【作者】 刘玲莉；

【导师】 夏斌；

【作者基本信息】 西安理工大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 由于股权集中度较高,在保护中小股东利益的法律体系不完善的情况下,导致终极控股股东通过利益输送行为掏空上市公司,转移上市公司利润和占用上市公司的资源,从而侵害了少数股东的利益。在金字塔控股结构下,终极控股股东所有权和控制权的分离诱使了更为严重的利益输送行为。随着公司治理、财务理论的不断发展,“终极股东行为方式及其后果”,也日益成为国际研究的焦点。我国当前的宏观经济环境以及上市公司特殊的股权结构,也为这一领域的研究提供了难得的机会。本文从终极控股股东的控股权、控制权、两权分离度出发,研究了上市公司利益输送行为。本文首先对终极控股股股东及特征、利益输送相关概念、LLSV模型、利益输送的度量进行了理论阐述,深入分析了终极控股股东进行利益输送的动因及方式。其次,在理论分析的基础上,以2005～2007年沪深两市493家A股公司作为样本,对样本总体终极控股权、控制权、两权分离度、利益输送相关变量进行描述性统计分析,运用分组样本差异性检验方法,研究了终极控制人的终极控股权、控制权、两权分离度与各利益输送(转移利润)的相关性,此外,还以现金股利作为衡量终极控制人与全体股东共享收益行为的变量,通过比较终极控制人损益相关交易和现金股利在不同组别之间的差异性,考察终极控制人对利润转移和共享收益行为的选择。最后得出了以下结论：(1)终极控股权比例越低,关联交易、资产转让、非经营性资金占用等利益输送行为发生或存在的可能性均较高,终极控制人派发现金股利就越少。(2)控制权比例较高的上市公司,关联交易、资产转让、占用非经营性资金等各利益输送的的发生额就越高,发放现金股利的额度就越低。(3)控制层级复杂的上市公司,其发生关联交易、资产转让发生额显著高于控制层级较简单组的上市公司。(4)国有控制上市公司在关联交易、非经营性资金占用上发生额发生的可能性都大于非国有控制上是公司,而在发放现金股利则相反。(5)两权分离度越高,关联交易越易发生,但是,资产转让交易与两权分离度不存在显著的差异。两权分离度较小的上市公司,越易发放现金股利。更多还原

【Abstract】 The legal system for minority shareholders benefits protection is imperfect, because of the high degree of ownership concentration, which leads the ultimate controlling shareholders to tunnel listed companies by profit transfer. This behavior transfers listed company interest and occupying resources, thus to vialate minority shareholders’benefits. Under pyramidal share structure, the separation of ultimate controlling shareholders’ownership from control right entices them into severer profit transfer. With the development of corporate governance and financial theories, the study on ultimate controlling shareholder behaviors and results has increasingly been worldwide. China’s macro economic environment and unique share strucure of listed companies provide valuable opportunities to these researches as well. This article, based on ultimate controlling shareholders’ownership, control right, and rights separation degree, was studying profit transfer in listed companies.First of all, the article described characteristics of ultimate controlling shareholders, profit transfer and relevant concepts, LLSV model, and theory of profit transfer measurement, with deep analysis on motivation and methods of ultimate controlling shareholders tunnelling. Furthermore, based on theoretical analysis, the article took 439 listed companies in a-share of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange market as sample to carry out descriptive statistic analysis on ultimate ownship, controlling right, both rights separation degree, and profit transfer relevant variables, applying diversity test for group sample to investigate their correlation. In addition, using cash dividend as the variable to measure ultimate controllers and whole shareholders shared profits, by compared ultimate controllers profits relative businesses and cash dividend in different groups, reviewed ultimate controllers’selection of profit transfer and shared profits.The conclusions are:1, The lower level of ultimate control right is, the higher possibility for related transaction, resources transfer, non-operational capital occupation, and other profit transfer behaviors exists, the less cash dividend ultimate controllers pay.2, The higher level of ultimate control right is in listed company, the more profit transfer occurs, the less cash dividend are paid.3, The complicated control structure listed companies occur remarkable amount of profit transfer behaviors.4, State-control listed companies has higher possibility to exist non-operational capital occupation than non-state, but opposite result in cash dividend distribution.5, The higher separation degree is, the easier related transactions exist, however, the resource transfer has no noticed diversity to separation degree.更多还原