【作者】 艾叶；

【导师】 饶晓秋；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 股权分置改革是我国证券市场发展进程中一次重大制度性变革。股权分置问题的解决,克服了我国证券市场原先存在的同股不同权的缺陷,使得大股东利益侵占行为的制度性基础得到较大削弱,有助于公司治理的逐渐完善。但也须认识到,股权分置问题的解决不会立刻消除各种市场顽疾,特别是大股东与中小股东利益之间的矛盾和冲突。后股权分置时代,大股东获利方式发生转变,其必然导致其利益侵占行为方式发生转变。因此,对后股权分置时期大股东侵害行为做出理论分析并预测其动向,以及提出相关的防范措施,无疑具有重要的现实意义。本文是在引用前人大量的实证研究结论及调查数据的基础上,遵循规范研究的方法展开论述的。文章梳理了国内外学者关于大股东利益侵占行为的研究成果,并进行了评价。在对股权分置前后大股东利益侵占的现状进行分析的基础上,借鉴西方国家的经验,对我国后股权分置时代防止大股东利益侵占行为提出了自己的建议。全文除引言和结束语外,共分为四部分。在引言中,主要阐述研究背景、研究目的及意义、文献综述、研究方法与研究思路以及本文的框架结构。正文为一至四部分,其中,第一部分为后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占的基本理论概述,包括基本概念界定、理论基础、大股东利益侵占行为的危害、股权分置改革前大股东利益侵占的实施途径、后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占行为的特点。通过学习前人的研究成果,该部分界定了后股权分置时代、大股东、中小股东、利益侵占的概念,从产权理论和委托代理理论的角度解释了大股东的利益侵占行为。大股东利益侵占行为严重侵害中小股东利益,降低上市公司资产质量,损伤上市公司盈利能力,增加上市公司财务风险,妨碍资本市场健康发展。文章简单列举了股权分置改革前大股东利益侵占行为的实施途径,大股东往往通过非公平关联交易、资金占用、股利政策、股权再融资等手段实现侵占中小股东利益的目的。为了形成对比,论文总结出后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占行为的新特点:部分侵占性、隐蔽性、可循环性。第二部分为后股权分置时代上市公司大股东侵占行为的现状分析,包括国家政府约束上市公司大股东侵占行为的有关情况简介、后股权分置时代大股东尚存在利益侵占行为及其原因分析。政府部门在法律层面、监管层面、公司治理层面都采取了相关措施来防范大股东利益侵占行为,也取得了一定成绩。但是,后股权分置时代仍存在大股东利益侵占行为,并变为较过去更为隐藏的新形式,包括违规信息披露、减持股份过程中操纵股价、违规短线交易、与高管合谋、关联交易非关联化等。针对这种现象,本文从内部和外部两方面进行了原因分析。从内因来看,大股东仍保留控制权优势是其利益侵占行为发生的根源;从外因来看,中小投资者保护法有待完善,我国证券监管体系也明显存在缺陷。第三部分为美日德三国约束大股东利益侵占行为措施的经验借鉴。通过分析美日德上市公司约束大股东侵占行为措施的经验,本文发现,三国都十分重视内部股权制衡机制,内部监督主体的独立性和中小投资者利益保护,三国的防范措施也是围绕这三个方面展开的。第四部分为完善大股东利益侵占行为监管的建议。随着股权分置改革的推进和资本市场的完善,我国畸形的股权结构将会得到改善,逐步建立起全流通条件下的股票市场,股票的全流通和多样化的持股主体有利于形成制衡型的内部治理机制,在一定程度上抑制大股东利益侵占行为。但是,只有制衡型内部治理机制并不能够完全制止大股东侵占行为,同时,还需要设计相关的外部监管机制。证监会应该将监管定位在大股东行为监管、中小股东权益保护、上市公司信息披露和违规处罚上来,同时加强资本市场和社会监督的力量,建立起全方位、多层次的监管体系,以保上市公司运行规范化和高效化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Shareholder Structure Reform is a major system-breakthrough of securities market in China. It overcomes pre-exiting defects of securities market-the same shares having different rights in China, weakens the base on which big shareholders practices benefit expropriation, and contributes to the improvement of corporate governance. Meanwhile, Shareholder Structure Reform does not eliminate market’s ills immediately. For example, the conflict between big shareholders and medium and small shareholders still exists in securities market in China. In the background of post-non-tradable share period, changes in the way big shareholders profits will inevitably lead to changes in the way of benefit expropriation behaviors of big shareholders. Therefore, it is undoubtedly of great significance that we should do a reasonable analysis and take some measures to prevent big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors.In reference to a large number of previous scholars’ logical positive findings and data, this paper follows normative approach to launch the elaboration. The paper combeds domestic and foreign scholars’ research findings about big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors at the present stage, and has carried on the appraisal. On the base of analyzing current situations of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, learning from hesperian experience, the paper puts forwards suggestions to prevent big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors.Besides the introduction and the concluding remarks, the paper falls into four parts. The introduction briefly introduces the research background, purpose and significance, document summary, researc approach and idea, and content framework. The text has four parts. The first part is the general introduction to the theories of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, including definition of main related concepts, theoretical foundation, the forms of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors before Shareholder Structure Reform, the new features of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, and the harm of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors. Through studying previous scholars’ research results, the paper defines the related main