【作者】 赵军；

【导师】 李艳军；

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 种子作为农业生产资料中至关重要的一环,在我国农业生产领域占着十分重要的地位。我国进入WTO后,国外种业巨头纷纷涌入我国种子市场,与国内种子企业在品种、市场、渠道等方面展开激烈竞争,未来种子行业的竞争将是种子品质和种子营销渠道的竞争。然而目前我国种子企业在设计与管理营销渠道时,基本上是生搬硬套其它行业的经验,很少考虑种子营销渠道的特殊性与复杂性,出现了渠道冲突严重、渠道忠诚低下等问题,落后的营销渠道已严重影响了我国种子企业的生存和发展。本研究主要研究种子在流通过程中所涉及的渠道参与方之间的关系,为建立更加高效的种子营销渠道提供依据。种子营销渠道的顺畅发展对农产品价格及流通体制都会起到促进作用。根据国外的研究总结发现,对营销渠道的研究主要集中在三个领域:营销渠道的结构及建设、营销渠道行为及营销渠道关系管理。在国内,根据现有文献,对种业营销渠道的研究多集中在渠道结构和建设方面的研究。实际上,目前国内的种子营销渠道中依然存在诸多问题,比如种子经销商的窜货行为,种子生产商联盟松散,生产商与经销商、甚至经销商与农户之间冲突严重等,这些问题直接或间接地阻碍了种子营销渠道的建设。因此研究种子营销渠道行为,分析渠道各参与方之间处理冲突,使用权力以及加强合作问题有一定迫切性。本研究通过文献阅读,在系统地分析和整理渠道研究相关理论后,得出适用于种子营销渠道的结构方程模型——“渠道行为模型”,将其应用于以种子经销商为分析对象的渠道行为问题的探讨,不仅完善了对种子营销渠道的理论研究,更能对种子营销渠道改进提供指导意见。本研究结合国内种子营销渠道最新现状,及实证调查数据对“渠道行为模型”进行分析。结论显示:①种子经销商在渠道中与上游的冲突会降低其对渠道的满意度,而生产商和经销商之间愉快的合作则可以加强彼此之间的满意度;②种子经销商对上游生产商的依赖越强则彼此之间产生冲突的可能性越小,进而有更大合作的可能性。同时渠道生产商合理使用非强制性权力时会增加彼此合作的可能性和减少冲突的发生,而如果应用强制性权力不当时则会对双方合作产生负面影响;③冲突与合作之间有显著的负向关系,即冲突越高,合作的可能性就越低;④渠道上游生产商的强制性权力对渠道冲突没有多少影响。此四个结论是“渠道行为模型”在国内种子营销渠道应用的反映,对种子经销商和生产商之间如何处理冲突,生产上如何应用自己的权力来增加彼此合作的稳定性等问题提出了一些建议,正契合了本文研究的目的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Seed is an important link in the agricultural production materials, which plays a very important role in our agricultural production. With the entry of overseas seed industry companies into our country’s seed market, the competition between overseas seed industrial companies and domestic ones lies in the seed variety, market, marketing channel etc. The future seed industry’s competition will be centralized on seed quality and seed marketing channel. However, our country’s seed enterprises are prone to duplicate other industry’s experiences and give little attention to the particularity and complexity of seed marketing channel when designing and managing marketing channels which results in serious channel conflicts, low channel loyalty and so on. All these problems have dramatically impacted our country seed enterprise’s survival and the development.This dissertation mainly researches the relationship among the channel participants in the circulation process with an aim to provide a solid base for constructing more effective seed marketing channel. The smoothing development of seed marketing channel will be conducive to price and circulation mechanism of farm produce. Based on overseas studies, the writer discovers that the researches mainly centers on three fields: channel structure and construction, channel behavior, channel relationship management While in China, the researches mainly focuses on the channel structure and construction. As a matter of fact, there are still many problems existed in domestic seed marketing channel at present namely, fleeing good behaviors, unconsolidated seed producer alliance, serious conflicts between producers and dealers, even dealers and farmers etc. The problems directly or indirectly impeded the seed marketing channels construction. Therefore, studying the seed marketing channel behaviors, analyzing conflicts among the channel participants, using the channel power effectively, tightening the cooperation are become more and more urgent.Through reviewing literature and analyzing the correlative channel theories systematically, the writer designed the structural equation model for the seed marketing channel: channel behavior model. Then the writer applies the model to the discussion of seed channel behaviors of seed dealers which not only reinforce the theoretical research but also provide some advances for the improvement of seed marketing channels.This research uses the newest situation of the domestic seed marketing channel and the empirical data to analyze "The Channel Behavior Model" and obtain following conclusions: Firstly, the seed dealer will be less satisfied when it has conflicts with the producer in the seed marketing channel while the effective cooperation between seed dealers and producers will reinforce mutual satisfaction. Secondly, the dealer’s more dependency on seed dealers on producers, the less likely they will have conflicts which means they may have cooperation; the usage of non- coercive power by the seed producers will increase their chance in cooperation and reduce their chance in conflicts ,while the misusage of such power might hinder their cooperation.Thirdly, there is a remarkable negative relation between the conflict and the cooperation; higher conflicts could bring on low-level cooperation. Fourthly, the coercive power of the seed producer has no remarkable effects on channel conflicts.These four conclusions are the reflection of application of "The Channel Behavior Model" and provide some suggestions for dealing with conflicts between seed dealers and seed producers; seed producers’ exercise their power to reinforce mutual cooperation to promote stable cooperation, which is the purpose of this research.更多还原