段,并且考虑各种可能的战略联盟以应对这种挑战。广告作为企业在市场营销中最重要的非价格竞争手段,受到了众多企业家的重视和学者们的关注。本文在前人研究的基础上,运用博弈论和产业组织理论的原理和方法,从横向和纵向两个角度深入研究了广告竞争与合作的有关重要问题。首先,本文引入了广告外部性,建立了双寡头博弈模型,并重点考察了广告竞争、半联盟合作与全联盟合作这三种竞合形式的绩效。研究发现,在广告竞争情形下,“打广告”是每一个企业的占优战略,纳什均衡是(打广告,打广告),但这个均衡不是帕累托最优；全联盟合作下企业获得的利润最大,半联盟次之,广告竞争时企业利润最小；全联盟的社会福利最小,广告影响因子较小时,广告竞争情形下的社会福利大于半联盟情形下的社会福利,广告影响因子较大时,半联盟情形下的社会福利大于广告竞争情形下的社会福利。本文得到的启示是企业可以寻求半联盟或者全联盟合作,以获得企业间的帕累托改善,但在政府规制下,政府会禁止企业间的全联盟合作。其次,本文将产量作为内生变量,并将零售商扩大到两家,研究了一个供应链上生产商与零售商的广告不合作与合作问题,侧重探讨了生产商广告成本分担比例问题和对比分析了三种竞合模式的市场效率。结果表明,在生产商分担零售商广告成本合作形式下,生产商广告成本分担率的提高将增大零售商广告投入；广告影响因子较小时,生产商分担零售商广告成本,广告影响因子较大时,生产商不分担零售商广告成本。对市场效率的对比中,本文发现生产商和零售商都是在生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式下利润最高,而且在这种合作方式下,社会福利也最大。显然,政府应该鼓励生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式。最后,本文放宽需求确定性的假设,研究了不确定需求下的供应链广告合作问题。本文得到的主要结论是,广告影响因子增加,广告成本分担率降低,零售商广告投入减少,零售商订货量减少；广告壁垒增大时,广告成本分担率提高,零售商广告投入减少,零售商订货量将减少；当需求不确定性降低时,零售商的利润增加。更多还原

【Abstract】 Market competition becomes unprecedentedly fierce today. In order to survive and develop, firms must wield price and non-price competition means synthetically, and consider possible strategic alliance to answer this challenge. Advertising as the most important means of non-price competition in marketing, has been valued by numerous entrepreneurs and caught a lot of scholars’ attention. On the basis of previous studies, this paper applies the theory and methods in game theory and industrial organization theory to study relevant important issues on advertising competition and cooperation from the perspective of both horizontal and vertical.First, the advertisement externality is introduced into this paper. Then, this paper establishes a duopoly game model and focus on the performance of adverting competition semi-alliance and total alliance. This paper finds that in the advertising competition case, "advertising" is the dominant strategy of each firm, and Nash equilibrium is the (advertising, advertising), but the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. The firm gains the most profit in total alliance case, the second in semi-alliance case, and the least in advertising competition. The social welfare is smallest in total alliance. When ads impact factor is relatively smaller, social welfare in competition case is larger than that in semi-alliance. When ads impact factor is relatively bigger, social welfare in semi-alliance is larger than that in competition case. This paper obtains the enlightenment that the firms may seek half alliance or entire alliance to improve firms’ Pareto Optimum, but under the government regulations, the government will forbid entire alliance cooperation of firms.Second, this paper takes the output as the endogenous variable, and expands the retailer to two, and studies noncooperative and cooperative advertising in a supply chain. The producer’s proportional share of the cost of advertising and market efficiency of three kinds of competition and cooperation models are mainly discussed. The results show that in the cooperation cases that the producer shares the cost of retailer advertising, when the producer shares the cost of advertising, the retailer advertisement will increase. When the impact factor of ads is relatively smaller, the producer will share the cost of retailer advertising, when the impact factor of ads is relatively bigger, the producer does not share the cost of retailer advertising. Comparing efficiency of the market, the results show that when producer and retailers both advertise, producer and retailers obtain most profit, and social welfare is also the largest. It is clear that the Government should encourage producer and retailers both to advertiseFinally, the assumption that the market demand is certain is given up and the cooperative advertising issue in uncertain circumstances in a supply chain is studied. The main conclusions are that when the impact factor of ads increases, the producer’s proportional share of the cost of advertising, the amount of advertising and ordering quantity all decline, when advertising barrier increases, the producer’s proportional share of the cost of advertising increases, and the amount of advertising and ordering quantity both decline; when the demand uncertainty declines, the retailer’s profit will increase.更多还原