【作者】 史晓芳；

【导师】 任曙明；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 金融学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 团体贷款作为一种独特的小额信贷模式,在还款率方面取得了巨大成功,从而引起了世界各国的注意。现今,无论是发展中国家,还是发达国家都竞相引入这一贷款方式,以解决国内低收入群体的信贷难题。然而,在移植学习团体贷款时,并非每个国家都能获得成功,甚至有些国家和地区的团体贷款最终走向了失败。那么,其原因何在呢?本文认为这主要是因为有些国家的小额信贷机构在开展团体贷款的过程中,未能抓住影响其还款率的核心要素——社会资本。因此,有必要对社会资本是如何影响团体贷款还款率进行系统深入的研究,以给我国成功推广团体贷款提供指导。由此,本文从社会资本角度入手,在分析社会资本影响团体贷款还款率作用机理的基础上,构建了引入社会资本的团体贷款博弈模型,丰富了现有关于团体贷款的研究。首先本文分析了社会资本对团体贷款还款率的影响机理,发现社会资本可以通过信息共享机制、横向监督机制及社会奖惩机制促进团体贷款还款率的提高;随后本文构建了两个博弈模型——小额信贷机构与小组间的博弈、小组借款者之间的还款博弈,并将来自小组外部的社会惩罚、社会奖励及违约者的再偿还约束引入模型,进一步说明了社会资本影响团体贷款还款率的内在作用机理,同时还用实际中的案例加以验证;最后本文得出结论,认为社会资本能够通过社会惩罚(包括小组内部的及来自小组外部的)、社会奖励及违约者的再偿还约束来激励借款者还款,从而提高团体贷款的还款率。鉴于社会资本在提高团体贷款还款率中的积极意义,本文认为我国在移植学习团体贷款时,要对社会资本给予足够的重视,尽可能创造一切条件使其在提高团体贷款还款率中的作用得以充分发挥,从而保证移植学习的成功,进而达到改善低收入群体信贷难题的终极目标。更多还原

【Abstract】 Group lending is a unique micro-credit model. It has aroused the attention of the world because of its higher repayment rate. Recently almost all of the countries in the world are rushing to introduce the loan model in order to solve the credit problems of domestic low-income groups. However, not every country was able to be successful during the transplantation of group lending. Even in some countries and regions the group lending had ultimately failed. Well what’s the reason on earth? This paper argued that it was mainly because the MIFs in these countries couldn’t capture the social capital in the process of developing group lending, which is the key factor in the group lending. So it is essential to study how the social capital affects the repayment rate in the group lending. This will give some guidance for the extension of the group lending in our country.Thus, from the perspective of social capital, this article analyzed the impact mechanism of social capital on the repayment rate of group lending. And then we built the game models of group lending with the introduction of social capital. The study enriched the existing research on group lending. Firstly, this paper analyzed the social capital’s influence mechanism on the group lending’s repayment rate. We found that the social capital could improve the repayment rate of group lending through information-sharing mechanism, horizontal-monitoring mechanism and social incentives and sanctions mechanism. Then we constructed two game models which were the model between MFI and lending group and the repayment game model between Borrows in the Group Lending. In the models we introduced the external social penalty out of the group, social incentives and the defaulter’s re-pay restraint. The models further illustrated the intrinsic mechanism of social capital’s impact on the groups lending’s repayment rate. In addition we also used actual cases to verify the conclusions of the models. Finally, the paper concluded that the social capital could through social sanctions (including group internal and from outside groups), social incentives and the defaulter’s re-pay restraint to encourage borrowers to repay the group loan, thereby enhancing group lending’s repayment rate.In view of the fact that the positive significance of social capital in improving the group lending’s repayment rate, this paper pointed out that we must pay enough attention to the social capital when our country transplant and learn the group lending. We should create all conditions to make the social capital fully play its positive role in improving the group lending’s repayment rate as far as possible. So as to ensure the success of transplantation and learn, and then realizing the ultimate goal of improving the low-income groups’ credit difficult problems.更多还原