【作者】 谢会芹；

【导师】 谭德庆；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 现代经济活动中商品日益多样化、市场竞争加剧,一些制造商可能将产品委托给多家零售商进行销售,同时零售商也可能与多家制造商签订委托代理合同销售多种商品,于是在委托代理博弈环境中出现了多个参与人,而多参与人的出现造成了竞争和交互委托代理的现象。此时,以往的单委托、单代理的研究已不能满足现实需求。本文应用委托代理理论,从博弈环境中的参与人数量多少入手,首先将博弈环境中存在“自营店”和“自有品牌产品”的特殊情况考虑到单委托代理问题中,研究了努力成本(产出)系数以及风险规避度等对均衡解的影响,并进行了信息价值分析,填充了该问题研究上的空白。接着,研究了平行委托关系的多委托——多代理问题,通过分析并结合现实分别在信息对称和非对称条件下建立模型,进行了均衡分析和信息价值分析。最后,扩展到交互委托关系下的多委托——多代理问题研究中。在存在“自营店”和“自有品牌产品”的特殊委托——代理问题中,可以看出,信息非对称时,制造商在经营自营店时付出的努力程度绝对大于代理商在销售代理产品上的努力程度；代理人在其自有品牌产品上的努力程度恒大于其在代理产品上的努力程度。为了避免代理商过于“偷懒”,制造商应该在适当范围内给代理人足够高的工资和奖金,激励代理商努力工作。另外,当代理商对其自有品牌产品做促销时,建议制造商积极主动地进行相应的活动。在平行和交互委托关系下的多委托——多代理问题中,分析得出,在正当竞争中,制造商的利润随着努力产出系数和销售商间竞争激烈程度的增大而增大,建议制造商为有能力的代理商提供平台充分激发其创造力,充分利用零售商间的竞争,并适当及时地对商品做促销；当代理商的风险规避度越小,而其他制造商的代理商的风险规避度越大,制造商的收益越多,因此制造商应给有创新和挑战品格的代理商更高的报酬,更好地激励代理商努力工作。更多还原

【Abstract】 In modern economic activities, product diversification and market competition increased and enhanced. Some manufacturers may entrusted their products to many retailers.Meanwhile, retailer may sign the appointed agency agreement with many manufacturers to sell many commodities. So that a number of participants appear in such a situation which leads to the competition and interactive principal agent. At this point, the previous studies about single entruster and single agen can not satisfy the practical needs any more.This study adopts principal-agent theory, setting out from the number of participants in the game. First, two special situations of "Operated Stores" and "Private Brand Product" are considered in single principal-agent problem in which case effort cost (output) coefficient as well as the effect of the degree of risk-aversion on the equilibrium are discussed. Information value analysis are also conducted in this article. Furthermore, parallel multi principal-agent problem is studied. Models are set up under the conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information according to the analysis and the practise, followting the equilibrium analysis and information value analysis. Finally, the study is extended to solve the problem of interactive multi principal-agent.As it reffers to the particular principal-agent problem that existing in the "Operated Stores" and "Private Brand Product", we can figure out that under the conditions of asymmetric information, effort made by the manufacturer on operating the Operated Stores is absolutely more than that by agents on selling the agented products. At the same time, effort made by agent on the sales of their own private brand product is absolutely more than that of the agented products.In order to avoid the agents being too"lazy", manufacturers should provide reasonable high saliries and bonuses to incentive the agents to work hard. Besides, manufacturers are suggested to organize corresponding activities actively and initiatively.In the problem of parallel and interactive multi principal-multi agent, studies show that, in legitimate competition, the manufacturer’s profit increases with the increase of output and level of competitionSo that we recommend that manufacturers should provide a platform for excellent agents to incentive their creativity and make full use of retailers’competition, promoting the products appropriatedy and opportunely. The smaller the agents’degree of risk aversion is, the greater that of other manufacturers’agents is and more benefits are obtained by the manufacturers. So that manufacturers should give a higher rewards to the innovative and challenging agents to incentive them to work harder.更多还原