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地区性行政垄断对区域产业竞争力的影响分析

Analysis of Local Administrative Monopoly’s Influence on Local Industrial Competitiveness

【作者】 李丽

【导师】 于良春;

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 , 国民经济学, 2010, 硕士

【摘要】 行政性垄断是我国转轨经济时期主要的垄断现象,包括行业性行政垄断和地区性行政垄断两种。行业行政垄断主要是指政府对一些具有网络经济和规模经济效应的行业的行政干预,如电力、石油、铁路等行业;地区性行政垄断是指地方政府运用行政权利对市场竞争的限制和排斥,其根本的表现形式是地方政府凭借行政权力对市场资源配置进行直接的干预甚至替代。由此可见,地区行政垄断对内主要表现为替代市场进行资源配置和产业决策,对外则表现为地方保护主义,阻碍商品和要素在全国范围内的自由流动,削弱市场机制优化资源配置的有效性,其必然结果是带来资源配置的扭曲、社会福利的损失、财富分配不均以及市场分割等。产业是联系国家宏观层次与微观企业主体间的中观概念,而区域经济发展的过程实质上就是区域产业竞争力形成、发展和提升的过程,因此,分析地区性行政垄断问题,对区域产业竞争力的研究是必不可少的一环。本文首先对地区性行政垄断和产业竞争力的现有研究成果分别做了分析、整理,在此基础上借鉴钻石模型与金碚产业竞争力分析模型,提出了一个地区行政正垄断影响区域产业竞争力的传导机制模型,将地区性行政垄断做为政府条件中的行为因素,加入到模型当中,分别从对要素条件、需求条件、支持和相关产业条件、产业组织条件四个方面,详细分析了地区性行政垄断对区域产业竞争力的影响机理。为验证模型的正确性,笔者尝试构建了一个衡量区域产业竞争力水平的三级指标体系,结合课题组的对地区性行政垄断程度测算的研究成果,运用最小二乘法对2000-2006年28个省份竞争力指数和行政垄断程度指数的混合面板数据进行了简单回归分析,结果显示,地区性行政垄断程度上升1个单位,地区竞争力将下降0.71个单位,符合理论预期。实证说明地区性行政垄断对区域产业竞争力有明显较强的负的影响力,那么反过来说,打破地区性行政垄断,将会极大的促进区域产业竞争力的发展。但地区性行政垄断的形成也并非朝夕之事,要想消除这一现象,也必须追本溯源,标本兼治。结合它的形成根源,笔者给出几条建议:首先必须转变政府职能,退出相关市场,转向公共服务领域;其次要深化财税体制改革,并在此基础上建立区域协商合作机制;第三是要改革地方政府的考核机制,降低采取地区行政垄断行为的动力;最后是建立有效的法律约束机制,保证上述措施的实施效果。

【Abstract】 Administrative monopoly is a special phenomenon occurring in the transition economy. According to the scope of the effect, it can be sorted as two types:industrial administrative monopoly and local administrative monopoly. Industrial administrative monopoly mainly refers to the government’s administrative intervention against the industries with network economic effects and economies of scale effects, such as electricity, petroleum and railways; Local administrative monopoly happens when local governments interfere in a damaging way with the normal operation of the market competition mechanism. And it acts mainly as governments’direct intervention to the resource allocation. To specify, local administrative monopoly leads to inter-province resource allocation inefficiency by replacing the invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of the governments, it also increases the transaction cost of the resource movement across provinces the inevitable results of which are market segmentation, social welfare loss and uneven wealth distribution.The development of the regional economy depends on the formation and the development of the regional industrial competiveness to which one of the most important determinants is local administrative monopoly.This article first gives a review on local administrative monopoly and industrial competitiveness, then establishes a model based on Porter’s " Diamond model " and Jinbei’s industrial competitiveness model explaining the relationship between local protectionism and regional industrial competitiveness. Specifically, we introduce the local administrative monopoly into our model and make a detailed analysis on how the local administrative monopoly impacts regional industrial competitiveness from the following four angles, i.e. factor conditions, demand conditions, supporting conditions of related industries, and industry conditions. To verify the theoretical model, we have conducted a simple regression analysis with a panel data. As a conclusion, if the degree of local administrative monopoly goes up by one unit, regional competitiveness will decrease by 0.71 units, which ensure the former expectation.Empirical result indicates that local administrative monopoly has significantly negative effects on regional industrial competitiveness, so breaking up local administrative monopoly will greatly improve the regional industrial competitiveness. However, the local administrative monopoly is not created overnight. To eliminate this phenomenon, there is a long way to go. According to the root of this phenomenon, we give the following suggestions. First, transform the government functions from intervention in the market to public service; Second, deepen fiscal and tax reform in order to establish the regional consultation and cooperation mechanisms; Third, reform the local government assessment system to reduce local governments’incentives of adopting local administrative monopoly behavior; And finally, establish an effective binding mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of these measures.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 山东大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2010年 09期
  • 【分类号】F127;F203
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】157
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