【作者】 王万州；

【导师】 陈威；

【作者基本信息】 重庆理工大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 大量研究表明,并不是所有国家的股权都是分散的,相当部分国家的股权是相对集中甚至是高度集中的,集中的股权结构容易导致控股股东利用控制权侵害中小股东的利益,上市公司控股股东的隧道行为损害了中小股东的利益,不利于上市公司的发展,甚至严重阻碍资本市场的健康发展。我国上市公司普遍存在“一股独大”的现象,因此控股股东通过直接占用上市公司资金、关联方交易等“挖掘隧道”的方式损害中小股东的利益,侵占上市公司利益,阻碍我国金融市场的发展。本文首先从德棉股份和九发股份违规的例子引出:虽然上市公司隧道行为的环境有所改善,但是我国上市公司控股股东的隧道行为仍然存在。其次,本文在对国内外相关文献研究的基础上,结合我国隧道行为环境的变化,总结前人研究的不足,并指出本文的研究方向。再次,本文对隧道行为的形成机制、国有上市公司与非国有上市公司在隧道行为程度上的不同之处、隧道行为的方式以及隧道行为产生的危害进行理论分析。最后,本文选择08年我国A股上市公司样本,剔除不存在隧道行为的整体上市样本、可能会利用关联方交易对上市公司进行支撑的ST样本、可能会利用关联方交易进行盈余管理的样本,再将样本分为国有和非国有进行比较研究。选择关联方交易作为隧道行为的替代变量分析第一大股东持股比例、控制权与现金流权的分离、股权制衡、机构投资者、流通股比例、独立董事比例对隧道行为的影响。本文研究发现:在我国隧道行为的方式有了一定的变化;在影响因素上,第一大股东持股比例与两权分离度致使我国存在严重的隧道行为,股权制衡与流通股比例对隧道行为起到很好的制衡作用,机构投资者起到了一定的制衡作用,独立董事比例没有对隧道行为起到制衡作用;第一大股东持股比例过高、股权制衡较弱以及两权分离对国有上市公司的影响过大致使国有上市公司存在严重的隧道行为。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the research, we found that not all the countries’shares are dispersed, a considerable part of the country’s shares is relatively concentrated or highly concentrated, concentrated shares lead to controlling shareholders use control right to infract the interests of small shareholders, the tunneling activities not only undermine the interests of small shareholders, as well as damage the development of listed companies, or even impediment to the healthy of capital markets. The phenomenon of“only one big share”is very popular in China. therefore, the controlling shareholder of listed companies through direct occupation of funds, related party transactions and other "tunneling" approach to occupation listed company’s interests and harm the interests of small shareholders, impede China’s financial markets.Firstly, this paper take example of two list companies whose capital was occupied by the controlling shareholders get: Although the tunneling environment has changed, but the controlling shareholders of listed companies’tunneling activities still exists in China.Secondly, this paper obtains predecessors’shortage on the study of literature at home and abroad, and based on the changed environment of the tunneling activities.Again, this paper analysis the formation mechanism of the tunneling activities, the differences between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies in the tunneling activities, the quomodo of tunneling activities and the harm of tunneling activities.Finally, this paper distinguish between samples, excluding the holistic listed company samples, excluding the ST samples that controlling shareholders may use related party transactions to supported ,and excluding the samples that controlling shareholders may use related party transactions to do some earnings management, and then divide the sample into state-owned and non-state to do comparative study. This paper choice related party transactions as substitute variables for tunneling activities, choice the proportion of largest shareholder, the resolution between control rights and cash flow, equity restriction ratio, institutional investors, the proportion of circulation stock, the proportion of independent directors on board of directors. Through this paper we found that: our country’s tunneling behavior has changed in a certain way; in influencing factors, the first shareholding ratio and separation of ownership lead to the serious tunneling, equity restriction and the proportion of circulation stock restrain the tunneling, institutional investors play a limited role on tunneling, the proportion of independent directors does not play a role on tunneling, the high proportion of largest shareholder, the weak equity restriction and the excess influence of separation of two rights lead to state-owned listed company’s serious tunneling.更多还原