基于监管者声誉视角的银行业监管有效性研究

【作者】 张群；

【导师】 刘江会；

【作者基本信息】 上海师范大学 ， 政治经济学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 银行监管作为一种公共产品和公共服务,既承担着维系银行业安全的重任,也关系到广大存款人的合法利益。本文首先从市场失灵的角度回答了银行业为什么需要监管的问题;接着对监管者声誉与有效银行监管的一般理论进行了分析,研究了监管者声誉可以有效解决由监管者目标函数与公共利益不一致和监管信息约束所引起的监管失灵,揭示了监管者为什么需要声誉;然后根据银行业的监管从三个方面分析了监管者声誉如何影响被监管银行的行为和监管有效性,即市场准入监管、银行业业务运营监管和市场退出监管。在以上分析基础上,论文针对中国银行业监管的情况分析了影响监管者声誉的主要约束因素,并结合中国金融监管的现有框架和中国资本市场的发展特点,提出对应的政策建议以提高监管者声誉和监管有效性。论文共分为五章。第一章为绪论。这一章简要介绍了论文选题的背景和意义,文章的研究思路和基本框架,列出了研究方法,同时指出了文章的创新点及不足之处。第二章是分析银行业为什么需要监管。本章首先解释了银行监管的基本概念,然后分别从市场失灵的四个方面讨论了监管存在的必要性和重要性。不完全竞争所导致的高贷款利率,信息不对称会带来逆向选择和道德风险,外部性引发银行挤兑并蔓延,以及金融体系对整个社会经济具有明显的公共产品特性。因此,对银行业实行监管是必要的。第三章对监管者声誉与有效银行监管的一般理论进行了分析。文章首先介绍声誉机制的基本理论,应用交易费用理论和信息经济学的理论知识,并结合博弈论的工具论述了声誉的产生机制、功能和特性;接着分析了有效银行业监管的问题;最后介绍了一个监管者声誉的博弈模型,并且从中探究监管者声誉与银行业监管有效性的关系。模型指出:银行的声誉水平、监管者声誉水平对银行隐蔽行为的约束作用正相关。因此,提高银行声誉可以达到强化银行自我约束从而实现有效约束的目的;监管者树立严格监管声誉有利于声誉约束的实现。第四章分析了监管者声誉对被监管银行行为以及监管有效性的影响。从市场准入监管、银行业业务运营监管和市场退出监管三个方面,我们探讨了监管者声誉如何发挥作用,分别从监管者信誉的溢出效应对市场准入监管的影响,监管者信誉和银行声誉对于银行行为的约束,以及基于声誉维护的银行救助对市场退出监管的影响,再现了声誉的三大功能。第五章是根据中国银行业监管的情况分析了影响监管者声誉的主要约束因素,并结合中国金融监管的现有框架和中国资本市场的发展特点,提出了对应的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a public goods and public services, banking supervision not only bears the responsibility to maintain banking safety, but also affects the legitimate interests of depositors. This paper answers the problem why we need to regulate the banking sector firstly, from the perspective of market failure. Then the paper analyses the general theory of the regulator’s reputation and effective banking supervision, find out that the reputation of the regulator can effectively resolve the regulatory failure problem, which were caused by the regulatory information constraints and the different regulatory objective function from public interest. According to the function of the regulator reputation, the paper analyzed how the reputation affects the conduct of banking and the regulation effectiveness. At the basis of the above analysis, also the characteristics of China’s banking sector, the last part of the paper tries to find out main constraints on the regulator reputation and make policy recommendations, in order to enhance the reputation of regulators and regulatory effectiveness.From the view of structure, this paper has five parts as following.The chapter one is the Introduction of the paper. It includes the background, value, originality and research method of the essay, and sums up the basic framework, at last this part points out innovation and the lack of the paper.In the chapter two, we study why we need to regulate the banking sector. Firstly, we explain the concept of banking supervision. Secondly, we discuss four aspects of market failure, and conclude the necessity and importance of banking supervision.The chapter three is the general theory of the regulator’s reputation and effective banking supervision. Applying information theory and transaction cost theory, also the game tool, we study the emergence mechanisms, functions and features of reputation. In a game model, we discuss the relationship between regulator reputation and effectiveness of banking supervision. The level of the bank’s reputation and the regulator reputation, can constrain the bank conduct.The chapter four analyzes how the reputation affects the conduct of banking and the regulation effectiveness. The spill effect of the regulator reputation does an impact on the banking market access. While on the market exit, the regulator should put the attention on the reputation maintain. The regulator reputation can reduce the banks’ opportunism and Wrongful act. Through the theory analysis of this part, we conclude the enlightenment about function mechanism of the regulator reputation.The chapter five studies the regulator reputation on the China’s banking system. At the basis of the above analysis, also the characteristics of China’s banking sector, the last part of the paper tries to find out main constraints on the regulator reputation and make policy recommendations, in order to enhance the reputation of regulators and regulatory effectiveness.更多还原