concepts (post-non-tradable share period, big shareholders, medium and small shareholders, benefit expropriation), and generalizes theoretical foundation of expropriation of big shareholders (property right theory, principal-agent theory). It’s proved that big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors expropriates the interest of medium and small shareholders, impairs assets quality of listed companies, damages the profitability of listed companies, increases the financial risks of listed companies, and hampers the development of securities market in China. Then the paper simply lists the methods of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors before Shareholder Structure Reform. Big shareholders often use non-fair related-party transactions, occupation of funds, dividend policy, and equity refinancing to expropriate medium and small shareholders’ interest. In order to make a contract, the paper concludes the new features of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors: partial expropriation, concealment and circulation.The second part is the analysis of current situations of big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, including introduction of measures taken by the government, the forms of big shareholders’ benefit expropiration behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, and the causes analysis of big shareholders’ benefit expropiration behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period. The government departments have taken many measures to prevent big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors in law aspects, supervision aspects and corporate governance aspects. Certain achievements have been made. Therefore, big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors still exist in the background of post-non-tradable share period and may change to more hidden forms, including violating disclosure, manipulating price in decreasing shareholding, using short-swing trading, colluding with executives, using related party transactions in a non-associated form. According to these phenomena, both internal and external reasons are analyzed in the paper. From the internal perspective, big shareholders’ control superiority is the root that causes big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors. From the external perspective, protection of medium and small investors needs to be improved, and moreover, there are obvious deficiencies in securities supervision system in China.The third part is the experience reference of measures taken to prevent big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors in American, German and Japan. Through the analysis, it’s proved that a check and balance governance mechanism, independence of the internal supervisor, and interest protection of medium and small shareholders are very efficient to prevent big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors.The fourth part is the suggestions to perfect supervision on big shreholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors. With advancement of Shareholder Structure Reform and completion of securities market, the abnormal equity structure will be improved; fully circulating stock market will be established. Circulation of all stocks and diversification of shareholders contribute to the establishment of a check and balance governance mechanism. However, only a check and balance governance mechanism is not able to prevent big shareholders’ benefit expropriation behaviors, but also it is necessary to design the related external supervisory mechanism. In order to set up a comprehensive and multi-level supervision system for ensuring standardization and efficient operation of listed companies, Securities Supervisory Association should lay stress on supervision of big shareholders’ behaviors, protection of medium and small shareholders’ rights and interests, information disclosure of listed companies and non-compliance penalties, and strengthening supervision power of securities market and society.更多还原