【作者】 徐业坤；

【导师】 谢永珍；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 国内外相继出现的一系列公司丑闻事件以及当前的全球性金融危机,与制度层面的风险控制缺失所致的公司治理风险有关。国内企业在由“行政型治理”向“经济型治理”转型过程中,公司治理机制存在着较为严重的“治理失灵”现象,内部人控制、金融风险、关联交易等治理风险时有引爆,对公司治理风险进行预警成为当前公司治理研究的热点和迫切需要。中国市场改革开放30年来,企业改革由最初的公司治理结构建设转向完善公司治理机制,重点在于充分发挥董事会在公司治理中的核心作用。完善的董事会治理机制是企业规避治理风险、实现可持续发展的重要保证。国内外的一系列治理丑闻事件,使得董事会治理成为各界关注的焦点,以董事会为核心的公司治理内部控制系统的有效设置和实施对于防止和发现欺诈行为的重要性凸显。然而我国真正合格的董事会,屈指可数,上市公司董事会在应对公司治理风险能力上备受质疑。通过分析近年来国内外有关董事会治理风险的研究,发现现有研究主要集中于董事会治理机制与公司治理风险表征之间的关系,董事会治理风险预警问题尚未引起足够的重视。基于委托代理关系,采用规范研究方法分析了公司治理风险的产生机理,在此基础上界定了公司治理风险的概念,即在内外部公司治理环境的影响下,由于治理机制及其运作的不合理,导致公司治理偏离利益相关者利益最大化的可能性。董事会作为现代公司治理的关键要素,直接影响公司治理风险。由于不存在最优的公司治理机制,从公司治理机制偏离利益最大化的严重性程度衡量公司治理风险更具操作性。基于理论分析,选择2002-2007年上市公司数据进行了董事会治理风险预警的实证研究,利用信息含量丰富的Altman Z指数建立公司治理风险的代理变量,构建了董事会治理风险预警模型,使用2008年样本上市公司的数据对该模型进行的检验证实模型的预测效果较好,在此基础上利用该模型对我国2008年所有上市公司治理风险状况进行了预测,得到的主要结论包括：第一,我国上市公司董事会治理存在被动合规的现象,“自主性”治理缺失；第二,董事会治理机制中,董事激励(董事报酬、领取报酬董事比例、董事会持股比例)、董事会行为(薪酬与考核委员会及提名委员会设置、董事会会议次数)对公司治理风险有显著的影响；第三,包含了董事报酬、领取报酬董事比例、董事会持股比例、薪酬与考核委员会设置、提名委员会设置、董事会会议次数、资产收益率、总资产增长率、债务资产比率等在内的董事会治理风险预警模型能够较好地判断预测上市公司是否存在治理风险；第四,利用构建的董事会治理风险预警模型对我国沪深两市2008年上市公司的研究表明,我国上市公司普遍面临着较大的治理风险。完善董事会治理机制以规避治理风险成为上市公司的现实选择。本文的创新之处在于：首先,从委托代理关系角度界定了治理风险的概念,阐明了治理风险的产生机理；其次,构建了董事会治理风险预警模型；再次,从治理风险的角度探讨董事会治理机制的有效性,为合理建设董事会提供了新的视角。但在数据可得的情况下,公司治理风险的衡量可以进一步采用多个指标构建综合性的公司治理风险指数进行董事会治理风险的预警。更多还原

【Abstract】 A series of corporate scandals and the current global financial crisis which have happened at home and abroad are due to the corporate governance risk deriving from the missing risk control mechanism at system-level. During the process of transformation from administrative governance to economic governance in domestic enterprises, there exist a more serious problem of "governance failure" phenomenon as to corporate governance mechanism, governance risks like insider control, financial risk, related-party transaction erupt now and then, predicting governance risk has become a focus of current corporate governance research and urgent need for practice circle.From China’s market reform for opening till now has experienced about thirty years, enterprise reform has switched from initial construction of corporate governance structure to improve corporate governance mechanisms, and the critical point lies in displaying the central role of the board of directors in corporate governance fully. Sound board’s governance mechanism is an important guarantee for avoiding governance risks and achieving sustainable development for domestic companies. A series of governance scandals at home and abroad make board governance become the focus of attention of all sectors, which highlights the importance of the effective development and implementation of internal control system in corporate governance for preventing and detecting fraud. However, there are few truly qualified boards of directors in domestic companies; the competence of board of directors on reacting to corporate governance risk is doubted and must be clarified.We find that existing research has focused on the relationship between board governance mechanisms and characterization of corporate governance risk by analyzing related board governance risk researches at home and abroad, also the problem about predicting governance risk based on the board of directors has not yet attracted sufficient attention. This paper analyze the generation mechanism of corporate governance risk using normative research methods based on the principal-agent relationship, and we define the corporate governance risk, that is the probability of deviation between corporate governance and the maximization stakeholders’interests induced from unreasonable design and operation of governance mechanisms under the impact of the external and external corporate governance environment. As a critical factor, the board of directors affects governance risk directly. In the absence of optimal corporate governance mechanism, it is more operational to measure corporate governance risk from the perspective of the seriousness of deviation between the corporate governance mechanism and the interest maximization.From above theoretical analysis, we adopt a sample data from the year 2002 to 2007 of listed companies to do a empirical research on predicting governance risk based on the board of directors, and construct a model for predicting using a proxy variable to measure governance risk which is derived from Altman Z, after this, we use the data of year 2008 to test the effect of the model which indicate the model is reasonable. Then we use this model to predict the governance risk of all the listed companies of China in year 2008, the results are:first, there exists a phenomenon of passive compliance for the board of directors of listed companies in China, governance which derives from the motivation of their actual need is in short, so there exists a phenomenon of ceiling effect; second, for the mechanisms of the board of directors, director incentives, like directors remuneration, the proportion of receiving remuneration for directors, board ownership percentage, and behaviors, like the setting of Remuneration and Evaluation Committee and the Nomination Committee, board meetings frequency, all these affect governance risk significantly; third, the predicting model which include directors remuneration, the proportion of receiving remuneration for directors, board ownership percentage, the setting of Remuneration and Evaluation Committee, the setting of Nominating Committee, the number of board meetings, return on assets, total assets growth rate, debt-asset ratio can make a better judge on whether there has been a governance risk for listed companies; fourth, studying on the data of the year 2008 from China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange has shown that China’s listed companies are generally facing greater governance risk. Improving the mechanisms of the b of directors in order to avoid governance risk is a realistic choice.The innovations maybe:first, we define the governance risk based on the perspective of principal-agent relationship, and clarify the generation mechanism of governance risk; second, construct a predicting model to predict the governance risk based on the board of directors; moreover, we test the effectiveness of the board governance mechanisms from the view of governance risk and provide a new perspective for rational construction of the board of directors. However, in the case of data are available, more indicators can be further used to build a comprehensive risk index to measure the governance risk and do researches on predicting the governance risk based on the board of directors.更多还原